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ABSTRACT: The thesis examines the worry that celebrated developments in Anglophone 
philosophy that fall under the labels ‘semantic externalism’, ‘content externalism’, ‘anti-
individualism’, etc. are incompatible with a purported long-held notion regarding self-
knowledge. The thesis examines the worry that the developments that fall under the labels 
‘semantic externalism’, etc. may be incompatible with the notion that we know a priori what the 
content of our thoughts are. Although the thesis finds that the most prominent arguments for 
such incompatibility in the existing philosophical literature prove to be unconvincing, it does 
present an original argument for such incompatibility, and does treat the prospect of such 
incompatibility as a live possibility. The thesis argues that although the developments may 
indeed be incompatible with the notion that we know a priori what the content of our thoughts 
are, that need not also mean that they will be incompatible with the notion that we have a 
privileged epistemic access to the content of our own thoughts. The thesis suggests that what 
has motivated the worry is a conflation of those two things. It seems to be incontrovertible that 
we have a privileged epistemic access to the content of our own thoughts. It need not, however, 
seem as incontrovertible that we must be able to know a priori what the content of our own 
thoughts are. It is more feasible to reject the latter notion, and – the thesis ventures – we can do 
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0.0: What Keeps Me Awake at Night? 
 
Thoughts are strange. They are insubstantial, formless things that hardly seem to be there at all. Yet, 
they are things that we are very much aware of having; they are a constant and incessant feature of our 
waking lives. Our awareness of our thoughts constitutes one of the most humdrum aspects of human 
experience. But it also, paradoxically, seems to constitute one of the most profound mysteries.  
I lie awake at night. The lights are out. There are no audible noises. My senses are almost 
entirely deprived of any stimulus. But I cannot sleep. My thoughts will not allow me. I am being 
viciously and mercilessly harangued. Thoughts about the regrettable events of the preceding day keep 
fizzing up and forcing themselves before my conscious mind, precluding any chance of sleep. What I 
am experiencing here is not really something that I am experiencing. These thoughts that I cannot rid 
myself of produce no experiential phenomenology. There is no distinctive what it is like to think 
them.1 Yet I am being kept awake nonetheless.        
 There are certain claims that are standardly made regarding the nature of our awareness of our 
thoughts.  
 One such claim is that a subject is able to know a priori what it is she is thinking. A subject 
should be able to know a priori what the content of her thoughts are. A subject should be able to judge 
correctly what she is thinking without investigating the world around her, without such judgements 
having what the subject’s senses as part of their justificatory basis. When I am suffering my nocturnal 
torment, I may be judging that I should not have done a certain thing. As part of making that 
judgement I may make judgements about the consequences of that regrettable action. For instance, I 
 
1 Or at least arguably there isn’t – see below §0.3. 
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
8 
 
may remember the hurt look on the face of a close personal acquaintance, and thus judge that my 
relations with that acquaintance will forever be soured. Such a judgement will be a posteriori, and 
thus not a priori. Thus, if I judge, based on that, that I should not have done what it is I have done, 
then that judgement would not be a priori. However, this should not be the case when it comes to my 
second order judgement that I am thinking about how I should not have done that regrettable thing. 
This second order judgment should not, in any way, hinge on judgements that I’ve made about the 
external world.  
 There is a worry (Boghossian, 1989; 1998; McKinsey, 1991; Brown, 1995) that has sparked 
substantial debate – much of which features in this thesis (e.g. Brown, 2004; Korman, 2006; 
McLaughlin and Tye, 1998a; Warfield, 1992)2. The worry is that this claim may be incompatible with 
certain celebrated developments in Anglophone philosophy instigated, mostly circa 1970s, by Kripke, 
Putnam, Burge, et al (Kripke, 1982; Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979; Kaplan, 1989; Salmon, 1982; et al) 
that fall under the labels ‘content externalism’, ‘semantic externalism’, and ‘anti-individualism’. It is 
thought that if this is the case then that constitutes a grave problem for those developments. If the 
developments are incompatible with this first claim, then it must either be the case that the claim is 
false or that the developments are false. It is supposed that it can’t be the case that the claim is false. 
Thus, if the developments are incompatible with the claim, then it must be the case that the 
developments are false. 
 There is also another claim that is standardly made regarding the nature of our awareness of 
our thoughts.  
This second claim concerns an epistemic asymmetry. The claim is that a subject is better able 
to judge what it is she is thinking, what the content of her thoughts are than anyone else could 
possibly be. There is an asymmetry with respect to the epistemic relationship a subject has with her 
thoughts and the epistemic relationships that a third party may have with that subject’s thoughts. We 
can observe the external behaviour of others and abduce what they might be thinking. But we can’t 
know what’s on their mind as well as we can know what is on our own mind. 
In this thesis, I assess whether the developments that fall under the labels ‘semantic 
externalism’, etc. and the first – a priori – claim are indeed incompatible. I also assess whether their 
being incompatible should be deemed problematic. I suggest that a conflation of the first – a priori – 
claim with the second – privilege – claim may be the root of the concern. The first – a priori – claim, I 
suggest, may not be as incontrovertible as the second – privilege – claim. Thus, although it may be the 
 
2 Also see Beebee, 2001; Brueckner, 1992; 2002; 2004; 2008; Falvey, 2000; Falvey and Owens, 1994; Gerken, 2008; 
Gibbons, 1996; Goldberg, 2003; 2015; Kallestrup, 2011; Lasonen-AArnio, 2006; Ludlow, 1997; McKinsey, 2007; 
McLaughlin and Tye, 1998a; 1998b; Noordhof, 2005;; Sawyer, 1998; Warfield, 1997; et al. And also see the anthologies: 




case that the developments that fall under the labels ‘content externalism’, etc. being incompatible 
with the second – privilege – claim could constitute a grave problem for those developments, their 
being incompatible with the first – a priori – claim possibly does not. If we cannot deny the second – 
privilege – claim, then we might be able to deny the first – a priori – claim, and we might be able to 
do so without denying the second – privilege – claim.       
 
0.1: Outline of Thesis 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. 
 In Chapter 1, I present a definition of what I shall call content externalism. I go on to 
characterise two prominent ways in which it is possible to be a content externalist.  
 In Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, I examine the debate that lasted from the late eighties (Davidson, 
1987; Burge, 1988; Boghossian, 1989) to the mid noughties (Brown, 2004; Korman, 2006; et al) over 
whether content externalism is compatible with the claim that we have an a priori access to the 
contents of our thoughts. There have been two major strands to this debate. The first strand has 
concerned what have become known as slow-switch cases. The second strand has concerned potential 
reductios that putatively demonstrate that if content externalism, or a given form of content 
externalism, is true, and if it is indeed the case that we have an a priori access to our thoughts, then 
absurd consequences would follow. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the first strand. Chapters 4 and 5 
consider the second.  
In Chapter 6, I present an original argument for the incompatibility of what I call Kripkean 
externalism and the claim that we have an a priori access to our own thoughts, which takes the form 
of a reductio argument similar to those considered in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 In Chapter 7, I consider how our having an a priori access to our thoughts may not be as 
incontrovertible as it has been made out to be. I sketch an account of the provenance of our thought 
self-ascriptions that builds on the observation that thoughts produce no phenomenology, and under 
which we’d have a privileged access to our thoughts that is not necessarily a priori.    
 All seven chapters are relatively self-contained and could potentially be read in any order. It 
is important to note, however, that the first two chapters are intended as an informal introduction to, 
and informal framework for, the five chapters that ensue.   
 
0.2: Two Omissions 
 
There are two significant topics in the literature that this present thesis does not touch upon. One is the 
bearing that slow-switch cases, as considered in Chapters 2 and 3, have on our understanding of 
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memory and ratiocination.3 The other is the bearing that Wright’s et al4 ideas on warrant transmission 
failure have on the reductio arguments considered in Chapters 4 and 5 (and also 6). These two 
omissions are largely due to considerations of space.5 (Indeed, a full exploration of either would 
warrant – no pun intended – an entire PhD thesis in itself!) Both topics might be brought to bear on 
the specific lines of argument pursued in this present thesis. But that is something that must wait until 
potential sequels.   
 
0.3: An Assumption About Thoughts and Phenomenology 
 
I make an assumption throughout the thesis that is particularly relevant in Chapters 2 and 7, and that 
some may deem controversial. For me it is self-evident that thoughts do not produce phenomenology 
in the way that perceptions and sensations do. I appreciate, however, that not all may agree. I 
appreciate that not all philosophers find it to be incontrovertible that thought produces no 
phenomenology (e.g. see Lormand, 1996; Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Pitt, 2004; and Tye and Wright, 
2011) 6. An unequivocal acceptance that thought produces no phenomenology is not strictly essential 
for the line of argument explored in Chapters 2 and 7. If thoughts having no phenomenology is taken 
as a given, then the account of thought self-ascription that I give in Chapter 7 can be viewed as an 
explanation of how it is that we self-ascribe thoughts given that thoughts produce no phenomenology, 
as well as demonstrating how we can have a privileged access to our thoughts without having an a 
priori access to our thoughts. If, on the other hand, the question of whether thoughts produce their 
own phenomenology is considered something that is up for debate, then my account can be viewed as 
 
3 Wright, 2003; 2003; 2011; Davies, 2003; Schiffer, 2005; et al. 
4 E.g. Tye, 1998. 
5 The omission of Wright et al also, along with some of the other directions that this thesis takes, stem in-part from a broad 
frustration with the discipline of epistemology as it has been practiced within analytic tradition philosophy. Epistemology 
concerns normative evaluations of our beliefs. Such evaluations necessitate examinations of the provenance of our beliefs, 
but the epistemologist does not view such examinations of provenance as ends in themselves. Why we believe what we 
believe about ourselves and the external world is possibly a more interesting question than whether we deserve a pat on the 
back for believing what we believe. I believe this might be especially true when it comes to the beliefs we form about 
ourselves. (It is only in Chapter 3 and in certain places towards the end of Chapter 5 (§5.24) where I, in order to assess the 
arguments of others, fully succumb to this tendency in epistemology.)    
An additional reason for the other omission is focus. The entire focus of the thesis is on how we, if content 
externalism is true, discern the content of our occurrent thoughts – how we discern what we are presently thinking. If it were 
to consider memory and ratiocination, then this focus would become diffused.      
6 Horgan and Tienson (2002) and Pitt (2004) put forward a phenomenology of thought thesis that holds that for each 
thinkable thought there is a distinct what it is like to think that thought that is experienced during each token of the thinking 
of that thought. Tye and Wright point out that such accounts “have overlooked one important point: in the relevant sense, 




an explanation of how it is that we self-ascribe thought if it is indeed (or were) the case that thoughts 
produce no phenomenology (as well as demonstrating how we can have a privileged access to our 
thoughts without needing an a priori access to our thoughts).  
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1.0: Introduction to Chapter 1 
 
In this first chapter I define what I call content externalism and explain why two prominent content 
externalists are content externalists. I give an account of the arguments for content externalism 
advanced by Burge and by Kripke.   
 Being sympathetic to either Burge or Kripke is not exhaustive of all the possible ways it is to 
be a content externalist. If one is a content externalist, then it is not necessarily the case that one is 
either a Burgean externalist or a Kripkean externalist. I focus on Burge and Kripke because they are 
two of the most prominent – if not the two most prominent – content externalists, and also because 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively concern reductio arguments that apply to Burgean externalism – or 
rather Brown’s interpretation of what Burgean externalism is – and Kripkean externalism specifically.  
 The aim of this chapter is not to assess the positions of Kripke and Burge. The aim rather is to 
give an accurate characterisation of the respective provenances of Burge’s and Kripke’s content 
externalism.  
 I end the chapter characterising what (I think) is a key difference between Burge and Kripke, 
which is that Burge holds that the contents of singular thoughts are not individuated by their object 
whereas Kripke essentially does.    
  
1.1: Definition of Content Externalism 
 
What we can call content externalism holds that thought content does not supervene on intrinsic 
properties. A content externalist holds that there could be two subjects that are (qualitatively) 
identical, but who are nevertheless thinking thoughts with different contents.  
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Two such subjects will be identical in terms of their physical parameters. They will be atom-
for-atom duplicates of each other, and they will have been throughout their entire respective life 
histories. Every chemical reaction that has taken place within the body of subject A (let’s call her) 
will also have taken place in the body of her twin subject B (let’s call her) and will have done so in a 
way that mimics exactly the way in which it has in A’s body, and vice-versa. Every neural firing that 
has taken place in the brain of A, will also have taken place in the brain of B, and will have done so in 
a way that mimics exactly the way in which it has occurred in the brain of A, and vice-versa.  
The two subjects will also have experienced all the same phenomenology. Every event that 
has taken place in A’s conscious life that has a distinctive phenomenology will have taken place in 
B’s conscious life also. Every itch, every pain, etc. that A has experienced in her entire life history, B 
will also have experienced, and all what B will have experienced will have had a phenomenological 
character that is indistinguishable from what A has experienced, and vice-versa.  
There will be some difference in the subjects’ respective external environments, which the 
subjects will not be cognizant of. That difference will be why the subjects will be thinking thoughts 
with different contents.   
 Content externalism holds that thought is relational. The content externalist contends that a 
subject’s cognitive act of thinking certain thoughts is constituted by her being, during the moment of 
her cognitive act, in relations or complexes of relations with things that are in her external 
environment. 
 What I call Kripkean externalism holds that a subject’s thinking certain thoughts about a 
particular external object or individual is constituted by her being in a 2-way relation with that 
external object or individual.  
 What I call Burgean externalism holds that a subject’s thinking certain thoughts is constituted 
by her being in a complex of relations with both her environment and her socio-linguistic community. 
 The focus of this thesis is on the content of what one is presently thinking, and the epistemic 
relationship one has with that content. Thus, I couch my definition of content externalism in terms of 
thought content. It will, of course, apply in obvious ways to the content of propositional attitudes as 
well.  
 The reverse is also true. When talking of content externalism, although the points being made 
may be couched in terms of the content of propositional attitudes, those points often will apply, in 
obvious ways, to the content of occurrent thought. There will often, but (possibly) not always, be an 





1.2: Burgean Externalism7 
 
1.21: Ascription and Oblique Occurrence: Burge’s Framework  
 
Burge derives his brand of content externalism from an assumption that is practically tautological. 
This is what (I think) makes Burge’s arguments compelling.  
The assumption, basically, is that if it would be deemed correct to ascribe to someone a 
thought or attitude with some content, then it will be the case that that person harbours that attitude or 
is thinking that thought.  
Suppose that it can be said truthfully that: ‘John believes that Paris is the capital of France, 
and John also believes that Montevideo is the capital of Uruguay’. What this will entail, according to 
the assumption is that John harbours two beliefs with distinct contents. It will be the case that John 
believes that Paris is the capital of France – that he harbours a belief that has the content ‘Paris is the 
capital of France’ – and that he believes that Montevideo is the capital of Uruguay – he harbours a 
belief with the content ‘Montevideo is the capital of Uruguay’. 
More specifically and accurately, Burge’s assumption is that the content of a subject’s 
propositional attitudes corresponds to the ‘that’-clauses of what would be veridical propositional 
attitude ascriptions in which referring expressions occur obliquely:  
 
…obliquely occurring expressions in content clauses are a primary means of identifying a 
person’s intentional mental states or events. 
(Burge, 1979, p.76) 
 
An attitude content is the semantic value associated with oblique occurrences of 
expressions in attributions of propositional attitudes. 
(Burge, 1982, p.81, fn. 2)8 
 
…it is expressions in oblique occurrence that play the role of specifying a person’s 




7 The key works in which Burge develops his brand of externalism are ‘Belief De Re’, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, 
‘Other Bodies’, and ‘Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind’ (Burge, 1977; 1979; 1982; 1986).  
8 Page numbers correspond to the reprint in Burge 2007. 
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 A referring expression occurs obliquely in the ‘that’-clause of a propositional attitude 
ascription when that referring expression cannot be exchanged for co-referential referring expressions 
salva veritate.   
Suppose that unbeknownst to Hank, the man who lives next door is an undercover master 
criminal who happens to be at the very top of the FBI’s most wanted list. This master criminal has 
been putting on an act of being a profoundly unremarkable suburbanite, which has totally fooled 
Hank. We can clearly say that: ‘Hank believes that his next-door neighbour is unremarkable’. 
Suppose now we were to say in addition that: ‘Hank believes that the most wanted man in America is 
unremarkable’. There is a context in which the latter ascription – where we substitute ‘his [Hank’s] 
next door neighbour’ for the co-referential ‘the most wanted man in America’ – would be acceptable, 
and a context in which it wouldn’t. It is in the latter context that the referring expressions are 
understood to occur obliquely. Burge’s contention is that it is only consideration of this latter context 
that provides us with the means of determining what – in the relevant philosophical sense – Hank 
actually believes.      
Burge is not as interested in propositional attitude ascriptions as he is in propositional 
attitudes. He sees considerations of propositional attitude ascription as a means to an end. By 
considering discourse involving propositional attitude ascriptions (in which referring expressions 
occur obliquely) we can gain insight into propositional attitudes. In particular, this methodology 
should reveal facts about the individuation of propositional attitudes, and, by extension and more 
relevantly for the purposes of this thesis, the individuation of thoughts.      
      
1.22: Content Externalism via “Incomplete Understanding” 
 
In ‘Individualism and the Mental’ (Burge, 1979), Burge presents a famous three-step thought 
experiment that is meant to yield content externalism, involving a case in which a subject 




The first step requires that we concede that vocalised propositional attitude ascriptions (in which 
referring expression occur obliquely – see above) can be veridical, even if they involve a term that the 
ascribee doesn’t fully understand.   
 Such veridical ascriptions should accurately characterise that ascribee’s propositional 
attitudes, given the near-tautological assumption – discussed in the previous subsection – that 
veridical attitude ascriptions (in which referring expressions occur obliquely) accurately characterise 




 The example that Burge famously gives involves the term ‘arthritis’. Burge has us imagine a 
case in which someone, who we can call Alf, goes to the doctor complaining that the ‘arthritis’ in his 
knee has spread to his thigh. Alf does not realise that the term ‘arthritis’ only encompasses ailments of 
the joints.  
 Burge requires that we concede that ascriptions such as ‘Alf believes that arthritis is not as 
bad as cancer of the liver’ can be veridical, and thus accurately capture Alf’s belief about how arthritis 
is not as bad as cancer of the liver. Burge has us suppose that: 
 
A given person [i.e. Alf] has a large number of attitudes commonly attributed with 
content clauses containing ‘arthritis’ in oblique occurrence. For example, he thinks 
(correctly) that he has had arthritis for years, that his arthritis in his wrist and fingers is 
more painful than his arthritis in his ankles, that it is better to have arthritis than cancer of 
the liver, that stiffening joints is a symptom of arthritis, that certain sorts of aches are 
characteristic of arthritis, that there are various kinds of arthritis and so forth. In short, he 
has a wide range of such attitudes. In addition to these unsurprising attitudes, he thinks 
falsely that he has developed arthritis in the thigh. 




The second step requires that we imagine a counterfactual scenario in which the term in question is 
used differently to how it actually is, but in which that change of usage does not impinge on the 
subject’s intrinsic properties in any way.  
 In the case of Alf the arthritis sufferer, we need to imagine a counterfactual scenario in which 
the term ‘arthritis’ – as used by Alf’s wider socio-linguistic community – encompasses a wider range 
of ailments than just ailments of the joints, but in which from Alf’s perspective everything is has it 
actually is. In this counterfactual scenario the term could potentially apply to ailments that can spread 
from the knee to the thigh. But that change in the definition of ‘arthritis’ will not impinge on Alf’s 
intrinsic properties in any way. Counterfactual Alf and Actual Alf will have been identical in terms of 
all their physical parameters throughout their entire respective life histories. Every neural firing that 
has taken place in the brain of Actual Alf, will also have taken place in the brain of Counterfactual 
Alf, and will have done so in a way that mimics exactly the way in which it has occurred in the brain 
of Actual Alf. They will have also experienced all the same phenomenology throughout their entire 
respective life histories. Every itch, every pain, etc. that Actual Alf has experienced, Counterfactual 
Alf will have experienced also. 
 In Burge’s own words: 




We are to conceive of a situation in which the patient [Alf] proceeds from birth through 
the same course of physical events that he actually does, right to and including the time at 
which he first reports his fear [that the arthritis has spread to his thigh] to his doctor. 
Precisely the same things (non-intentional ascribed) happen to him. He has the same 
physiological history, the same diseases, the same internal physical occurrences. He goes 
through the same motions, engages in the same behaviour, has the same sensory intake 
(physiologically described). His dispositions to respond to stimuli are explained in 
physical theory as the effects of the same proximate causes. All this extends to his 
interaction with linguistic expressions. He says and hears the same words (word forms) at 
the same times he actually does. He develops the disposition to assent to ‘Arthritis can 
occur in the thigh’ and ‘I have arthritis in the thigh’ as a result of the same physically 
describe approximate causes. Such dispositions might have arisen in a number of ways. 
But we can suppose that in both actual and counterfactual situations, he acquires the word 
‘arthritis’ from casual conversation or reading, and never hearing anything to prejudice 
him for or against applying it in the way he does, he applies the word to an ailment in his 
thigh (or to ailments in the limbs or other) which seems to produce pains or other 
symptoms roughly similar to the disease in his hands and ankles. In both actual and 
counterfactual cases, the disposition is never reinforced or extinguished up until the time 
when he expresses himself to his doctor. We further imagine that the patient’s [Alf’s] 
non-intentional, phenomenal experience is the same. He has the same pains, visual fields, 
images, and internal verbal rehearsals. The counterfactuality in the supposition touches 
only the patient’s [Alf’s] social environment. In actual fact, ‘arthritis’, as used in his 
community, does not apply to ailments outside the joints. Indeed, it fails to do so by a 
standard, non-technical definition. But in our imagined case, physicians, lexicographers, 
and informed laymen apply ‘arthritis’ not only to arthritis but to various rheumatoid 
ailments. The standard use of the term is to be conceived to encompass the patient’s 
[Alf’s] actual misuse. 




The third and final step requires that we concede that, in the counterfactual scenario, the equivalent 




 What follows directly from this is that the content of the subject’s propositional attitudes in 
the counterfactual scenario will be different to the content of the subject’s actual propositional 
attitudes, even though the subject’s intrinsic properties remain constant.  
 In the counterfactual scenario in which ‘arthritis’ is defined differently it would be correct to 
say: ‘Alf believes that arthritis is not as bad as cancer’. Thus, that ascription would accurately capture 
the content of what Counterfactual Alf believes. However, the ascription would mean something 
different to what it actually means – per the counterfactual definition of ‘arthritis’. This forces the 
conclusion that Actual Alf and Counterfactual Alf believe different things, even though they share all 
the same intrinsic properties.    
  
1.23: Content Externalism via “Ignorance of Expert Knowledge” 
 
Suppose that somewhere in the very distant universe there is a planet that is Earth’s exact 
doppelganger. Earth and this Twin Earth are for the sake of all appearances exactly alike. The only 
difference between Earth and Twin Earth is the chemical composition of what the planets’ respective 
inhabitants call ‘water’. On Earth there is a clear, odourless liquid that is found all over the place 
called ‘water’, and which is in fact H2O, i.e. it is water. On Twin Earth there is also a clear, odourless 
liquid that is found all over the place called ‘water’, but which is not H2O. It is some other natural 
kind that has some other chemical composition, and that is standardly called – by Earthling 
philosophers – twater. Now suppose that on Earth there is Oscar who is ignorant of chemical theory – 
i.e. he doesn’t know that water is H2O. On Twin Earth there will be Twin Oscar, who will be Oscar’s 
atom-for-atom duplicate.9 Twin Oscar will be likewise ignorant of chemistry. He won’t know what 
the chemical composition of twater is. What I am describing here is Putnam’s infamous ‘Twin Earth’ 
thought experiment (Putnam, 1975). Content externalists ubiquitously hold that the content of Oscar’s 
and Twin Oscar’s thoughts and attitude will be different. When Oscar thinks the thought that he’d 
express ‘water is wet’, the equivalent thought that Twin Oscar would think would be different (even 
though it would be expressed, by Twin Oscar and by other twin earthlings, using phonetically 
identical words). Oscar and Twin Oscar are the classic case of two subjects who are qualitatively 
identical to one and other, but who nevertheless think thoughts with different contents.   
 
9 We need to ignore any other differences between Earth and Twin Earth that might follow as a consequent of ‘water’ having 
a different chemical composition. Strictly speaking, Oscar and Twin Oscar should not be atom-for-atom duplicates. 
Earthlings are 97% water. So Twin Earthlings should be 97% twater. This is something, along with other things, we need to 
ignore. This, of course, can be remedied – if indeed it needs to be – by change of example – from ‘water’ to ‘aluminium’ 
(say). 
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 Burge contends that Oscar and Twin Oscar would indeed think thoughts with different 
contents. His reasons for thinking this pertain, as in the case of Alf the Arthritis sufferer, to thought 
and attitude ascriptions in which the relevant terms occur obliquely: 
 
When [Oscar] says or consciously thinks the words, ‘There is some water within twenty 
miles, I hope’, [Twin Oscar] says or consciously thinks the same word forms. But there 
are differences. As Putnam in effect points out, [Oscar’s] occurrences of ‘water’ apply to 
water and mean water, whereas [Twin Oscar’s] apply to twater and mean twater. And, as 
Putnam does not note, the differences affect oblique occurrences in ‘that’-clauses that 
provide the contents of their mental state and events. [Oscar] hopes that there is some 
water (oblique occurrence) within twenty miles. [Twin Oscar] hopes that there is some 
twater within twenty miles. That is, even as we suppose that ‘water’ and ‘twater’ are not 
logically exchangeable with coextensive expressions salva veritate, we have a difference 
between their thoughts (thought contents). 
(Burge, 1982, p.86)10     
 
Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s thinking different thoughts is due to a difference in the meaning of the term 
‘water’ on their respective planets. This in turn is due to the non-socio-linguistic physical facts that 
water and twater have the chemical compositions that they have, and how those facts effect (and have 
effected) the linguistic practices of Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective socio-linguistic communities, 
which will include scientifically-literate individuals who are aware of the chemical composition of 
water/twater: 
 
The difference in [Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective] mental states and events seems 
to be a product primarily of differences in their physical environments, mediated by 
differences in their social environments – in the mental states of their fellows and 
conventional meanings of words they and their fellows employ. 
(ibid., p.87)  
 
1.24: Content Externalism via “Nonstandard Theory”  
 
Along with the route that Burge first presented in ‘Individualism and the Mental’ (Burge, 1979), and 
along with the route to content externalism that consists of Burge’s reading of ‘Twin Earth’, which is 
found in ‘Other Bodies’ (Burge, 1982), Burge also presents a third dialectical route to content 
 




externalism, which is found in ‘Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind’ (Burge, 1986). The 
first route centres around someone – Alf the Arthritis Sufferer – who has an incomplete understanding 
of a certain term – ‘arthritis’. The second centres around someone – Oscar – who is ignorant of the 
chemical composition of a natural kind – water. The third centres around someone who has a 
“nonstandard theory” with regards to the application of a certain term: 
 
The argument of ‘Individualism and the Mental’ and ‘Other Bodies’ ascribe incomplete 
linguistic understanding and ignorance of expert knowledge (respectively) to the relevant 
protagonists…The [third] argument features not incomplete understanding or ignorance 
of specialised knowledge, but nonstandard theory. 
(Burge, 1986, pp.708-9) 
 
The third route consists a three-step thought experiment that echoes the one found in 
‘Individualism and the Mental’. We start off with an individual who is wrong about the application of 
a term, but who we can nevertheless ascribe propositional attitudes to that involve that term (in 
oblique position). We then imagine a counterfactual scenario in which the person is right. Finally, we 
recognise that our counterfactual selves, in that counterfactual scenario, would be similarly able to 
ascribe propositional attitudes to the individual that involve the term (in oblique position), and 
because of that the individual would have attitudes that would have a different content to the attitudes 
that they actually have. 
 The key difference between the ‘Individualism and the Mental’ thought experiment, as 
already alluded to, pertains to the manner in which the respective individuals are wrong about a term’s 
application. Alf the Arthritis sufferer is wrong about the application of ‘arthritis’ due to his ignorance 
about how his wider socio-linguistic community define the term. Alf has an “incomplete 
understanding” of what ‘arthritis’ is. In the alternative thought experiment, we are to imagine 
someone who is fully aware of how their wider socio-linguistic community define a particular term, 
but who think their wider socio-linguistic community have got it wrong. In the alternative thought 
experiment, “incomplete understanding” is substituted for “nonstandard theory”. 
 Burge has us imagine a case in which someone – “person A” – subscribes to a nonstandard 
theory about ‘sofas’: 
 
We begin by imagining a person A in our community who has a normal mastery of 
English. A’s early instruction in the use of ‘sofa’ is mostly ostensive, though he picks up 
normal truisms. A can use the term reliably. At some point, however, A doubts the truisms 
and hypothesises that sofa function not as furnishings to be sat on, but as works of art or 
religious artefacts. He believes that the usual remarks about the function of sofas conceal, 
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or represent a delusion about, an entirely different practice. A admits that some sofas have 
been sat upon, but thinks that most sofas would collapse under any considerable weight 
and denies that sitting is what sofas are pre-eminently for. A may attack the veridicality of 
many of our memories of sofas being sat upon, on the grounds that the memories are 
product of the delusion. 
(Burge, 1986, p.707)           
   
 Burge then has us imagine a counterfactual scenario in which person A’s bizarre theory about 
sofas is right, in which ‘sofas’ are – and are recognised by the wider socio-linguistic community as 
being – iconographic artefacts that would normally collapse if sat upon, but in a way in which it 
would not impinge on A’s non-intentional intrinsic properties in any way: 
 
As a second step, imagine a person B (or A in nonactual circumstances) who is, for all 
intents and purposes, physically identical to A. He has the same physical dispositions, 
receives substantially the same physical simulations, produces the same motions, utters 
the same sounds. Like A, B hears, though seldom, word forms that are counterparts to the 
truisms that A hears. But in B’s situation, these word forms are not taken as truisms; they 
are contextual appropriate remarks that do not purport to convey a general meaning. 
(They could be lies or jokes, but it is more natural to take them as not-completely-general 
contingent truths.) The objects that B is confronted with are objects that look like sofas, 
but are, and are widely known to be, works of art, or religious artefacts sold in 
showrooms and displayed in people’s houses. Many of these objects would collapse 
under a person’s weight. There are no sofas in B’s situation, and the word ‘sofa’ does not 
mean sofa. Call the relevant objects ‘safos’. B assumes that most people would take these 
objects to function primarily as seats and that the remarks he hears are communally 
accepted truisms. But, like A, B develops doubts. At least by the time B expresses this 
scepticism and his theory, he is correctly doubting that safos function as furniture to be 
sat upon.  
(ibid., pp.707-8) 
 
Finally, Burge expects that we consequently draw the same conclusions mutatis mutandis about the 
contents of A’s and B’s propositional attitudes that we draw in the case of Actual Alf and 





A mistakenly thinks that sofas do not function primary to be sat upon. B’s counterpart 
thoughts do not involve the [actual] notion of sofa and could not correctly be ascribed 
with ‘sofa’ in oblique position [given its actual usage]. 
(ibid., p.708) 
   
1.3: Kripkean Externalism  
 
1.31: Content Externalism via Millianism 
 
Millianism is the thesis that the contribution that a name – a proper noun – makes to the meaning of a 
sentence in which it occurs, i.e. the content of the thought that that sentence expresses, is exhausted by 
the name’s referent.11 Millianism is something of a philosophical bogeyman. Something that 
according to received wisdom we must reject lest we face a host of inter-related issues pertaining to 
belief and desire ascription and the ways in which thoughts and attitudes feature in our cognitive 
economies. Kripke, nevertheless, argues in favour of Millianism, and against what he sees as the 
opposing ‘Fregean’12 view that holds that attached to a name there is something like a Fregean ‘sense’ 
that either makes the sole or an additional contribution to content determination. Kripke argues that a 
rejection of Millianism would be counter to common-sense intuitions about how names function in 
socio-linguistic practice, and that, crucially, rejecting it, and thereby accepting the opposing ‘Fregean’ 
view, would not in actual fact furnish us with the solutions that it is touted to furnish us with. Kripke 
does accept that Millianism poses serious philosophical challenges. He acknowledges the lure of 
Fregeanism. He argues however that Fregeanism fails to provide the solutions that it is touted to 
provide.   
 Kripke defines Millianism as the view that:  
 
…a proper name is, so to speak, simply a name. It simply refers to its bearer, and has no 
other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite description, a name does not 
describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying properties. 
(2011, p.126) 
 
Immediately after, Kripke gives a loose working definition of what he sees as the opposing 
‘Fregean’ view:  
 
11 So named after John Stuart Mill. 
12 The two most important Frege works are (arguably) ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’ and ‘Thought’ (Frege, 1892; 1918). For an 
anthology of other key works by Frege see Beaney, 1997. 




The opposing Fregean view holds that to each proper name, a speaker of the language 
associates some property (or conjunction of properties) which determines its referent as 
the unique thing fulfilling the associated property (or properties). This property(ies) 
constitutes the ‘sense’ of the name. Presumably, if ‘…’ is a proper name, the associated 
properties are those that the speaker would supply, if asked, “Who is ‘…’?” If he would 
answer “… is the man who ———,” the properties filling the second blank are those that 
determine the reference of the name for the given speaker and constitute its ‘sense.’ 
(ibid.) 
 
Kripke then goes on to consider Quine’s famous ‘Cicero’/‘Tully’ example:   
 
It has seemed…obvious that codesignative proper names are not interchangeable in belief 
contexts and epistemic contexts. Tom, a normal speaker of the language, may sincerely 
assent to “Tully denounced Catiline,” but not to “Cicero denounced Catiline.” He may 
even deny the latter. And his denial is compatible with his status as a normal English 
speaker who satisfies normal criteria for using both ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ as names for the 
famed Roman (without knowing that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ name the same person). Given 
this, it seems obvious that Tom believes that: Tully denounced Catiline, but that he does 
not believe (lacks the belief) that: Cicero denounced Catiline. So it seems clear that 
codesignative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts. It also seems clear 
that there must be two distinct propositions or contents expressed by ‘Cicero denounced 
Catiline’ and ‘Tully denounced Catiline.’ How else can Tom believe one and deny the 
other? And the difference in propositions thus expressed can only come from a difference 
in sense between ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero.’ Such a conclusion agrees with a Fregean theory 
and seems to be incompatible with a purely Millian view 
(ibid., p.130) 
 
According to the ‘Fregean’ explanation, in order to account for the phenomena so described – 
i.e. that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ occur obliquely (see previous section) – there must be attached to names 
such as ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ something like a Fregean ‘sense’, i.e. something along the lines of what 
Kripke describes in the previous quotation. Now, such an attachment can either be something that is 
agreed upon by the socio-linguistic community as a whole, or it must pertain to the way or ways in 
which an individual utterer of the name thinks of its referent, i.e. what reference determining property 
(or properties) the speaker associates with the referent. Kripke argues that neither can be the case, and 




Kripke observes that in the case of many or most names – and particularly in the cases of the 
names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ – there is no socio-linguistic-community-wide-agreed-upon ‘sense’. 
Kripke compares the ‘Cicero’/‘Tully’ example to Frege’s paradigmatic ‘Hesperus’/‘Phosphorus’ 
example. Kripke initially considers how Fregeanism could be meshed with the most famous claim of 
Naming and Necessity13 that names are rigid designators to account for how the co-referential 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are non-interchangeable in intentional contexts: 
 
In the case of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ it is pretty clear what the different ‘modes of 
presentation’ [i.e. Fregean ‘senses’] would be: one mode determines a heavenly body by 
its typical position and appearance, in the appropriate season, in the evening; the other 
determines the same body by its position and appearance, in the appropriate season, in the 
morning. So it appears that even though, according to my view, proper names would be 
modally rigid—would have the same reference when we use them to speak of 
counterfactual situations as they do when used to describe the actual world— they would 
have a kind of Fregean ‘sense’ according to how that rigid reference is fixed. And the 
divergences of ‘sense’ (in this sense of ‘sense’) would lead to failures of 
interchangeability of co-designative names in contexts of propositional attitude, though 
not in modal contexts. Such a theory would agree with Mill regarding modal contexts but 
with Frege regarding belief contexts. The theory would not be purely Millian. 
(ibid, p.131) 
 
Kripke argues, however, that this can’t be true in the case of names such as ‘Holland’ and ‘The 
Netherlands’, and – more to the point – names such as ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’:  
 
After further thought, however, the Fregean conclusion appears less obvious. Just as 
people are said to have been unaware at one time of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus, 
so a normal speaker of English apparently may not know that Cicero is Tully, or that 
Holland is the Netherlands. For he may sincerely assent to ‘Cicero was lazy,’ while 
dissenting from ‘Tully was lazy,’ or he may sincerely assent to ‘Holland is a beautiful 
country,’ while dissenting from ‘The Netherlands is a beautiful country.’ In the case of 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ it seemed plausible to account for the parallel situation by 
supposing that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ fixed their (rigid) references to a single 
object in two conventionally different ways, one as the ‘evening star’ and one as the 
‘morning star.’ But what corresponding conventional ‘senses,’ even taking ‘senses’ to be 
 
13 Kripke, 1982. 
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‘modes of fixing the reference rigidly,’ can plausibly be supposed to exist for ‘Cicero’ 
and ‘Tully’ (or ‘Holland’ and ‘the Netherlands’)? Are not these just two names (in 
English) for the same man? Is there any special conventional, community-wide 
‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other? I am unaware of any. 
(ibid., p.132) 
      
On the other horn of the dilemma, there is the view that ‘senses’ are individualistically 
attached to tokens of a name’s usage. Kripke observes that in the case of many, if not most, instances 
in which a name is uttered there could be no appropriate candidate ‘sense’ being individualistically 
assigned by the utterer:  
 
…individuals who “define ‘Cicero’” by such phrases as “the Catiline denouncer,” “the 
author of De Fato,” etc., are relatively rare: their prevalence in the philosophical literature 
is the product of the excessive classical learning of some philosophers. Common men 
who clearly use ‘Cicero’ as a name for Cicero may be able to give no better answer to 
“Who was Cicero?” than “a famous Roman orator,” and they probably would say the 
same (if anything!) for ‘Tully.’ (Actually, most people probably have never heard the 
name ‘Tully.’) Similarly, many people who have heard of both Feynman and Gell-Mann, 
would identify each as ‘a leading contemporary theoretical physicist.’ Such people do not 
assign ‘senses’ of the usual type to the names that uniquely identify the referent (even 
though they use the names with a determinate reference). But to the extent that the 
indefinite descriptions attached or associated can be called ‘senses,’ the ‘senses’ assigned 
to ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully,’ or to ‘Feynman’ and ‘Gell-Mann’ are identical.   
(ibid., pp.134-5) 
 
What Kripke has presented us with is a simple but compelling argument for the Millian view 
that the contribution that a name makes to the content of a sentence is exhausted by the name’s 
referent. To deny the Millian view is to suppose that attached to the use of a name is something like a 
‘Fregean’ sense. Such an attachment can either be agreed upon by the socio-linguistic community as a 
whole, or it must pertain to the way or ways in which an individual utterer of the name thinks of its 
referent. Neither option is tenable. In many, if not most, cases there can be no socio-linguistic-
community-wide-agreed-upon ‘sense’. Similarly, in many, if not most cases, there will not be a 
‘sense’ that is attached by an individual speaker. Therefore, the ‘Fregean’ view is false. Therefore, the 
Millian view is correct.  
Supposing that attached to each name there is something like a Fregean ‘sense’ may seem 




Kripke also provides us with a second argument for Millianism. In Naming and Necessity 
Kripke presents a picture of how the referent of a name, but not anything like a ‘sense’, is passed 
down a socio-linguistic chain, which begins with the initial baptiser. If such a picture is correct, or if it 
is correct at least in some cases, then that would give strong support for Millianism: 
 
…the real determinant of the reference of names of a former historical figure is a chain of 
communication, in which the reference of the name is passed from link to link. Now the 
legitimacy of such a chain accords much more with Millian views than with alternatives. 
For the view supposes that a learner acquires a name from the community by determining 
to use it with the same reference as does the community. We regard such a learner as 
using “Cicero is bald” to express the same thing the community expresses, regardless of 
variations in the properties different learners associate with ‘Cicero,’ as long as he 
determines that he will use the name with the referent current in the community. That a 
name can be transmitted in this way accords nicely with a Millian picture, according to 
which only the reference, not more specific properties associated with the name, is 
relevant to the semantics of sentences containing it.   
(2011, p.136) 
 
Now, in giving us arguments for Millianism, Kripke has provided us with additional routes to 
content externalism. Content externalism – as defined at the start of this chapter (§1.1) – follows 
trivially from Millianism. Indeed, if Millianism is correct then changing the reference of a name 
changes the content of the sentence in which it occurs, and thus the content of the thoughts that those 
sentences express. And, it is easy to conceive of actual/counterfactual pairs in which a name, as used 
by some individual, changes referent, but in which the intrinsic properties of that individual remain 
constant. For instance, suppose I think the thought that I’d express: ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’. 
Imagine a counterfactual in which ‘Aristotle’ referred to someone else, who would be numerically 
non-identical to the actual Aristotle. Imagine also that within the counterfactual scenario all my 
intrinsic properties would be exactly as they actually are. Drawing on the Kripkean picture of names 
being passed down socio-linguistic chains may help in conceiving such a counterfactual, but it is not 
essential. We can imagine a counterfactual new-born baby, who we can call Arisnotle, being baptised 
– or given the name via the ancient Macedonian equivalent – ‘Aristotle’. We can imagine this 
Arisnotle growing up and doing all the things that (the actual) Aristotle did, and writing all off the 
works that (the actual) Aristotle wrote, and none of this effecting me and my intrinsic properties in 
any palpable way. In such a counterfactual, the reference of ‘Aristotle’ on my lips would refer to 
Arisnotle, according to the Kripkean picture. The reference in both the actual and counterfactual case 
is determined by the linguistic activities of the original baptisers of ‘Aristotle’ to which I am 
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connected to via a trans-millennia socio-linguistic chain. In the actual situation, such a socio-linguistic 
chain connects me to persons who baptised (the actual) Aristotle ‘Aristotle’. In the counterfactual 
scenario, the chain connects me to persons who baptised the numerically non-identical Arisnotle 
‘Aristotle’. In any case, regardless of how we suppose that the reference of ‘Aristotle’ is determined, 
Millianism forces the conclusion that my thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ would have a different 
content in a counterfactual scenario in which ‘Aristotle’ refers to someone else, even though ex 
hypothesi that change of reference would have no effect on my intrinsic properties.14      
 
1.32: Millianism Extended to Natural Kind Terms 
 
Kripke doesn’t seem to make it explicit whether he believes that something akin to Millianism would 
be true of natural kind terms, i.e. whether he believes that the contribution that a natural kind term 
makes to the content of a sentence in which it occurs is exhausted by the term’s referent. Kripke does 
seem to see natural kind terms has having many of the same semantic properties as proper nouns, 
however. (We can see this throughout the third lecture of Naming and Necessity in particular.) So, it 
does not seem too far-fetched to suppose that Kripke may endorse the view that the contribution that a 
natural kind term makes to the content of a sentence in which it occurs is exhausted by the term’s 
referent. 
 In any case, supposing that Millianism may be expandable to natural kind terms gives a 
different perspective on why it might be that Oscar and Twin Oscar, of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ (see 
above, §1.23), will be thinking thoughts with different contents. The reference of the natural kind term 
‘water’ on Oscar’s lips will be different to what it is on the lips of Twin Oscar. On Oscar’s lips it will 
refer to water. On Twin Oscar’s lips it will refer to twater. Thus, if the contribution that a natural kind 
term makes to the content of a sentence is exhausted by the term’s referent, then the content of 
Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective sentences in which the term ‘water’ occurs will be different, and 
thus the content of the thoughts that those sentences express will also be different. In short, Oscar and 
Twin Oscar will be thinking thoughts with different contents.    
  
1.4: Burge (and Kripke) on Singular Thought 
  
On the face of it, it may seem that the Burgean and Kripkean routes to content externalism are similar, 
as both are derived via similar considerations of linguistic practice. They are nevertheless the products 
of opposing points of view. 
 To begin with Burge rejects Millianism. In ‘Belief De Re’, Burge writes: 
 





Several philosophers have held that proper names do not express anything, but merely tag 
objects. I think this incorrect. 
(Burge, 1977, p.344) 
 
In the adjoining footnote (ibid, fn.7), Burge gives two reasons for his dismissal of what he calls “the 
‘tag’ view”. The first is “Frege’s paradox of identity”, (which is one of the aforementioned issues that 
pertains to the ways in which thoughts and attitudes feature in our cognitive economies – see above, 
§1.31). The ‘tag’ view – i.e. Millianism – fails to explain why statements such as ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus’ are informative, and why statements such as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ are trivial; why the 
former has a cognitive value whilst the latter does not. The second reason is that Millianism is 
incompatible with Burge’s view that names are essentially disguised indexicals. Briefly, according to 
Burge’s view, names have a predicative use and thus also have a demonstrative use. Aristotle, the 
great philosopher of antiquity, was an Aristotle. It is also the case that Aristotle Onassis was an 
Aristotle. In either instance, we can make the move from the predicative use to the demonstrative use 
and refer to the Aristotle in question as ‘that Aristotle’. According to Burge, when I say: ‘Aristotle 
was an alcoholic’, what I really mean is: ‘That Aristotle [i.e. not the one who was married to Jackie 
Kennedy] was an alcoholic’.15 
 In addition, there is also a deeper reason why Millianism and Burge’s views are in conflict. 
For Burge what are known as singular thoughts16 – or alternatively de re thoughts – have contents that 
are not individuated by objects of which they are about. If Millianism is correct, then there will be 
singular thoughts that have contents that are individuated by the objects of which they are about.  
 Consider the opening two paragraphs of ‘Other Bodies’, which I quote in full: 
 
It is fairly uncontroversial, I think, that we can conceive a person’s behaviour and 
behavioural dispositions, his physical acts and states, his qualitative feels and fields (all 
non-intentionally described) as remaining fixed, while his mental attitudes of a certain 
kind – his de re attitudes – vary. Thus we can imagine Alfred’s believing of apple 1 that it 
is wholesome, and holding a true belief. Without, altering Alfred’s dispositions, 
subjective experiences, and so forth, we can imagine having substituted an identically 
appearing but internally rotten apple 2. In such a case, Alfred’s belief differs, while his 
behavioural dispositions, inner causal states, and qualitative experience remain constant.  
 
15 See Burge, 1973. Also see Segal, 2001. 
16 For an anthology of papers on singular thought see Jeshion, 2010. 
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This sort of point is important for understanding mentalistic notions and their role in our 
cognitive lives. But, taken by itself, it tells us nothing very interesting about mental states. 
For it is easy (and I think appropriate) to phrase the point so as to strip it of immediate 
philosophical excitement. We may say that Alfred has the same belief content in both 
situations. It is just that he would be making contextually different applications of that 
content to different entities. His belief is true of apple 1 and false of apple 2. The nature 
of his mental state is the same. He simply bears different relations to his environment. We 
do say in ordinary language that one belief is true and the other is false. But this is just 
another way of saying that what he believes is true of the first apple and would be false of 
the second. We may call these relational beliefs different beliefs if we want. But 
differences among such relational beliefs do not entail differences among mental states or 
contents, as these have traditionally been viewed. 
(Burge, 1982, pp.82-3, my emphasis)17  
  
Compare now Burge’s reading18 of his ‘Alfred’ case with the Millian/Kripkean reading of my 
‘Aristotle/Arisnotle’ case (see above, §1.31). Burge presents his ‘Alfred’ case in the hope that it 
excites the intuition that any singular thought or propositional attitude entertained or held by Alfred 
will have the same content in the counterfactual situation in which the wholesome apple 1 is replaced 
with the rotten apple 2, and he expects that we draw the conclusion that the same will be true mutatis 
mutandis in the case of all singular thoughts and attitudes. In contrast, if Millianism is correct, then it 
will be the case that my singular thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ will have a different content in 
 
17 Page numbers correspond to Burge 2007. 
18 Segal holds essentially the same view on singular thought as Burge – see Segal 2000, pp.3-4. Everyday Abraracourcix has 
the belief that tomorrow the sky will fall on his head. For Segal there is a looser sense of the word ‘content’ under which the 
belief that Abraracourix has on Tuesday will have a ‘content’ that is different to the belief he had on Monday in that the 
beliefs will have different truth conditions. But under the philosophically proper sense of content the Monday and Tuesday 
beliefs will have the same content. The re changes but the content – as the term properly should be understood – does not. In 
the Segal case, the relevant res are days, in the Burge case the res are pieces of fruit, but the principle is the same. In the 
Segal case, the re changes from Tuesday to Wednesday but the content remains the same. In the Burge case, the re changes 
from wholesome apple 1 to rotten apple 2 but the content remains the same. A consequence of the Burge/Segal view on 
singular thought is that in the case of singular thought content – as it should be properly understood – is divorced from truth 
conditions – this is why Abraracourcix’s beliefs have a different ‘content’ in the aforementioned looser sense. 
Abraracourcix’s belief on Monday will be true if and only if the sky falls on his head on Tuesday. Whereas, Abraracourcix’s 
belief on Tuesday will be true if and only if the sky falls on his head on Wednesday. Yet, both beliefs have the same content. 
Likewise, Actual Alfred’s belief or thought that that apple is delicious (say) will be true if and only if apple 1 is delicious. 
Whereas, the equivalent belief or thought of Counterfactual Alfred would be true if and only if apple 2 is delicious. Yet, 




the counterfactual situation in which (the actual) Aristotle is replaced with (the counterfactual non-
numerically-identical) Arisnotle. Burge seems to offer a way one can be a content externalism, whilst 
still agreeing adamantly with Frege that Mont Blanc with all its snow fields cannot be a propositional 
constituent. In contrast, Millians are Millians and hence are content externalists essentially because 
they are sympathetic to Russell’s19 position that Mont Blanc with all its snow fields can be a 
propositional constituent. For Millians content is inextricably tied to object. Thoughts such as 
‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ owe their very content to Aristotle. Changing the object of the thought 
from Aristotle to Arisnotle changes the content of the thought. According to the Burgean view, the 
content of thoughts can be and is affected by things that are external to the thinker. For instance, if we 
– reversing a famous example of Putnam20 – place Alfred in a world where what are known as 
‘apples’ are not grown but are in fact a sort of man-made confectionery, then that might change the 
content of Alfred’s thoughts. However, placing Alfred in a world where the wholesome apple 1 is 
replaced by the rotten apple 2 would not. 21   
 
19 In this thesis, as seems to be common throughout the philosophical literature, when we talk of Russell we’ll be talking 
exclusively of the earlier Russell, i.e. the Russell of works such as ‘On Denoting’, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description’ and The Problems of Philosophy (Russell, 1905; 1910-11; Russell 1912), i.e. Russell before his 
adoption of neutral monism (see for example Russell, 1921). The famous exchange between Frege and Russell can be found 
in Beaney, 1997, pp.290-3.  
20 Putnam actually attributes the example to Rogers Albritton. It’s the one that involves considering a counterfactual in 
which pencils are organisms, and are therefore grown and not made (Putnam, 1975, p.242).  
21 This Chapter has focused on the content externalism of Burge and Kripke, as will the rest of the thesis. Other prominent 
content externalists, which aren’t to feature in this present thesis, include Evans and McDowell (Evans, 1982; McDowell, 
1986), and also Davidson (Davidson, 1987; 2001a; 2001b; – see also Bridges, 2006), and maybe Putnam (Putnam, 1975).  
 The versions of content externalism offered by Evans and McDowell can be viewed as being versions of the 
Russellian account of singular propositions that allow for a broader set of possible propositional constituents than the narrow 
set permitted in Russell’s original framework. Evans and McDowell allow for there to be illusion of thought, and that 
broadens the set of available propositional constituents. (See in particular the first two sections of McDowell 1986 (pp.137-
141).) Russell, in the case of singular propositions, saw content has being tied to object. There are thoughts that require the 
object of which they are about for their very content. No object, no thought. In other words, objects can be propositional 
constituents. For Russell, an object can be such a propositional constituent as long as the thinker can ‘know which’ object 
the thought concerns – the thinker must be able to differentiate the object from the rest of creation. But that was not the only 
restriction Russell placed on propositional-constituent-hood. Russell did not countenance that there could be illusions of 
thought. This in turn severely limited the scope of the what could be a propositional constituent to only include things that 
cannot fail to exist if they are contained within one’s thoughts. It meant, in particular, that external world objects cannot be 
propositional constituents, because if it so turned out that the external world object in question did not exist – if the thinker 
was suffering from a perceptual illusion (say) – then the thinker would be suffering from illusions of thought, and Russell 
did not countenance that possibility. In one sense Mont Blanc with all of its snowfields is the sort of thing that could be a 
propositional constituent. In another sense Mont Blanc (with all of its snowfields) is precisely the sort of thing that cannot be 




thought. This allows for external world objects that we have had perceptual contact with to enter into our thoughts as 
propositional constituents. Content externalism – as I define it in this chapter (§1.1) – follows directly from this.     
 The content externalism of Evans and McDowell is similar to Kripke’s content externalism – as I characterise it in 
§1.3 – in that both involve singular thoughts viewed as having (external-world)-object-dependent contents. (They are two 
forms of what Brown calls “singular anti-individualism” – see Brown, 2004, Ch.1; see also my Chapter 3, §3.22.) A key 
difference is that Evans and McDowell reject the Millianism that drives Kripkean content externalism and essentially 
embrace Fregeanism. (See in particular the third section of McDowell 1986 (pp.141-3).) Allowing for illusions of thought 
enables a perfect marriage of Frege and Russell. (Or at the very least it enables Russell to live in Sinn with Frege!) Indeed, if 
we, on the hand, disallow illusion of thought, then that means occurrent sense impressions of Venus would need to be 
propositional constituents instead of Venus itself. Thus, a thought about Venus during the early morning will automatically 
have a different content to a thought about Venus in the early evening, as they will involve different propositional 
constituents. Allowing illusion of thought, on the other hand, means that Venus (itself), which can enter one’s perceptual 
field both during early morning and during early evening, may enter into one’s thoughts as a propositional constituent. If 
Venus (itself) is a propositional constituent, then it will be a propositional constituent of both the morning thought and the 
evening thought. Thus, if the two thoughts are to have differing contents as the standard arguments demand that they should, 
then there must be something else that differentiates them. This differentiating something will be Venus’s respective modes 
of presentation (which are not be confused with Venus-picking-out definite descriptions but are something else entirely.) Or 
so the Fregean-cum-neo-Russellian/Evansian/McDowellian story goes.  
 Evans and McDowell’s crucial endorsement of the view that there is such a thing as illusion of thought possibly 
gives their brand of content externalism a level of immunity against the sort of reductio arguments considered in Chapters 4-
6. If we were/are happy to say that what may seem to me to be the thought that I’d express ‘water is wet’ (say) may and may 
quite easily be an illusion of thought – if (say) it turned out water did not exist – then there is possibly less pressure to 
suppose that I must know in any sort of special way that I am thinking what I believe I am thinking.   
 Davidson is committed to content externalism – as I define it in this present chapter – but he is so because of a 
commitment to a more radical and overarching thesis, which is that the very possibility of thought requires the right sort of 
environmental causal relations, and which is given its most striking explication in Davidson’s famous ‘The Swampman’ 
thought experiment:   
 
Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, 
while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My 
replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs the swamp, encounters and 
seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my house and 
seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference.  
But there is a difference. My replica can’t recognize my friends; it can’t recognize anything, since it never 
cognized anything in the first place. It can’t know my friends’ names (though of course it seems to), it can't 
remember my house. It can’t mean what I do by the word ‘house’, for example, since the sound ‘house’ it 
makes was not learned in a context that would give it the right meaning – or any meaning at all. Indeed, I 
don’t see how my replica can be said to mean anything by the sounds it makes, nor to have any thoughts.   
(Davidson, 1987, p.443-4 (p.91 in Ludlow and Martin, 1998))    
 
 The ideas put forth in this thesis may be brought to bear on such other versions of content externalism, but 




Kripke. Having said that, anything in the thesis that is applicable with respect to content externalism simpliciter – 
which as I define is the thesis that two qualitatively identical subjects could be thinking thoughts with different 
contents – should automatically be applicable with respect to all forms of content externalism. In looser words, there 
may be times in the thesis in which the version of content externalism doesn’t matter. 
 The thesis refers frequently to Putnam’s famous ‘Twin Earth’ thought externalism. It is not clear, however, 
whether Putnam himself at least at around the time he wrote the ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ (Putnam, 1975), which 
is the paper from which the thought experiment originates, was in fact a content externalist – as I define the term. The 
thought experiment was originally intended to show the inconsistency of two assumptions. The first assumption is 
“[t]hat knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state” (ibid., p.219), where 
“psychological state” is understood to be a narrow state, i.e. as denoting an intrinsic property of a subject. The second 
assumption is “[t]hat the meaning of a term (in the sense of ‘intension’) determines its extension” (ibid.). If the ‘Twin 
Earth’ thought experiment does indeed demonstrate that one of these two assumptions must be rejected, then arguably 
it would only be a rejection of the first assumption that could lead to content externalism. Also – and relatedly – 
Putnam’s contention that the word ‘water’ is indexical, or is like an indexical, possibly precludes him being a content 
externalist (see §II of Burge, 1982.)  
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2.0: Introduction to Chapter 2 
 
This present chapter serves a dual purpose. It characterises what in the literature is the principle 
positive case for compatibilism – the thesis that content externalism is compatible with traditional 
notions of privileged access. The four subsequent chapters all consider negative cases against 
compatibilism. This chapter also sets up something of a cliff hanger that is not to be resolved until the 
final chapter of this thesis.   
 
2.1: The Redeployment Thesis and the Incomplete Argument for Compatibilism 
 
What we can call the Redeployment Thesis, after Peacocke (Peacocke, 1996 – also see Sawyer, 2001, 
pp.121-2)22, states that we should be able to form second-order beliefs about our first-order thoughts 
such that the content of such second-order beliefs should be reflective of the content of the first-order 
thoughts of which they are about in such a way that guarantees truth. (The concepts that are involved 
in the first-order thoughts are redeployed in the corresponding second-order beliefs about those 
thoughts.)      
Consider Oscar and his atom-for-atom Twin-Earthling duplicate, Twin Oscar. Whilst Oscar is 
on Earth thinking that water is wet, Twin Oscar will be on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet. 
Should Oscar reflect upon what he is currently thinking he should be able to form the belief that he is 
thinking the thought that water is wet. Twin Oscar will at the same time also form a belief about what 
he is thinking. The redeployment thesis states that the content of Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective 
 
22 We are restricting ‘the redeployment thesis’ to the special case of occurrent thought. Peacocke and Sawyer characterise it 
as applying to a larger range of mental states that includes propositional attitudes. 
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beliefs will both have content that is reflective of the content of their respective thoughts, in a way 
that ensures the truth of both beliefs. Oscar’s belief will be that he is thinking that water is wet. It will 
indeed be the case that Oscar is thinking that water is wet. Thus, Oscar’s belief will be true. 
Symmetrically, Twin Oscar’s belief will be that he is thinking that twater is wet. It will indeed be the 
case that Twin Oscar is thinking that twater is wet.  
If it is indeed the case that Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s first-order thoughts differ in content, as 
the content externalist maintains, then Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective second-order beliefs about 
those first-order thoughts will also differ in content but they will both be true. 
Twin Oscar would, in expressing his belief, use the same words as Oscar would to express his 
belief. Twin Oscar would say: “I believe that I am thinking that water is wet”. But, those words on 
Twin Oscar’s lips will mean something different to what they would on the lips of Oscar.   
The redeployment thesis is neutral with respect to explanations of why Oscar and Twin Oscar 
will be thinking different thoughts. In other words, it should apply with respect to both Kripkean 
externalism and Burgean externalism (see previous chapter).   
 Consider also the case of Slow-Switching Sally, which is to feature heavily in the next chapter. 
Slow-Switching Sally was born here on Earth but, completely unbeknownst to her, has spent a 
significant portion – roughly half (say) – of her lifetime on the Twin Earth of Putnam’s famous 
thought experiment. Sally has for some mysterious reason been subject to switches between the two 
planets. After spending days, months or years (even) on one planet she will undergo a switch and will 
be transported across the vastness of space to the other planet. She may spend seven months on Earth 
(say) and then be transported to Twin Earth, and then after spending thirteen months (say) on Twin 
Earth will return to Earth, and so on and so on. Slow-Switching Sally is totally unaware that she 
periodically takes such incredible universe-spanning journeys. As far as Slow-Switching Sally is 
concerned it is as if she spends the entirety of her time on Earth.  
Both the Kripkean and Burgean externalist should concede that sometime not long after a 
switch the content of the thoughts (and propositional attitudes) that Sally would express using the 
word ‘water’ will undergo a change. The thought that Sally would express ‘water is wet’ whilst on 
Earth will be different in content to the thought that she’d express ‘water is wet’ whilst on Twin Earth.  
For the Burgean externalist the thoughts will be different in content because Sally has 
switched between a socio-linguistic community in which ‘water’ means one thing to a socio-linguistic 
community in which ‘water’ means something else. Sometime after a switch, Sally will cease to be a 
member of one of the socio-linguistic communities and become again a member of the other socio-
linguistic community.  
 The Kripkean externalist should concede ‘water’ will name different natural kinds depending 
upon whether Sally is on Earth or Twin Earth. Sometime after a switch from Earth to Twin Earth 




equivalent natural kind twater. Thus, it should follow that Sally will be thinking thoughts with 
different contents depending upon which planet she is on.   
 (There may be complexities with respect to how Kripkean views of reference mesh with the 
case of Slow-Switching Sally that we need not here fully go into. Indeed, if we were to suppose that 
‘water’ on the lips of Sally acquires its reference via Sally being at the end of a Kripkean socio-
linguistic chain that has at its other end some mythic original baptisers of water, then the reference of 
‘water’, on the lips of Sally, is in danger of being the same on Twin Earth as it is on Earth. If so, then 
the contents of Sally’s ‘water’ thoughts will be the same on Twin Earth as they are on Earth. This is 
implausible, however. The Kripkean externalist cannot be committed to such a story of how ‘water’ 
gets its reference given that it has that consequence.)      
According to the redeployment thesis when Sally is on Earth and forms a second-order belief 
about her thinking that water is wet, the content of that belief will be reflective of her first-order 
thought in such a way that guarantees the truth of her belief. Symmetrically, when Sally is on Twin 
Earth, what’ll be the equivalent second-order belief – that she is thinking that twater is wet – is 
guaranteed to be true, because its content will be reflective of the content of the first-order thought – 
that twater is wet. 
For the redeployment thesis to be true it must be the case that there is a linking belief-forming 
process by which a subject comes to form a belief about what she is presently thinking, and that links 
that second-order belief to the first-order thought that that second-order belief will be about.  
If such a process can be successfully identified, and if the process can be said to be a priori, 
then that would – prima facie at least (see subsequent chapters) – present a strong case for supposing 
that we’d be able to know the contents of our thoughts a priori even if content externalism is true – 
that the two things could well be compatible.  
Likewise, if there is such a belief-forming process, and that process is a process by which a 
subject can acquire guaranteed-to-be-true second-order beliefs about her own thoughts, but would not 
also be a process by which a third-party can acquire guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about what a subject 
is thinking, then that would – prima facie at least – present a strong case for supposing that we’d be 
able to know what the contents of our own thoughts are better than anyone else. We’d have a 
privileged access to the contents of our own thoughts, even if content externalism is true      
In the next section we’ll be considering a candidate for what such a process could consist of 
that is presented by Burge (Burge, 1988). Burge’s candidate process could potentially be a priori. It 
would most definitely constitute a privileged method by which a subject can ascertain the content of 
her own thoughts. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) considers the discrimination argument. Proponents of the 
discrimination argument contend that slow-switch cases such as that of Slow-Switching Sally mean 
that the guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about our thought contents that we would have per the 
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redeployment thesis won’t constitute knowledge – even though such beliefs would be guaranteed to 
be true. In this present chapter we put that worry to one side.                    
 Subsequent chapters (Chapters 4-6) consider reductio arguments that if successful would 
seem to demonstrate that if content externalism were true, then there being an a priori process by 
which we can ascertain the contents of our thoughts would seem to mean that we’d also be able to 
ascertain things about the external world in a way that we ought not to be to be able to. Again, we put 
such worries to one side for the moment.  
 
2.2: The Burgean Candidate 
 
If I judge that: I am thinking that writing requires concentration, then it will indeed be the case that I 
am thinking that writing requires concentration. By the very act of making the judgement I am 
thinking the thought. The second-order belief that I will have formed by judging that I am thinking 
that writing requires concentration is guaranteed to be true, because the very process by which the 
belief has been formed has made the belief true. The judgement is self-verifying. It is through such 
cogito-like judgements that Burge proposes that we have an ultra-reliable way of ascertaining the 
content of our thoughts (Burge, 1988 – see also Boghossian, 1989, §III; Peacocke, 1996; MacDonald, 
1998; Sawyer, 2001; Spicer, 2009; 2011; Brueckner, 2011; 2015)23. A subject can judge that she is 
 
23 None of the cited authors seem to fully countenance what (I think) is the most pressing problem for Burge, which is the 
‘no provenance’ objection – see next section.    
That is, apart from Boghossian – see fn. 24. 
 Burge 1996, Peacocke 1996, and MacDonald 1998 all attempt to place the notion of cogito-like judgements in the 
wider context of the Burgean notion of ‘entitlement to self-knowledge’. This aspect is something else that this present thesis 
omits. Discussing it properly would require that we go beyond what is the very narrow focus of this present thesis. This does 
not necessarily mean that such considerations cannot be brought to bear on the specific lines of argument of this thesis. It 
just means that that’ll have to wait until potential sequels.     
 Sawyer 2001 is in a similar vein. In order to better elucidate the – actually very limited – role cogito-like 
judgements play in the bigger Burgean picture of self-knowledge Sawyer demonstrates that three putative counterexamples 
aren’t counterexamples. The first of which comes from Gallois: 
 
The…thesis that thinking that one thinks that p entails thinking that p…seems implausible. Surely I can 
mistakenly ascribe a thought to myself. Convinced by a dogmatic psychoanalyst I think that I think that my 
mother does not love me even though I have no such first-order thought.  
(Gallois, 1996, p. 173; quoted in Sawyer, 2001, p.111)   
 
Sawyer (correctly) identifies the mistake that Gallois is making which is that he doesn’t understand the very restricted 





thinking a thought with a certain content, because she is making that judgement it will indeed be the 
case that she is thinking a thought with that content, and thus the subject judges correctly. 
 If Slow-Switching Sally, whilst on Earth, were to judge that she was thinking that water is 
wet it will be the case that she is thinking that water is wet, and thus she judges correctly. Her judging 
that she is thinking that water is wet is the very thing that makes it the case that she is thinking the 
thought that water is wet. Now, both Burgean and Kripkean externalists should contend – although for 
slightly different reasons – that when Sally is on Twin Earth and makes the equivalent judgement, that 
judgement will have a different content to what it would be were Sally on Earth. Whereas on Earth 
Sally would judge that she is thinking that water is wet, when on Twin Earth she instead judges that 
she is thinking that twater is wet. And, it will indeed be the case that she is thinking that twater is wet, 
as her judging that she is thinking that twater is wet makes it the case that she is thinking that twater is 
wet. 
 Slow-Switching Sally would not be able to discriminate between a situation in which she is 
on Earth and judges that she is thinking that water is wet, and an equivalent situation in which she is 
on Twin Earth and judges that she is thinking that twater is wet. She would not be able to tell the 
difference. Thus, Sally cannot discriminate between the situation in which she is thinking that water is 
wet from the situation in which she is thinking that twater is wet. Proponents of the discrimination 
argument – which is to be the topic of the next chapter – maintain that because of this Sally cannot be 
said to know what she is thinking. It is worth emphasising, nevertheless, that in either situation there 
would be no way in which Sally’s judgement would be false. Proponents of the discrimination 
argument in effect contend that infallible true belief is not sufficient for knowledge.            
 It needs emphasising that Burge’s proposed process for thought self-ascription would have a 
very limited application. However, that limited application is the entire focus of this thesis. The 
process would only apply with respect to what a subject is presently thinking. Burge’s proposed 
 
…we need to distinguish between the thought I am thinking my mother does not love me and the thought I 
think my mother does not love me….the former is self-referential and self-verifying in virtue of being so, 
whereas the latter is an attribution of a standing state with which it can at best be contingently related.  
(Sawyer, 2001, p.119) 
 
The two other supposed counterexamples, which come from Goldberg and Bernecker (Goldberg, 2000; Bernecker, 1996), 
essentially make the same mistake.  
The Spicer and Brueckner exchange (Spicer, 2009; 2011; Brueckner, 2011; 2015) is very technical. It concerns an 
argument, advanced by Spicer, that aims to demonstrate that cogito-like judgements are not in fact self-verifying (essentially 
because cogito-like judgements do not share the same truth conditions as the first-order thoughts of which they are about). 
We are, in this present thesis, making a concession to Burge, and his defenders, in assuming that cogito-like judgements 
would indeed be self-verifying.   
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method of thought self-ascription could not be used by a subject to ascertain what she was thinking at 
any earlier moment in time. She would not be able to use the method to determine what she was 
thinking when she stood taking in the Mona Lisa during a recent Paris visit (say). Nor could the 
subject use the method to determine what she was thinking a few moments ago.     
Burge’s proposal would bestow a subject with a privileged method by which she can ascertain 
the content of her own thoughts, however. Indeed, this is (hopefully) very easy to see. The necessary 
asymmetry is obvious. If I judge that you are thinking that writing requires concentration, then it may 
or may not – most probably not – be the case that you are thinking that writing requires concentration. 
But, if I judge that I am thinking that writing requires concentration, then it will be the case that I am 
thinking that writing requires concentration, because my making the judgement that I am thinking that 
writing requires concentration makes it the case that I am thinking that writing requires concentration. 
My making the judgement that you are thinking that writing requires concentration would not make it 
the case that you are thinking that writing requires concentration.  
Since Burge does not seem to explain what the provenance of cogito-like judgments could be 
– see next section – it is not entirely clear whether they’d actually be a priori. Thus, all we can say is 
that they would potentially be a priori.      
 
2.3: The ‘No Provenance’ Objection and the ‘No Phenomenology’ Problem: A Cliff Hanger  
 
If I judge that I am thinking that writing requires concentration, then it will indeed be the case that I 
am thinking that writing requires concentration. But what is it that prompts me to make that 
judgement in the first place? That is something that Burge does not explain.24  
Now, surely the reason why I would judge that writing requires concentration should be based 
on the fact I am thinking that writing requires concentration. I shouldn’t just judge that I am thinking 
that writing requires concentration apropos of nothing. The appropriate event should precede the 
judgement. That event should presumptively be my thinking that writing requires concentration. 
 
24 C.f. Boghossian: 
 
We are struck by our ability to know, non-inferentially and authoritatively, that a certain mental event has 
occurred, immediately on its having occurred. We think: Writing requires concentration. And then we know, 
directly and unproblematically, that that is what we thought. A first-order thought occurs. And we are then 
able, without benefit of inference, to form a correct judgement about what the thought was. The second-order 
judgement in these central cases is not self-verifying…How does [Burge’s] proposal help explain how they 
are possible? The fact that had the thought been part of a second-order judgment, then that judgement would 
have been self-verifying, does not help explain how we are able to know what thought it was, given that it 
wasn’t part of such a judgement.  




However, it is not clear how it is that such an event would prompt me to make the judgement that I 
am thinking that writing requires concentration. As was noted in the opening paragraph of this thesis 
thoughts produce no phenomenology (§0.0 – see also §0.3). Thus, it is not clear how I would be made 
aware of the event describable as ‘my thinking that writing requires concentration’ that accordingly 
causes me to make the judgement that I am thinking that writing requires concentration.      
 What we have here is a problem for Burge’s account of thought self-ascription, and a problem 
that we encounter when we try to remedy the situation, which is a problem that any account of 
thought self-ascription would need to overcome. We can call these two problems the ‘no provenance’ 
objection and the ‘no phenomenology’ problem. Burge’s proposal is missing an explanation of why 
I’d make the judgement that I am thinking that writing requires concentration in the first place. This is 
the ‘no provenance’ objection. When we consider how we might complete Burge, or might construct 
an alternative, by considering what might cause me to make the judgment that I am thinking that 
writing requires concentration, our efforts are stymied by the realisation that thought produces no 
phenomenology. This is the ‘no phenomenology’ problem. We have thus arrived at the afore-
mentioned cliff hanger.  
 It is worth emphasising that even if we were to suppose that the content of our thoughts is 
decided by factors that are entirely internal – i.e. if we were to reject content externalism – we’d still 
face the same problems, if, or when, we turn to the question of how thought self-ascription works.  
I leave the resolution of this cliff hanger to the final chapter of this thesis. In the interim 
chapters, we will be in effect taking seriously the possibility that the redeployment thesis is true, and 
that crucially the linking belief-forming process so required by the redeployment thesis, whether or 
not it would be as Burge describes, will be a priori. In the next chapter we will be in effect making the 
concession to compatibilists that the redeployment thesis would be true, even if content externalism is 
true, and that the requisite linking belief-forming process is a priori. We will be considering whether 
‘slow-switching’ cases such as that of Slow-Switching Sally, that would be possible if content 
externalism were true, would mean that the guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about our thought contents 
that we should have per the redeployment thesis won’t always constitute knowledge, if content 
externalism were indeed true. In the subsequent chapters, we will in effect be making an ex hypothesi 
assumption that something like the redeployment thesis is true and that the requisite linking process is 
a priori, along with the ex hypothesi assumption that content externalism is true, to consider whether 
those two ex hypothesi assumptions lead to absurdities.
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3.0: Introduction to Chapter 3 
 
Consider (again) the case of Slow-Switching Sally. Slow-Switching Sally was born here on Earth but 
at various points in her life history has been routinely transported between Earth and the Twin Earth 
of Putnam’s thought experiment (see Chapter 1, §1.23 and §1.32). (We need not concern ourselves 
with why or how Sally is subject to such incredible universe spanning journeys.) By such switches, 
Sally has spent a significant amount of her life on both Earth and Twin Earth. She could spend (say) 
seven months on Earth before being transported to Twin Earth. She could then spend the next 
eighteen months (say) on Twin Earth, after which she is then transported back to Earth – and so on 
and so forth. Sally is totally unaware that such an extraordinary thing keeps on happening to her. As 
far as she’s concerned it’s as if all her life takes place on only the one planet. If content externalism is 
true, then it should follow that after Slow-Switching Sally has spent a sufficient amount of time on 
Twin Earth after a switch, the thought that she’d express as ‘water is wet’ should change its content. 
And, the same should happen when Sally returns to Earth, that is, the content should change back to 
what it originally was on Earth. Whereas when on Earth Sally may be thinking that water is wet, if she 
happened to be on Twin Earth she would instead be thinking that twater is wet.  
It is argued that because Slow-Switching Sally would be unable to discriminate through a 
priori means her being on Earth and thinking that water is wet from her being on Twin Earth and 
thinking that twater is wet she cannot be said to know a priori that she is thinking that water is wet, 
when she is on Earth and thinking that water is wet. Thus, if content externalism were true there 
would be cases in which someone does not know a priori what they are thinking. This essentially is 
what has become known as the discrimination argument (Brown, 2004), and is attributable to 
Boghossian (Boghossian, 1989).  
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3.1: The Discrimination Argument 
 
The dialectical impetus of the discrimination argument is provided by Goldman’s famous ‘fake barn’ 
case (Goldman, 1977).   
Bert is driving through the countryside when he happens to see a barn. Bert forms the true 
belief that what he is looking at is a barn.  
There will be innumerable possible worlds within which it won’t be the case that Bert is 
looking at a barn. For instance, there will be worlds in which a crop silo stands where the barn stands 
in actuality. There will also be more distant possible worlds in which what Bert is looking at is not in 
fact a barn but is a hollow film-set-like structure that has been purposefully made to look exactly like 
a barn. There will also be even more distant worlds in which Bert is a BIV (a brain in a vat) and the 
grand computer simulation to which he is plugged into is leading him to falsely believe that he is 
looking at a barn.  
In a world in which Bert was looking at a crop silo, as opposed to a barn, things would seem 
different to Bert to how they actually seem. If Bert were looking at a crop silo and not a barn, he’d be 
very much aware of it. He can discriminate his looking at a barn from his looking at a crop silo. Thus, 
Bert is able to rule out the possibility that he is looking at a crop silo. 
In a world in which Bert was looking at a fake barn, i.e. a hollow film-set-like structure that 
has been purposefully made to look exactly like a barn, things would not seem any different to Bert to 
how they actually seem. Bert cannot rule out the possibility that he is looking at a fake barn. 
In a world in which Bert was a BIV, things, again, would not seem any different to Bert to 
how they actually seem. Bert cannot rule out the possibility that he is a BIV.         
Consider now the case of Russ. Like Bert, Russ is driving through the countryside and 
happens to see a barn, and forms the true belief that he is looking at a barn. Unlike in the case of Bert 
however, there is something peculiar about the region that Russ is driving through. Russ is driving 
through a region where, unbeknownst to Russ, there is, for some reason or other, a large number of 
hollow film-set-like structures that have purposefully been made to look exactly like barns, i.e. there 
is a large number of fake barns.  
Russ would, like Bert, be able to rule out, based on how things seem to him, the possibility 
that he is looking at a crop silo. He, also like Bert, would not be able to rule out the possibility that he 
is looking at a fake barn, nor would he be able to rule out the possibility that he is a BIV.  
 Standardly it is held that Bert would know that he was looking at a barn, whereas Russ could 
not know that he is looking at a barn.  
A necessary condition for knowledge is that a putative knower must be able to rule out all and 




which it is not the case that they are looking at a barn that are relevant, if it is to be said that they are 
to know that they are looking at a barn.  
Neither Russ nor Bert can rule out the possibility that they are a BIV. But, in neither the case 
of Russ nor Bert are such possibilities relevant. The possibility that Bert is looking at a crop silo 
constitutes a relevant alternative, as does the possibility that Russ is looking at a crop silo. But both 
Bert and Russ are able to rule out such possibilities.  
Neither Bert nor Russ can rule out the possibility that they are looking at a fake barn. They 
would not be able to discriminate between their looking at a real barn from their looking at a fake. In 
the case of Bert, this will not in itself prevent his true belief that he is looking at a barn from 
qualifying as knowledge. But it does in the case of Russ. Russ does not know that he is looking at a 
barn because he cannot discriminate his looking at a barn from his looking at a fake. Of course, 
neither can Bert. But in the case of Bert that possibility does not constitute a relevant alternative. It 
does in the case of Russ because Russ is driving through ‘fake barn’ country, and it could very easily 
have been the case that he was looking at a fake barn as opposed to a real one.  
The redeployment thesis (see Chapter 2, §2.1) states that when Oscar – one half of the 
dramatis personae of Putnam’s original ‘Twin Earth’ (see Chapter 1, §1.23 and §1.32) – reflects upon 
what he is thinking and forms, presumptively through a priori means (see Chapter 2), the belief that he 
is thinking that water is wet, that believe is guaranteed to be true (because its content will be reflective 
of the thought of which it is about). 
Now, in the case of Oscar, there will be counterfactual scenarios in which that guaranteed-to-
be-true belief would be false. If sometime before the thought, Oscar had been the unwitting victim of 
the sort of switches Slow-Switching Sally periodically undergoes, and had been transported to Twin 
Earth, then Oscar would not have been thinking what he was actually thinking. He would be thinking 
that twater is wet as opposed to thinking that water is wet. In such a counterfactual scenario, Oscar 
would not form the belief that he is thinking that water is wet. He’d form what would be the true 
belief that he is thinking that twater is wet. But it would still, nevertheless, be the case that he is 
thinking something other to what he is actually thinking, and in which his actual belief would be false. 
Oscar is not able to discriminate between the actual and such a counterfactual scenario. Oscar is not 
able to discriminate through a priori means between his being on Earth and thinking that water is wet 
from his being on Twin Earth and thinking that twater is wet. This, following Goldmanian logic, 
would disqualify Oscar’s belief from counting as knowledge if such a counterfactual scenario 
constitutes a relevant alternative. But it does not. Symmetrically, all this will, of course, be true, 
mutatis mutandis, of Twin Oscar – the other half of the dramatis personae of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ – 
as well.  
Similarly, when Arthritic Alf – the star of Burge’s famous ‘arthritis’ thought experiment (see 
Chapter 1, §1.22) – reflects upon what he is thinking, and forms a belief with respect to his ‘arthritis’ 
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thought, via similar ex hypothesi a priori means, there will be counterfactual scenarios in which that 
belief is false. In counterfactual scenarios in which ‘arthritis’ is defined by medical practitioners and 
the like to encompass a wider range of ailments, it will not be the case that Alf is thinking what he is 
actually thinking. In such counterfactual scenarios everything would seem to Alf exactly as it actually 
does. But such counterfactual scenarios would not constitute relevant alternatives. Thus, such 
counterfactual scenarios do not preclude Alf’s belief from qualifying as knowledge.       
Consider now the case of Slow-Switching Sally. The redeployment thesis states that Slow-
Switching Sally, regardless of what planet she is on, should be able to form, presumptively via a priori 
means, guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about what she is thinking. Suppose she is on Earth and forms 
the belief that she is thinking that water is wet. Like in the case of Oscar, there will be counterfactual 
scenarios in which her belief would be false. If she had undergone a switch sometime before her 
thought, then she would not have been thinking what she was actually thinking. She would be 
thinking that twater is wet as opposed to thinking that water is wet. In such a counterfactual scenario 
Sally would not form the belief that she is thinking that water is wet. Sally would instead form what 
would be the true belief that she is thinking that twater is wet. But it would still, nevertheless, be the 
case that she is thinking something other to what she is actually thinking. Sally is not able to 
discriminate a priori between the actual and such a counterfactual scenario. She is not able to 
discriminate between her being on Earth and thinking that water is wet from her being on Twin Earth 
and thinking that twater is wet. This, following Goldmanian logic, should disqualify Sally’s belief 
from counting as knowledge, if such a counterfactual scenario constitutes a relevant alternative. In the 
case of Oscar such a counterfactual scenario does not constitute a relevant alternative, as Oscar is not 
being routinely switched between Earth and Twin Earth like Sally. Since Sally is being periodically 
switched from Earth to Twin Earth, a counterfactual scenario in which Sally is on Twin Earth thinking 
that twater is wet does constitute a relevant alternative. Hence, following Goldmanian logic, Sally’s 
belief that she is thinking that water is wet cannot count as knowledge.  
The cases of Oscar and Slow-Switching Sally and the cases of Bert and Russ are exactly 
analogous. Both Bert and Russ are unable to discriminate between the actual and a counterfactual 
scenario in which they a looking at a fake barn. Both Oscar and Sally are unable to discriminate the 
actual from a counterfactual scenario in which they are on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet. For 
Bert a counterfactual scenario in which he is looking at a fake barn does not constitute a relevant 
alternative. But, since Russ is driving through ‘fake barn’ country, a counterfactual scenario in which 
he is looking at a fake barn does constitute a relevant alternative. Thus, Russ’s belief that he is 
looking at a barn is precluded from qualifying as knowledge, though Bert’s belief is not. For Oscar a 
counterfactual scenario in which he is on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet does not constitute a 
relevant alternative. For Sally, on the other hand, a counterfactual scenario in which she is on Twin 




switched between the two planets, it could very easily have been the case that she were on Twin Earth 
thinking that twater is wet. Thus, Sally’s belief is precluded from qualifying as knowledge, whereas 
Oscar’s is not. This is the discrimination argument. 
Proponents of the discrimination argument concede that Slow-Switching Sally per the 
redeployment thesis is able to, either through the Burgean mechanism characterised in the previous 
chapter (§2.2) or otherwise, form guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about what she is thinking. Proponents 
of the discrimination argue that, nevertheless, such guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs cannot constitute 
knowledge, because of the knowledge-precluding relevant alternatives that there are in the case of 
Slow-Switching Sally.      
  
3.2: Responses to the Discrimination Argument 
 
3.21: Warfield’s Response 
 
Warfield (1992) argues that the discrimination argument would only have any teeth if slow-switching 
cases were actual real-world occurrences. They are not. In the case of Slow-Switching Sally, when 
she thinks that water is wet, her thinking that twater is wet is a relevant alternative. But when we think 
that water is wet, although we may not be able to distinguish this from our thinking that twater is wet, 
our thinking that twater is wet does not constitute a relevant alternative. We live in the real world, and 
not in some contrived philosophical thought experiment. 
In response to Warfield, Ludlow (1995) has argued that, Burgean externalism (see my 
Chapter 1) entails a “prevalence” of real-world slow-switch cases. We, almost certainly, are not 
routinely switched from Earth to Twin Earth. We are all potentially victims of slow-switch cases of 
another sort, however. Consider the case of Biff. Biff, due to his job, spends a significant proportion 
of his life in either America or Britain. He may whilst nominally living in Britain keep on having to 
spend two-to-four-month stints in America. Unbeknownst to Biff, in America ‘chicory’ has a different 
meaning to what it has in Britain. It refers to a similar but different species of edible plant. Biff 
concerned about his health may have thoughts to the effect that he should eat more vegetables. He 
may think to himself specifically that eating some chicory might be a good idea. Ludlow supposes 
that the relationship between Biff and the term ‘chicory’ is analogous to the relationship that Alf the 
Arthritis sufferer has with the term ‘arthritis’. Biff will have a moderate degree of linguistic 
competence with respect to the term ‘chicory’, even though he won’t know the term’s precise 
definition. Following Burgean logic, this should mean that the content of thoughts that Biff would 
express using the term ‘chicory’ should be determined by his wider socio-linguistic community in the 
same way that Alf’s wider socio-linguistic community determine what thought Alf would express 
when using the term ‘arthritis’. An adherent to Burgean externalism should maintain that the thoughts 
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that Biff would express using the term would have a different content depending upon whether Biff is 
in America or in Britain.   
Biff would be able to discriminate between his being in America from his being in Britain. 
However, the way in which Biff does so will be via a posteriori judgments about his external 
environment – about which side of the Atlantic Ocean he is on. If, however, we suppose that Biff is 
able to make a priori judgements with respect to what he is thinking (see my Chapter 2), then 
Goldmanian logic dictates that such judgements cannot constitute knowledge.   
Ludlow suggests a number of other instances of everyday slow-switching cases. One such is 
the case of Griff. Griff spends some of his time in philosophical circles where he often hears 
‘pragmatists’ being spoken of. The word ‘pragmatists’ has a different usage in such philosophical 
circles to what it has in non-philosophical circles. In the former the word is used to refer to the likes of 
Pierce and James. In the latter it is used to refer to those who are guided more by practical 
considerations than by ideals. The Burgean externalist should, similarly, maintain that depending 
upon whether Griff is cavorting with his philosopher pals, or whether he is chatting with his other 
more pedestrian acquaintances, Griff could entertain thoughts with different contents about 
‘pragmatists’.            
In response to Ludlow, Brown (2004, pp.138-142) has argued that the sort of slow switch 
cases invoked by Ludlow cannot be as prevalent as Ludlow supposes.25  
Brown delineates three criteria that a bona-fide Ludlowian slow-switch case would need to 
meet. There would need, firstly, to be a subject who “is slowly switched between two linguistic 
communities that share a single word but define it differently” (ibid., p.139). Secondly, that subject 
 
25 Warfield has given what is frankly a bizarre counter-response to Ludlow (Warfield, 1997). Warfield notes that at best what 
Ludlow’s everyday slow-switching cases demonstrate is that in some possible worlds including the actual world content 
externalism being true would be incompatible with our having a priori knowledge of the content of our own thoughts. What 
it doesn’t show is that in every possible world externalism is incompatible with our having a priori knowledge of our thought 
content. The sort of everyday slow-switch cases described by Ludlow won’t occur in every possible world:  
 
The problem that Ludlow and Boghossian face is not merely a problem of detail. The kind of argument they 
offer couldn't possibly show that externalism is incompatible with privileged [a priori – see my Chapter 7, 
§7.2] self-knowledge. To show that these doctrines are incompatible one needs to show that every possible 
world in which externalism is true is a world in which individuals do not have privileged [a priori] self-
knowledge. Boghossian shows at most that some possible worlds are worlds in which externalism is true and 
individuals lack privileged self-knowledge and Ludlow shows at most that one world, the actual world, is a 
world in which externalism is true and (some) individuals lack privileged self-knowledge. 
(ibid., p.284, Warfield’s emphases) 
 
This seems a considerable retreat on the part of Warfield. Surely compatibilists should want it shown to be the case that in 




would need to be “ignorant of this linguistic difference” (ibid.). Thirdly and finally, the subject would 
need to be “a competent speaker of both languages” (ibid.). Specifically, the subject must be 
‘competent’ with respect to the word that changes from socio-linguistic community to socio-linguistic 
community.  
Brown then argues that these three criteria “are not normally jointly met” (ibid., p.141). She 
contends that if there were cases in which all three criteria were met, then the differences between the 
socio-linguistic communities involved would breakdown. They’d become one. Hence it would cease 
to be the case that the subjects who would be switching between the socio-linguistic communities 
would be switching between different socio-linguistic communities. Suppose there is a term ˹φ˺ that 
has different meanings within two linguistic communities. Suppose that it is common for subjects to 
be switched between the two linguistic communities. Suppose also that it is common for those 
subjects to be ignorant of there being a difference in the meaning of ˹φ˺, and yet otherwise be 
considered competent with respect to the use of ˹φ˺. Brown contends that if that were to happen, then 
the two linguistic communities would eventually “settle on a single meaning” (ibid.) for ˹φ˺.   
Even if this is true, it is unclear why it would entail that Brown’s three criteria “are not 
normally jointly met”. It may be that because of persons such as Biff switching between Britain and 
America it will eventually happen that ‘chicory’ will come to mean the same in America as it does in 
Britain. However, that hasn’t happened yet. Thus, it may still be that Biff and persons similar to Biff – 
who switch between Britain and America, and who are ignorant of the difference in the meaning of 
‘chicory’ – could presently meet Brown’s three criteria – even though they may cease to do so in the 
future. And thus, it may still be that the content of Biff’s and others’ ‘chicory’ thoughts do indeed 
change in the way that Ludlow supposes, even though that may cease to be the case at some future 
date.               
 
3.22: The Reliabilist Response 
 
What we can call the reliabilist response to the discrimination argument (Falvey and Owens, 1994; 
McLaughlin and Tye, 1998b)26 proposes a reinterpretation of Goldman’s ‘fake barn’. It suggests that 
 
26 There are differences in the details of Falvey and Owens’s response and McLaughlin and Tye’s response. But those 
differences are ultimately superficial. 
Falvey and Owens characterise the discrimination argument as resting on the following assumption: 
 
(FO1) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and (ii) S’s belief that p is based on evidence that is compatible with 
it being the case that q, then S does not know that p. 
 




Slow-Switching Sally’s belief that she is thinking that water is wet is based on introspective evidence that would seem the 
same to Sally were she were on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet. It would have the same phenomenological character. 
Thus, the evidence available to Sally would be the same if she were on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet. That is, it 
would if the ‘sameness of evidence’ is to be identified with sameness of phenomenological character. Thus, the evidence 
available will be compatible with it being the case that she is thinking that water is wet. Thus, Sally and her belief that she is 
thinking that water is wet satisfies the antecedent of (FO1). And thus, if (FO1) is correct, then Sally cannot know that she is 
thinking that water is wet. 
Falvey and Owens characterise the impetus for (FO1) as coming from ‘fake barn’. They suggest, however, that 
(FO1) might be the wrong conclusion to draw from ‘fake barn’. They suggest an alternative conclusion. They suggest that 
rather than it being a tacit commitment to (FO1) that prejudices us against ascribing Russ knowledge, it is instead a 
commitment to:      
 
(FO2) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p and (ii) S’s justification for their belief that p is such that, if q were 
true, then S would still belief that p, then S does not know that p.  
 
If Russ – who is driving through ‘fake barn’ country – sees a barn, and hence forms the true belief that what he is looking at 
is a barn, then (i) Russ looking at a fake barn constitutes a relevant alternative, and (ii) Russ would still belief that what he is 
looking at is a barn if what he was looking at were a fake. That is why Russ doesn’t know that what he is looking is a barn.  
Although (FO2) disqualifies Russ’s belief that he is looking at a barn from counting as knowledge, it does not has 
disqualify Slow-Switching Sally’s belief that she is thinking that water is wet from counting as knowledge. The case of 
Slow-Switching Sally does not meet both of the criteria stated in the antecedent of (FO2). It meets the first, but not the 
second.   
McLaughlin and Tye suggest that a rejection of (FO1) in favour of (FO2) may not be the correct conclusion to 
draw from ‘fake barn’. Consider the case of Dennis the Diviner. There is a wide-spread rumour that Dennis the Diviner is all 
too aware of, which is that an evil wizard has been going around turning peoples’ brains into sawdust. Dennis worried that 
he’s a victim removes the entrails of a chicken. By sheer coincidence, the reading from the chicken entrails suggests that 
Dennis has nothing to worry about – that he does have a brain after all. Based on that reading Dennis forms the true belief 
that he has a brain. Now, it is highly unlikely that Dennis has a head full of sawdust. However, given the nature of Dennis’s 
enquiry, it would still be a relevant alternative that Dennis’s head is full of sawdust. (In a similar way, my being a brain in a 
vat would be a relevant alternative with respect to the question of whether I know that I am not a brain in a vat.) If Dennis’s 
brain were made of sawdust, then the chicken entrails would still give Dennis the reading that he has a brain. Thus, Dennis’s 
evidence that he has a brain would be compatible with him not having a brain. Thus (FO1) applied to Dennis gives us the 
correct result that Dennis doesn’t know that he has a brain. Dennis and his belief that he has a brain does not however satisfy 
the antecedent of (FO2). If Oscar’s brain were full of sawdust, then he could not form any belief at all. Let alone the false 
belief that he has a brain and his head isn’t full of sawdust. Thus (FO2) is “silent” where (FO1) gives us the correct result. 
McLaughlin and Tye contend that that gives us some grounds for not jettisoning (FO1) in favour of (FO2). (McLaughlin and 
Tye, 1998b, p.356, fn.15). 
McLaughlin and Tye (ibid.) characterise the discrimination argument as consisting of an incompatible quadruple 
of assumptions. The first of which is the principle that Falvey and Owens reject: 
 
(FO1) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and (ii) S’s belief that p is based on evidence that is compatible with 






Secondly there is:  
 
The Introspective Evidence Thesis. Introspective [i.e. a priori] knowledge of what we are occurrently thinking is based 
on evidence that we can introspect. 
(ibid., p.358) 
 
Thirdly, there is the assumption that we are able to know a priori what the contents of our own thoughts are – which 
McLaughlin and Tye label “privileged access”. Fourth and finally, we have:  
 
The Alternative Thought Thesis. For at least one type of occurent thought that P, there is some possible 
circumstance in which one is occurently thinking that P, one’s faculty of introspection is functioning 
properly, and the evidence that one can introspect is compatible with it being the case that one is thinking 
some relevant alternative thought that Q.   
(ibid., p.358) 
 
McLaughlin and Tye concede that these four assumptions do indeed form an incompatible quadruple. They suggest that our 
way out of that incompatible quadruple is to deny the alternative thought thesis. They argue that externalists are free to do 
so, and are free to do so without rejecting the other three assumptions – so without rejecting (FO1). McLaughlin and Tye 
maintain that externalism would only imply the alternative thought thesis if the following were true:    
 
The Underdetermination Thesis. For at least one type of occurent thought that P, whether one is occurently thinking that 
P (at t) fails to supervene on the evidence introspectively available to one (at t). 
(ibid., p.360)  
 
McLaughlin and Tye contend that externalists are free to reject this underdetermination thesis. It is not entailed by 
externalism. Hence externalists are free to reject the alternative thought thesis. 
 McLaughlin and Tye contend that externalists can reject the underdetermination thesis if they understand the 
‘evidence’ that per the introspective evidence thesis should ground our knowledge of our thought contents, in terms of its 
causal powers as opposed to its phenomenological character. Suppose that slow-switching Sally is (on Earth) thinking that 
water is wet. There should be some sort of mental item(s) that Sally can introspect, and on which Sally can take as 
‘evidence’ that she is thinking that water is wet. That mental item should have a certain phenomenological character. If 
counterfactually Sally were on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet then there’d be a mental item that corresponds to that 
thought. That mental item would have the very same phenomenological character as the mental item that corresponds to 
Sally’s actual thought that water is wet. However, the mental item would have different causal powers. It would cause Sally 
to belief that she is thinking that twater is wet, as opposed to causing her to think that water is wet.  
We have here two criteria for the sameness of evidence. Under one criterion the ‘evidence’ introspectively 
available to Sally would be the same if she were thinking that twater is wet. Thus, Sally’s evidence that she is thinking that 
water is wet will be compatible with her thinking that twater is wet. This would validate McLaughlin and Tye’s 
underdetermination thesis. That in turn would imply the alternative thoughts thesis, and we would be faced with the 
incompatibility quadruple.  
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the conclusion that is standardly drawn from ‘fake barn’ may in fact be the wrong one. The reason 
why Russ does not know that he is looking at a barn is not because he is unable to discriminate 
between his looking at a barn and a relevant alternative in which he is looking at a fake barn. Russ 
does not know that he is looking at a barn because if those relevant alternatives in which Russ is 
looking at a fake barn were the case, then the method by which Russ attains his actual belief would 
cause Russ to form the false belief that he is looking at a barn.  
 If this is the real reason why Russ does not know that he is looking at a barn, then the analogy 
between Russ and Slow-Switching Sally, which is what drives the discrimination argument, collapses. 
Slow-Switching Sally is on Earth and thinking that water is wet. She forms the a priori belief that she 
is thinking that water is wet. A relevant alternative may be that Sally is on Twin Earth and thinking 
that twater is wet. However, if that relevant alternative was the case, then Sally would not form the 
false belief that she is thinking that water is wet.  
That is, she wouldn’t if the redeployment thesis is true (see Chapter 2). The redeployment 
thesis states that the (presumptively) a priori second-order beliefs that a subject forms with respect to 
what she is thinking will have content that is reflective of the first-order thoughts of which they are 
about, in such a way that guarantees their truth. When Slow-Switching Sally is on Earth she would 
form the belief that she is thinking that water is wet, which will be true because on Earth she will be 
thinking that water is wet. Whereas when Sally is on Twin Earth, she would not form the belief that 
she is thinking that water is wet. She would instead form the belief that she is thinking that twater is 
wet, which will be true because it will be the case that when she is on Twin Earth she will be thinking 
that twater is wet.   
 Similarly, when Biff and Griff form (presumptively a priori) beliefs with respect to their 
respective ‘chicory’ and ‘pragmatist’ thoughts, there will be relevant alternatives in which they are not 
thinking what they are actually thinking, and in which their respective beliefs are false. But, according 
to the redeployment thesis, within such relevant alternatives, Biff and Griff would not form what 
 
However, under the other criterion, the evidence introspectively available to Sally wouldn’t be the same if she 
were (on Twin Earth) thinking that twater is wet – as it is individuated in terms of causal powers – and thus wouldn’t be 
compatible with her thinking that twater is wet. If this latter view of ‘evidence’ is correct, then it undermines the 
underdetermination thesis. Thus, we could reject the underdetermination thesis. Hence, we could reject the alternative 
thought thesis – as opposed to (FO1). 
 Falvey and Owen and Mclaughlin and Tye give accounts of why Slow-Switching Sally’s belief that she is thinking 
that water is wet counts as knowledge that, although differ in some of their details, both ultimately and essentially argue that 
Sally’s belief counts has knowledge even though she is not able to discriminate between her being on Earth and thinking that 
water is wet, from her being on Twin Earth and thinking that twater is wet.  
 Both accounts invoke phenomenological evidence that Sally supposedly uses to self-ascribe her thought that water 
is wet. This shared detail is problematic. Thoughts (at least by assumption – see Introduction, §0.3) produce no 




would be false beliefs about what they would be thinking. They’d form, instead, true beliefs that have 
content that is reflective of what they would counterfactually be thinking.   
 Now, it may be thought that if this re-interpretation of ‘fake barn’ is accepted then that should 
allow us to conclude that any instance in which a subject reflects upon her thoughts and forms, via an 
a priori means, a belief that she is thinking that <p> is an instance in which that subject knows that 
she is thinking that <p>. Such beliefs would be such that a subject could only form them if it is true. A 
subject could only form the belief that she is thinking that <p> if she is thinking that <p>. When a 
subject does form the belief that she is thinking that <p>, there may be relevant alternatives in which 
things would seem to the subject exactly as they actually are, but in which the subject is not thinking 
that <p>, as there is in the case of Slow-Switching Sally, and as there are in the cases of Biff and 
Griff. But, within those relevant alternatives the subject would not form the false belief that she is 
thinking that <p>. Brown, however, does present a putative case in which a subject does form the sort 
of belief being described, but in which putatively that belief does not count as knowledge.     
 Brown presents the case of Wasp-Phobic Wendy (Brown, 2004, p.115). Wasp-Phobic Wendy 
has a phobia of wasps. She is prone to imagine that she is hearing a wasp when there isn’t one there. 
She hears a wasp. That is, she actually hears an actual wasp. She doesn’t just imagine that she is 
hearing a wasp. Wendy thinks a perceptually demonstrative singular thought that has as its object the 
wasp that she hears, and that she’d express ‘that wasp is near’. Wendy forms the a priori belief that 
she is thinking that thought.  
 Brown characterises three broad forms of content externalism – see below (§3.23-7). One of 
which is what she calls “singular anti-individualism”27, which is the thesis that “a subject’s thought 
contents are individuated partly by the particular objects that are in her environment” (ibid., p.13-4). 
More specifically, singular anti-individualism holds that singular thoughts have contents that are in 
part individuated by the object of which they are about. Changing the object of a singular thought 
changes its content. Kripkean externalism is a form of singular anti-individualism.28 Burgean 
externalism is not (see Chapter 1, §1.4). A singular thought, according to the singular anti-
individualist, is a thought that owes its very content to, and thus requires the existence of, the object of 
which it is about. A perceptual demonstrative singular thought is a singular thought that has as its 
object something that is presently within the thinker’s perceptual field, and thus requires that object to 
exist. Wendy’s perceptual demonstrative singular thought ‘that wasp is near’ requires “that wasp” to 
exist  
 
27 Brown prefers the term ‘anti-individualism’ to ‘content externalism’. The two terms can be and are used interchangeably.  
28 The philosophers that Brown deems to be singular anti-individualists along with Kripke are Perry (1979), Evans (1982), 
Peacocke (1983), McDowell (1986), Salmon (1986), Soames (1987), and Kaplan (1989).   
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 Consider, a counterfactual scenario in which things seems to Wendy exactly has they actually 
are, but in which there is no wasp. There is only a wasp in Wendy’s imagination. Due to Wendy being 
prone to hearing imaginary wasps, such a counterfactual scenario in which she imagines hearing a 
wasp should be a relevant alternative. Within the counterfactual scenario, Wendy cannot be thinking a 
perceptual demonstrative singular thought that has a wasp as its object, as there is no wasp.  
There are several options with respect to what we could suppose is going on in this 
counterfactual – in which ‘that wasp’ does not exist. One option is to suppose that Wendy’s thought 
could be descriptive. Wendy could be thinking the thought that: the F is near, where ‘the F’ would be 
some definite description that Wendy believes her imaginary wasp to uniquely satisfy. A second 
option is that Wendy is not thinking a thought at all. She is suffering from what is known as an 
illusion of thought (Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1986). Although it would seem to Wendy that she was 
thinking a thought, she in fact wouldn’t be. A third option is to suppose that Wendy is thinking a 
singular thought. That singular thought, however, does not have as its object an actual flesh-and-blood 
wasp. It has as its object an illusory wasp, which only Wendy can hear – ‘that wasp’ does in fact exist 
in some sense, but not in the sense that Wendy believes it to exist.      
The first option is problematic. It requires assent to a sort of second order externalism, 
whereby it is certain external factors that determine the logical form of a thought. This, as we’ll be 
seeing in Chapter 6 (§6.2) of this thesis, is problematic29. For reasons that will be intimated elsewhere 
in the thesis (e.g. Chapter 4, §4.211), I believe that the third option may be viable however. In any 
case, let us suppose anyway that only the second option is open to us. Wendy, let us suppose, would 
suffer an illusion of thought.  
If Wendy would be suffering an illusion of thought, then she would not be able to form the 
belief that she actually does form. Similar to how she would be suffering an illusion of thought, she 
would also be suffering an illusion of belief. Thus, the method by which Wendy forms her actual 
belief would not cause her, within the counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp, to form what 
would be the false belief that she is thinking the thought ‘that wasp is near’. This, prima facie, should 
mean that her actual belief can still count as knowledge, as our relevant alternative is not one in which 
Wendy forms a belief that is false.       
Suppose now that when Wendy formed her belief, she also, based on her belief, formed the 
belief that she is thinking a bona-fide waspy thought – i.e. she is not suffering an illusion of thought. 
This belief in the actual case would be true. In our counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp, 
 
29 To be clear, it is me who is saying that it is problematic, not Brown. Brown, in fact distinguishes between two forms of 
“singular anti-individualism”. The first of which – what Brown calls “the descriptive version” (Brown, 2004, p.16) – holds 
that in the counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp, Wendy would think a descriptive thought. According to the 




Wendy would still form this belief, and it would be false, as Wendy would be suffering an illusion of 
thought.  
Brown argues that if it is maintained that global reliability is required for knowledge, and not 
just local reliability, then because Wendy would form the false belief that she is thinking a bona-fide 
waspy thought in our counterfactual scenario, Wendy’s belief that she is thinking the thought ‘that 
wasp is near’ cannot count as knowledge.  
Suppose a subject S forms a true belief that <p> is the case via a method of belief formation 
M. That method of belief formation M will be locally reliable just in case there are no relevant 
alternatives in which <p> is not the case, but M would still cause S to form the false belief that <p> is 
the case. The method of belief formation M will be globally reliable just in case M is and would be 
locally reliable with respect to a range of propositions that are similar to <p>. M is globally reliable 
just in case, for any true proposition <q> that M might cause S to believe, and that is similar to <p>, 
there will be no relevant alternatives in which <q> is not the case, but M would still cause S to form 
the false belief that <q> is the case. 
Brown argues that the proposition <Wendy is thinking a bona-fide waspy thought> is the 
same sort of proposition that forms the content of Wendy’s other belief, which is <Wendy is thinking 
the thought ‘that wasp is near’ >, because both propositions concern what Wendy is currently 
thinking. Thus, the method by which Wendy has acquired her belief that she is thinking the thought 
‘that wasp is near’ won’t be globally reliable, as it would lead her to belief falsely that she is thinking 
a bona-fide waspy thought in the counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp. And thus, if we 
assume that global – and not just local – reliability is required for knowledge, then we must concede 
that Wendy’s guaranteed-to-be-true belief that she is thinking the thought ‘that wasp is near’ cannot 
count as knowledge. 
For Brown’s argument to go through it must be the case that knowledge requires global – and 
not just local – reliability.  
Even if that is assumed, Brown’s argument still faces a couple of further inter-related 
problems.   
Firstly, there is what Brown herself identifies as “the generality problem” (2004, p.132). A 
method of belief formation M will be globally reliable just in case M is and would be locally reliable 
with respect to a range of propositions that are similar to <p>. What Brown calls “the generality 
problem” is the problem of what determines which propositions are similar to <p>. If a subject S has 
come to believe that <p> is the case via a method M, then M won’t be globally reliable if there is a 
proposition <q> that is sufficiently similar to <p>, and for which there will be a relevant alternative in 
which <q> is not the case, but M would still cause S to believe that <q> is the case. The generality 
problem is the problem of what would be required of such a global reliability denying proposition <q> 
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to be sufficiently similar to <p>. It is the problem of what criteria such a proposition <q> must meet. 
Brown’s argument requires a convincing solution to this problem. 
Secondly, assuming this generality problem can be solved, and appropriate criteria can be 
found for what it takes for a proposition <q> to be knowledge denying, then it must also be the case 
that the proposition that Wendy is thinking a thought meets those criteria. It is not immediately clear 
that the proposition that Wendy is thinking a thought about a wasp is indeed the same sort of 
proposition that constitutes the content of Wendy’s other belief. The latter proposition is a proposition 
that ascribes to Wendy a thought with a specific content, whereas the former is the proposition that 
Wendy is thinking a bona fide thought. It could be maintained that the method by which Wendy 
acquires her belief that she is thinking the thought ‘that wasp is near’ is globally reliable if it is locally 
reliable with respect to any proposition that ascribes to Wendy a thought with a specific content, 
which it will be. If Wendy’s method were to lead Wendy to form beliefs with respect to any such 
proposition, then they’d be sort of guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs that are envisioned by the 
redeployment thesis. Thus, the method by which Wendy acquires the belief is globally reliable, even 
though, it may not be locally reliable with respect to all of the beliefs that the method produces, and in 
particular with respect to Wendy’s belief that she is thinking a bona-fide waspy thought.  
In sum, if (i) in the counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp Wendy would be 
suffering an illusion of thought, and if (ii) global, and not just local, reliability is required for 
knowledge, and if (iii) the generality problem can be solved, i.e. if criteria can be successfully and 
correctly identified for what it takes for a proposition <q> to be knowledge denying, and if (iv) it can 
be shown that the proposition that Wendy is thinking a bona fide waspy thought constitutes a 
knowledge-denying proposition, i.e. if it can be shown that it meets those criteria, then Brown may 
have indeed identified a case in which a subject forms a guaranteed-to-be-true belief about what she is 
presently thinking – of the sort envisioned by the redeployment thesis – but in which that belief does 
not count as knowledge.            
      
3.23: Brown’s Response I: Brown’s Overall Strategy 
 
In her (2004) book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Brown mounts a comprehensive and 
anticipatory offensive against the discrimination argument. The approach she takes assumes that ‘fake 
barn’ should be interpreted as it standardly is. That is, Brown’s approach rejects the reinterpretation 
discussed in the previous subsection. It is “a response to the discrimination argument that takes 
seriously the incompatibilist’s claim that knowledge requires discriminative abilities” (Brown, 2004, 
p.75).  
Brown identifies three forms of externalism. For each of those three forms, she argues cases 




either involve counterfactual scenarios that could never constitute relevant alternatives in the case of 
normal subjects, and/or there are deeper reasons why they could not occur.      
  
3.24: Brown’s Response II: Natural Kind Anti-Individualism and Recognitional Capacities 
 
The case of Slow-Switching Sally is too outlandish to be taken seriously. Brown suggests, however, 
that there is also a deeper reason why cases such as that of Slow-Switching Sally cannot occur, and 
why it is that there cannot be cases in which a subject forms a true belief that they are thinking a kind-
directed thought, but in which there are knowledge-denying relevant alternatives.    
 Brown defines “natural kind anti-individualism” as the thesis that “a subject’s thought 
contents are individuated partly by the natural kinds in her environment” (ibid., p.9). Essentially, 
natural kind anti-individualism is singular anti-individualism (see above, §3.22), but in which objects 
are replaced with natural kinds. Singular anti-individualism holds that we can think singular thoughts 
that owe their very content to the objects of which they are about. Natural kind anti-individualism 
holds that we can think what we can call kind-directed thoughts that owe their very content to the 
natural kind of which they are about. Oscar’s thought that ‘water is wet’ will be such a kind-directed 
thought. That is why it will be different in content to Twin Oscar’s equivalent thought. Oscar’s 
thought is directed at water. Whereas, Twin Oscar’s thought is directed at twater.  
Brown (2004, pp.142-5)30 proposes that in order for a subject to think the sort of kind-directed 
thought envisioned by natural kind anti-individualism, that subject must have a recognitional capacity 
with respect to the kind that the thought is directed at. The subject must have encountered the kind in 
her environment, and she must be able to distinguish it from the other kinds that she finds in her 
environment. On the occasions in which she encounters the kind, the subject must know that what 
she’s encountered is the same kind that she’s encountered on previous occasions in which she’s 
encountered the kind. This, Brown contends, should ensure that when or if the subject forms a belief 
with respect to a kind-directed thought that there cannot be any relevant alternatives. In short, in order 
for a subject to think a kind-directed thought she must meet a certain condition – she must have a 
recognitional capacity with respect to the relevant kind. The fact that the subject meets that 
requirement ensures that if she were to form a second-order belief that she is thinking a particular 
kind-directed, then that belief would constitute knowledge.  
Consider René. René is thinking the thought that he’d express ‘water is wet’ – where ‘water’ 
would refer to water directly. René forms the belief that he is thinking that thought. That belief could 
not count as knowledge if there were a relevant alternative in which it is not true that René is thinking 
 
30 See also Brown, 1998. 
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that water is wet, and in which things would seem to René exactly as they actually do. But, Brown 
contends, there cannot be any such relevant alternatives. Such a relevant alternative would be one in 
which René has had encounters with a substance that is superficially identical with water, that as far 
as René is concerned is no different to water, but is not water. If such a possibility was relevant, then 
it could not be the case that René is thinking what he is thinking. For René to be thinking what he is 
thinking he must have a recognitional capacity for water. That is, when he encounters samples of 
water he must know that he is encountering the same substance that he has encountered on previous 
occasions. For that to be the case there can be no danger of René encountering a substance that is 
superficially identical to water, which he’d mistake for water.       
Implicit in Brown’s proposal is the contention that what seems to Slow-Switching Sally to be 
the thought that water is wet, is not in fact a thought at all. When it seems to Sally that she is thinking 
such a thought, she is in fact suffering an illusion of thought, similar to how Wasp-Phobic Wendy 
would suffer an illusion of thought in the counterfactual in which there is no wasp (See above, §3.22). 
The reasons why Sally and Wasp-Phobic Wendy would suffer an illusion of thought diverge. In the 
case of Wasp-Phobic Wendy it is because there is no wasp. Sally suffers an illusion of thought not 
because there is not water, but because she does not have a recognitional capacity for water. When 
Sally is on Earth and encounters a sample of water, a relevant alternative would be that she is on Twin 
Earth encountering a sample of twater. Thus, Sally cannot know that she is encountering a sample of 
the same stuff that she encountered on previous occasions. And thus, she does not have a 
recognitional capacity for water. And thus, Sally is not able to think the sort of water directed 
thoughts that we are supposing she can think.  
This is tantamount to saying that when Sally says ‘water is wet’, her utterance is meaningless, 
which seems bizarre. 
 There are in fact a second and a third way of interpreting the case of Slow-Switching Sally 
that respect Brown’s invocation of recognitional categories – i.e. that grant that Sally must have a 
recognitional capacity for water if she is to think the sort of kind-directed thoughts that we were 
supposing that she can think.  
The second way supposes that Sally’s thoughts would be descriptional. Sally is not able to 
think the sort of water directed thoughts that we are supposing she can think. Since she is the victim 
of a slow-switch case, she does not have a recognitional capacity for water. However, that does not 
mean that Sally suffers illusions of thought. If Sally weren’t a victim of a slow-switch case, then she’d 
be thinking a kind-directed thought. But, by virtue of the fact that Sally is a victim of a slow-switch 
case, the thought that Sally would express by ‘water is wet’ would be something along the lines of: 
the clear, odourless liquid that I (Sally) drank a lot of yesterday is wet.      
 If this were the case, then it should allow that the beliefs that Sally forms with respect to what 




express ‘water is wet’, she’d be thinking the exact same thought that she’d be thinking if 
counterfactually she were on Twin Earth. Thus, there will be no relevant alternatives in which Sally is 
not thinking what she is thinking, but in which things would seem to Sally exactly as they actually 
are. 
 This second option is problematic. It requires assent to the sort of second order externalism 
mentioned previously (§3.22), whereby external factors determine whether a term refers directly or is 
descriptional, which, as we’ll be seeing in Chapter 6 of this thesis, is problematic.     
The third interpretation supposes that Sally is able to think the sort of water/twater directed 
thoughts that we are supposing she can. Therefore, she does have a recognitional capacity for 
water/twater. Thus, when Sally is on Earth and encounters a sample of water, her being on Twin Earth 
encountering a sample of twater is somehow not a relevant alternative. And equivalently, when Sally 
is on Twin Earth and encounters a sample of twater, her being on Earth and encountering a sample of 
water is somehow not a relevant alternative. 
It may seem ad hoc to deny that counterfactual scenarios in which Sally is on Earth/Twin 
Earth encountering a sample of water/twater constitute relevant alternatives. We could maintain, 
however, that we do have a sort of quasi-transcendental argument for denying that Sally being on 
Earth/Twin Earth and thinking that water/twater is wet constitutes a relevant alternative. Sally is 
thinking the sort of kind directed thought that we were supposing she can think. It cannot be the case 
that Sally is suffering an illusion of thought – because it would be odd to suppose that she is. Nor can 
it be the case that she is thinking a descriptional thought – for the reasons we’ll be considering in 
Chapter 6. If Sally is thinking the sort of kind-directed thought that we were supposing she can think, 
then she must have a recognitional capacity for water. Sally is thinking the sort of kind-directed 
thought that we were supposing she can think. She therefore must have a recognitional capacity for 
water. Thus, when Sally encounters a sample of water she knows it is the same substance that she has 
encountered on previous occasions. Ipso facto, when Sally encounters a sample of water and judges 
that she is encountering a substance that she has encountered on previous occasions, her being on 
Twin Earth and encountering a sample of twater cannot constitute a relevant alternative.   
Sally having a recognitional capacity for water, in itself, does not necessarily entail that 
Sally’s belief that she is thinking that water is wet will constitute knowledge. A further thing is 
required. It must be the case that there is a transference of irrelevance from the question of whether 
Sally has a recognitional capacity for water to the question of whether Sally’s belief that she is 
thinking that water/twater is wet counts as knowledge. It must be that – i.e. it must be argued that – 
because the counterfactual scenarios that involve Sally being on Twin Earth that are ruled out from 
constituting relevant alternatives when it comes to the question of whether Sally has a recognitional 
capacity for water, those very same counterfactual scenarios are ruled out as constituting relevant 
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alternatives when it comes to the separate question of whether her belief that she is thinking that water 
is wet counts as knowledge.  
If there is no such transference of irrelevance, then Sally’s belief the water/twater is wet 
won’t be knowledge constituting, which means that Brown’s proposal is void.   
We can, of course, follow the Warfield line and discount the case of Slow-Switching Sally on 
the grounds that it is too outlandish to be taken seriously. When you or I think that water is wet, we 
may not be able to discriminate the actual from a counterfactual scenario in which we have been 
transported to Twin Earth and are thinking that twater is wet. But, for us at least, such a far-fetched 
counterfactual scenario cannot constitute a relevant alternative. Thus, it can still be claimed that both 
you and I know what we are thinking when we think the thought: water is wet. If we go down this 
route. i.e. if we are to dismiss the case of Slow-Switching Sally on the grounds that it is too outlandish 
to be taken seriously, then that begs the question of why, within the present context, we need to 
invoke Brown’s recognitional capacity requirement at all.31      
    
3.25: Brown’s Response III: Perceptual Demonstrative Singular Thought: The Problem Case 
 
The singular anti-individualist holds that we are able to think thoughts that have contents that are 
inextricably tied to the objects of which the thoughts are about. Brown proposes that such thoughts 
fall into either of two categories. There are perceptual demonstrative singular thoughts of the sort that 
Wasp-Phobic Wendy entertains towards a nearby wasp (see above, §3.22). There are also recognition-
based singular thoughts (see next subsection).  
Brown concedes something that she finds to be “disappointing” (ibid., p.152). There will be 
cases, everyday cases – which don’t involve subjects being transported an unthinkable number of light 
years – in which a subject thinks a perceptual demonstrative singular thought and forms a guaranteed-
to-be-true belief with respect to that perceptual demonstrative singular thought, but in which that 
belief won’t count as knowledge.    
In Sandra’s neighbourhood there live identical twins Anja and Tanja. One day Sandra is 
sitting in the park. She sees a child, who happens to be Anya, playing in the children’s play area. 
Sandra thinks a perceptual demonstrative singular thought that she’d express, using a demonstrative 
and possibly pointing to Anya, as ‘that child is happy’. Sandra forms a true belief with respect to that 
thought. It could very easily be the case that it is Tanja that Sandra is seeing frolicking in the 
children’s play area. If that were the case, then Sandra’s thought would be different in content to what 
it actually is, as it would be Tanja, and not Anya, who is the object of the thought. Such a 
 
31 Brown does make a separate case – which has nothing to do with what is presently being discussed – for kind-directed 




counterfactual scenario should constitute a relevant alternative. It will also be the case that, within 
such a counterfactual scenario, things would seem to Sandra exactly as they actually are. Thus, 
Sandra’s belief about what she is thinking cannot count as knowledge (Brown, 2004, pp.86-88).  
 Of course, if we go down the reliabilist response route of denying that discriminative abilities 
are required for knowledge, we could say that Sandra’s belief does count as knowledge. Within the 
counterfactual scenario in which it is Tanya not Anja that Sandra is seeing, the belief that Sandra 
would form would have a different content and would be true. But that is not the route that Brown is 
trying to defend.  
               
3.26: Brown’s Response IV: Recognition-Based Singular Thought 
 
Recognition-based singular thoughts are singular thoughts that have as their object something that we 
perceived in the past, but that is no longer within our perceptual field. We are able to think 
recognition-based singular thoughts as long as a certain condition holds. A subject is able to think a 
recognition-based singular thought about some object o, which they’ve perceived but no longer 
perceive, on the condition that if, at the moment of the thought, the subject were to re-encounter o 
then they’d know that what they are encountering is the same object that they had perceived 
previously. 32  
 Brown assumes that all thinkable singular thoughts are either perceptual demonstrative 
singular thoughts or recognition-based singular thoughts. In order for us to think a singular thought 
about a particular object, that object must either currently be in our perceptual field, or the object must 
have been within our perceptual field in the past and if we were to re-encounter that object we’d know 
it is the same object.  
 Brown finds it to be “disappointing” that when a subject thinks a perceptual demonstrative 
singular thought and forms a belief with respect to that perceptual demonstrative singular thought, 
there may be relevant alternatives in which the subject thinks something other to what she is actually 
thinking, but in which thing seems to the subject exactly as they actually are. Brown argues however 
that the same won’t be true with respect to recognition-based singular thought. If a subject thinks a 
recognition-based singular thought and forms a belief with respect to that recognition-based singular 
thought, then – Brown argues – there won’t be any relevant alternatives in which the subject thinks 
something other to what she is actually thinking, but in which thing seems to the subject exactly as 
they actually are.    
 We have seen (§3.24) how Brown identifies a condition for natural kind directed thoughts, 
and argues that if a subject is indeed thinking such a thought – and hence meets the condition that 
 
32 Brown draws heavily from Evans’s account of recognition-based singular thought (Evans, 1982; Brown, 2004, pp.77-83). 
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Brown identifies – then that precludes there being relevant alternatives in which things seems to the 
subject exactly as they actually do, but in which the subject is thinking something other to what she is 
actually thinking. Brown argues for a similar thing with respect to recognition-based singular 
thoughts. If a subject is thinking a recognition-based singular thought, then she will meet the 
condition that Brown identifies as necessary for recognition-based singular thought and that, Brown 
argues, will entail that, if the subject forms a belief with respect to that thought, there will be no 
danger of knowledge-disqualifying relevant alternatives. 
 Nick is looking at a cat, Tabby, when whoosh all of a sudden Tabby is nowhere to be seen. 
Whilst Tabby was still in Nick’s perceptual field, Nick was able to think perceptually demonstrative 
singular thoughts that have Tabby as their object. But, now that Tabby is gone, Nick has ceased to be 
able to think such perceptually demonstrative singular thoughts. It may, however, still be possible for 
Nick to think a Tabby-centred singular thought of another sort. Nick will be able to think a Tabby-
centred recognition-based singular thought on the condition that if he were to re-encounter Tabby he 
would know that he was re-encountering the same cat that was previously within his perceptual field. 
In order, for Nick to think a Tabby-centred recognition-based singular thought, it must be the case 
that, if Nick were to re-encounter Tabby, there would be no relevant alternative in which the cat that 
Nick encounters looks exactly like Tabby, but is in fact another cat. That could only be the case – 
Brown contends – if there is no nearby doppelganger cat that could have wandered into a certain area 
that can be called the area of search33. The area of search is defined by how far Tabby could have 
moved since Tabby was in Nick’s perceptual field – i.e. is defined by how fast Tabby can move. If 
there were a doppelganger cat that could have moved into the area of search, then Nick would not be 
able to think a Tabby-centred recognition-based singular thought.               
 Brown’s contention is that if Nick were to form a second-order belief about his Tabby-centred 
recognition-based thought, then there would be no relevant alternative in which things would seem to 
Nick exactly as they actually would, but in which Nick is thinking a different thought to what he 
would actually be thinking. That is, there will be no such relevant alternatives so long as there is no 
 
33 By ‘area of search’ I mean what Brown calls the ‘actual area of search’ – i.e. what Brown proposes should be regarded as 
the ‘area of search’ – as opposed to the ‘estimated area of search’ – which is what Evans regarded as the ‘area of search’. 
Under Evans’s original account of recognition-based singular thought (Evans, 1982) the ‘area of search’ comprised the 
‘estimated area of search’, which, in our example, would be defined by Nick’s estimation of how fast Tabby can move. 
Under Evans’s account, Nick would only be able to think a Tabby-centred recognition-based singular thought if there is no 
Tabby-look-alike cat within this ‘estimated area of search’. Brown argues that this is wrong (Brown, 2004, pp.96-106). Nick 
would only be able to think a recognition based singular thought if, were he to re-encounter Tabby, he’d know he was 
reencountering Tabby. That means – Brown argues – that Nick would only be able to think a Tabby-centred recognition-
based singular thought if there is no Tabby-look-alike cat in the ‘actual area of search’, which is defined by how fast Tabby 




doppelganger cat that could have moved within the area of search since Tabby was last in Nick’s 
perceptual field – i.e. so long as Nick is able to think a recognition-based singular thought.    
Brown, however, fails to make it clear why this should be the case. It is not clear why there 
being no duplicate within the area of search entails – as Brown contends that it does – that there are 
no knowledge denying relevant alternatives in which Nick would be thinking a recognition-based 
singular thought that is centred on a Tabby-look-alike cat.    
Consider Nicola. Nicola encounters a cat, Tibby. Nicola is then momentarily distracted and 
whoosh Tibby is nowhere to be seen. Nearby there is another cat, Kitty, who is an exact doppelganger 
for Tibby. Although Kitty is nearby, Kitty is of a sufficient distance away from the boundary of the 
area of search so as to render it impossible – given how fast Kitty and Tibby can travel – for Kitty to 
have moved within that area. That is, Kitty could not have gotten to somewhere where Tibby could 
have gotten to since Tibby was last within Nicola’s perceptual field. There are no other doppelgangers 
for Tibby nearby. Crucially, there is not a doppelganger for Tibby that could have gotten within the 
area of search. Thus, Nicola should be able to think a recognition-based thought with respect to Tibby. 
She should consequently be able to form a guaranteed-to-be-true belief that she is thinking that 
thought.  
Consider, now, a counterfactual scenario in which it is Kitty, and not Tibby that Nicola 
encountered, and in which Tibby is exactly where Kitty actually is. In such a counterfactual scenario, 
Nicola should be able to think a recognition-based thought. That recognition-based thought will be 
different to what Nicola will actually be thinking. It will be a Kitty-centred recognition-based singular 
thought, as opposed to a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought. Due to the proximity of 
Kitty, such a counterfactual scenario would arguably constitute a relevant alternative with respect to 
the question of whether Nicola’s second-order belief counts as knowledge. Furthermore, it would be a 
relevant alternative in which things would seem to Nicola exactly as they actually are. Thus, we 
possibly have a relevant alternative that disqualifies Nicola’s belief about what she is thinking from 
counting as knowledge.  
 It is intuitively plausible that counterfactual scenarios in which it is Kitty that Nicola re-
encounters should not be considered relevant alternatives with respect to the question of whether 
Nicola would know that she is encountering the same cat as she encountered previously, were she to 
re-encounter Tibby. It is, however, equally intuitively plausible that a counterfactual scenario in 
which it was Kitty and not Tibby that Nicola initially encountered, and in which it is Tibby and not 
Kitty that is outside of the area of search, should be considered a relevant alternative with respect to 
the question of whether Nicola could know what she was thinking. 
 There are several options here. 
 One option is that we try to argue – in a sort of quasi-transcendental way – that because 
certain counterfactual scenarios should not be considered relevant alternatives with respect to one 
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question of knowledge, similar counterfactual scenarios should not be considered relevant with 
respect to another question of knowledge. That is, we may try to argue that because scenarios that 
involve Nicola encountering Kitty34 won’t constitute relevant alternatives when it comes to the 
question of whether Nicola would, were she to re-encounter Tibby, know that she is re-encountering 
the same cat – i.e. because Nicola is able to think a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought 
– counterfactual scenarios in which it is Kitty and not Tibby that Nicola initially encounters should 
not be consider relevant when it comes to the question of whether Nicola knows what she is thinking. 
There is a transference of irrelevance from one of the questions of knowledge to the other.  
 This first option should, if successful, leave Brown’s proposal intact. 
 However, a second and just as plausible option is that we try to go the other way. We could 
try to argue that because of the presence of Kitty, Nicola does not know what she is thinking, and 
because of a transference of relevance she cannot think a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular 
thought. If Nicola were able to form a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought Nicola 
initially encountering Kitty would constitute a relevant alternative when it comes to the question of 
whether Nicola knows what she is thinking. Thus, scenarios in which Nicola encounters a different cat 
– namely Kitty – should be considered relevant alternatives when it comes to the question of whether 
Nicola would know that she is re-encountering Tibby, were she to re-encounter Tibby. And thus, if 
Nicola were to re-encounter Tibby she would not know that she is re-encountering Tibby. And thus, 
Nicola won’t be able to a think a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought. 
 If this is the case, then it is possible that being able to think a recognition-based singular 
thought could still preclude knowledge denying relevant alternatives in the way that Brown contends 
that it would. Brown, however, would need to provide a new account of what is required to think a 
recognition-based thought that would preclude Nicola’s putative Tibby-centred recognition-based 
singular thought from counting as a bona-fide Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought.   
There is, finally, a third option that is just as plausible as the other two. Under this third 
option we maintain that Nicola is able to think a Tibby-centred recognition-based singular thought, 
but the belief that that thought would give rise to would not constitute knowledge. Were Nicola to re-
encounter Tibby, a counterfactual scenario in which it is Kitty that she encounters should not be 
considered a relevant alternative with respect to the question of whether Nicola would know that she 
is re-encountering Tibby. However, a counterfactual scenario in which it is Kitty that Nicola initially 
encounters should be considered a relevant alternative when it come to the question of whether Nicola 
 
34 These will be second order counterfactuals, that is, counterfactuals that are within counterfactuals. We are considering 
counterfactuals in which Nicola reencounters Tibby, and we are considering what would be a counterfactual within those 




knows what she is thinking. There is no transference of irrelevance nor relevance between the two 
questions of knowledge. 
If this third option were to succeed, then it would demonstrate that Brown’s strategy has 
failed. A subject being in a position to think a recognition-based singular thought would not guarantee 
that there are no relevant alternatives in which the subject is thinking something other to what she is 
actually thinking, but in which things seem to the subject exactly as they actually are. Thus, if 
discriminative abilities are required for knowledge, a subject being able to think a recognition-based 
singular thought would not guarantee that the subject would be able to know a priori what she is 
thinking.          
 
3.27: Brown’s Response V: Social Anti-Individualism (a.k.a. Burgean Externalism) and Illusion Cases 
 
As well as singular anti-individualism and natural kind anti-individualism, Brown also characterises a 
third form of anti-individualism(/content externalism), which she calls “social anti-individualism”, 
and which is essentially what I’ve been calling Burgean externalism.  
We have already seen how Brown deals with the sort of cases in which a subject forms a 
belief about what she is thinking in which there are knowledge-denying relevant alternatives that pop 
up under Burgean externalism/social anti-individualism. Cases such as that of Biff and his ‘chicory’ 
thoughts and that of Griff and his ‘pragmatist’ thoughts aren’t so outlandish that they are not to be 
taken seriously. But, Brown suggests, there is a deeper reason why such cases could not occur. They’d 
need to involve a subject-word pairing that meets three criteria. There could not be, Brown contends, 
a subject-word pairing that meets those three criteria. Hence, cases such as those of Biff and Griff 
cannot actually exist. The problem with this, as we’ve seen (§3.21), is that there could be a subject-
word pairing that meets those three criteria – even though they may do so only for a limited period of 
time.   
 There is however still one final sort of putative case in which a subject forms a belief about 
what she is thinking, and in which there are knowledge-denying relevant alternatives. These are cases 
in which a subject is somehow prone to hallucinate the existence of something that doesn’t in fact 
exist, and in which it is supposed that because of that the subject suffers an illusion of thought.  
The case of Wasp-Phobic Wendy is such a case. When Wendy thinks her wasp-directed 
(perceptual demonstrative) singular thought, she is unable to discriminate what is actual from a 
counterfactual scenario in which she is imagining a wasp, and in which she is therefore suffering an 
illusion of thought. For Wendy, due to her proneness to aurally hallucinate non-existent wasps, such a 
counterfactual scenario does constitute a relevant alternative. Thus, the second-order guaranteed-to-
be-true belief that Wendy would form with respect to her wasp-directed thought cannot constitute 
knowledge. Brown contends, however, that the case of Wendy is exceptional. We are not normally 
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prone to the sort of aural hallucinations that poor Wendy is subject too. If a normal subject where to 
hear a wasp and think a wasp-directed singular thought, then she, like Wendy, would not be able to 
discriminate what is actual from a counterfactual scenario in which she is imagining a wasp and is 
therefore suffering an illusion of thought. However, for a normal subject, such a counterfactual 
scenario cannot constitute a relevant alternative.    
 This may at first glance seem wrong. We can all recall times in which we thought we heard 
something that wasn’t in fact there. If, however, we are to suppose that Wendy is able to think a wasp-
directed perceptual demonstrative singular thought when she hears the wasp, it can’t just be the case 
that Wendy thinks she might be hearing a wasp. Wendy must experience the vivid phenomenology of 
hearing a wasp. It must also be the case that Wendy would experience that same vivid 
phenomenology in the counterfactual scenario in which there is no wasp. And, for such a 
counterfactual scenario to constitute a relevant alternative, it must be that Wendy is prone to such 
vivid aural illusions. Wendy, it turns out, must suffer from some form of psychosis.    
 This ends our discussion of Brown’s response to the discrimination argument. Brown’s 
strategy is, firstly, to concede to the advocate of the discrimination argument that discriminative 
abilities are required for knowledge. The strategy is to then argue that despite that under all of the 
three forms of content externalism – what Brown labels “natural kind anti-individualism”, “singular 
anti-individualism”, and “social anti-individualism” – there will still be no cases in which a subject 
thinks a thought, but in which there are the knowledge-denying relevant alternatives that an advocate 
of the discrimination argument contends that there would be. Brown herself admits that her strategy is 
less than successful in the case of perceptual demonstrative singular thought – i.e. with one half of 
singular anti-individualism. Brown’s strategy also seems to be unsuccessful in the case of social anti-
individualism/Burgean externalism. It is also – as we’ve seen – questionable whether it is successful 
in the case of natural kind anti-individualism and in the case of recognition-based singular thought – 
i.e. in the case of the other half of singular anti-individualism. There is, nevertheless, something very 
intriguing about Brown’s idea that requirements that are baked into the thinking of a thought could 
preclude knowledge-denying relevant alternatives. It just that it seems that if indeed there is a kernel 
















4.0: Introduction to Chapter 4 
 
Water exists. This is something I know. It is not, however, something that I could know a priori. I 
know that water exists because of my repeated encounters with – through seeing, touching, tasting, 
etc. – a substance that has certain perceptual qualities. I have a true belief that water exists. I have a 
justificatory basis for my belief, which consists of my repeated encounters with a substance that has 
certain perceptual qualities. By virtue of my belief having that justificatory basis, my belief qualifies 
as knowledge. Suppose that a subject could have a knowledge-granting justificatory basis for her 
belief that water exists that does not rest with her senses in this way or in any way. That is, suppose 
that a subject could come to know a priori that water exists. Such a prospect is absurd. Suppose now 
that there were two philosophical theses such that those theses both being true would entail that a 
subject could know a priori that water exists. If the two theses both being true would entail something 
that is so absurd, then it must be the case that at least one of those theses must be false. Boghossian 
(1998) ventures that content externalism along with the contention that a subject should be able to 
know a priori what she is thinking constitute two such theses. Boghossian ventures that both being 
true would have the absurd consequence that a subject could know a priori that water exists. Thus at 
least one must be false.  
 
4.1: Boghossian’s Reductio: Preliminaries and the Basic Argument 
 
4.11: Preliminaries I: Content and ‘Concept’ 
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Boghossian’s reductio argument requires a number of commitments with respect to the notion 
‘concept’.  
The first of these commitments is that concepts are key contributing factors in what 
determines the content of a subject’s thought. When a subject thinks a thought about water (say), 
thinks that water is wet (say), she does so by in some sense deploying a concept of water. It is such a 
cognitive deployment that is in part responsible for her thinking that water is wet – i.e. for her 
thinking a thought with the content that it has. Had the subject not been deploying that concept she 
would not have been thinking that water is wet – she wouldn’t have been thinking a thought with the 
content that she was thinking. Had she been deploying a different concept instead of that concept, she 
would have been thinking a different thought – she would have been thinking a thought with a content 
that is non-identical to the content of the thought she was in actual fact thinking. 
 The second commitment is that concepts are in part individuated by their extension. Two 
tokens of a concept that have different extensions will always be tokens of two different concepts. The 
extension of a concept is all the things that fall under it. The extension of our concept of water 
encompasses all and every instance of water. Lake Geneva, rain falling from the sky, what would 
come out if I were to turn on a tap,…all fall under the concept of water. They are all part of its 
extension. Such things are not part of the extension of the concept of twater – the substance that is on 
Twin Earth in lieu of water (see Chapter 1, §1.23, and below). Rather it’s the equivalent things – Twin 
Lake Geneva of Twin Earth, the ‘rain’ that falls from the skies of Twin Earth, what would come out if 
a Twin Earthling were to turn on a tap – that constitute the extension of the concept of twater. When 
Oscar thinks that water is wet, he deploys a concept that has belonging to its extension things such as 
Lake Geneva, rain that falls from the sky, etc.. When Twin Oscar – Oscar’s atom-for-atom duplicate – 
thinks that twater is wet he deploys a concept that has its extension not those things but their Twin 
Earthly equivalents. Hence Oscar and Twin Oscar deploy different concepts. This is why the contents 
of Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective thoughts are different. 
The third commitment is that a concept is either atomic or non-atomic. If a concept is not 
atomic then it is non-atomic. If a concept is not non-atomic then it is atomic. A non-atomic concept – 
or alternatively a compound concept – will be breakdownable into constituent parts that will 
themselves be concepts. An atomic concept, on the other hand, won’t be breakdownable in that same 
way.  
Suppose that Oscar was to think a thought that’d be expressed as the tasteless, odourless 
liquid that flows in rivers and from taps is wet. Oscar would be thinking a thought that will be 
different in content to what it would have been had he been thinking a thought that’d be expressed as 
water is wet. In the former instance Oscar would be deploying a non-atomic concept of water, one that 




latter instance it is conceivable that the concept being deployed in Oscar’s thought processes could not 
be broken down into other concepts, and thus Oscar’s concept is atomic. 
The fourth commitment is that a concept must have determinate application conditions. For 
any given concept there must be a fact of the matter with respect to what does, what doesn’t, what 
would, and what wouldn’t belong to its extension. For any given thing, actual or counterfactual, and 
for any given concept, it must either be the case that the thing belongs or does not belong, or would or 
would not belong, to the concept’s extension.  
For the concept water, it is water itself that provides the sole application condition. 
Something belongs to the extension if and only if it is water – i.e. if and only if it is made up of H2O 
molecules. Something is water if and only if it is water. The liquid found in Lake Geneva falls under 
the concept’s extension because it is water. (The liquid found in Lake Geneva is water because it is 
water.) The liquid methane found in the methane lakes of Titan (Saturn’s largest moon) won’t belong 
to the extension of the concept water, as that liquid will be liquid methane and not water. If I had in 
my hand a glass of water, which I don’t, then the counterfactual liquid found within that 
counterfactual glass would belong to the extension, as it would be water. If I had in my hand a glass 
of beer, which I also don’t, then the counterfactual liquid found within that counterfactual glass would 
not belong to the concept’s extension, as it would be beer and not water. 
The same will be true mutatis mutandis in the case of Twin Oscar’s twater concept. It will be 
the natural kind twater, as opposed to water, that acts as the sole application condition for Twin 
Oscar’s concept. Something will belong, or would belong, to the extension if and only if it is, or it 
would be, an instance of twater.                  
A concept’s extension can in the actual world be empty. That is, it can be the case that nothing 
in actuality belongs to a particular concept’s extension. But for such a concept it will still need to be a 
fact of the matter over what items would belong to the concept’s extension. There is nothing in 
actuality that falls under the concept unicorn. However, something could arguably fall under the 
concept in certain possible worlds. If counterfactually there were an animal that was in appearance 
and in physiology almost identical to a horse, except it had a spiracle horn protruding from just above 
its nose, and if that animal had certain magical characteristics, then perhaps that animal would fall 
under the concept ‘unicorn’. (This is supposing that the concept ‘unicorn’ is not, as some may 
contend, necessarily vacuous – see below (§4.29).)  
The fifth and final commitment is that individual concepts are associated with particular 
words. When Oscar utters ‘water is wet’ he expresses a thought. As he utters the word ‘water’ he also 
expresses a concept. This concept will be different to the concept that Twin Oscar expresses when he 
utters the word ‘water’.  
 
4.12: Preliminaries II: Content and ‘Concept’ and Twin Earth 




Boghossian’s reductio also requires a couple of further commitments that concerns the provenance of 
the famous Putnamian result that Oscar and Twin Oscar will be thinking thoughts with different 
contents. Boghossian views Putnam’s Twin Earth case as an intuition pump that generates the result 
that Oscar and Twin Oscar will be thinking thoughts with different content:       
 
…let us remind ourselves how Putnam’s thought experiment is supposed to work. 
Whereas Oscar, an ordinary English Speaker, lives on Earth, his molecular and functional 
duplicate, Toscar, lives on Twin Earth, a planet just like Earth except that the liquid that 
fills its lakes and oceans, while indistinguishable from Earthly water in all ordinary 
circumstances, is not H2O but some other substance with a different chemical 
composition – call it XYZ. Going by whatever criteria are relevant to such matters, water 
and twin water are distinct kinds of substance, even though a chemically ignorant person 
wouldn’t be able to tell them apart. Now widespread intuition appears to have it that, 
whereas Oscar’s tokens of ‘water’ apply exclusively to H2O, Toscar’s tokens of ‘water’ 
apply exclusively to XYZ. Widespread intuition appears to have it, in other words, that 
Oscar’s and Toscar’s ‘water’ tokens have distinct extensions.  
(Boghossian, 1997, p.164) 
 
Boghossian claims that this “widespread intuition” is only generated if it is supposed that the 
concepts that are respectively expressed by ‘water’ on the respective lips of Oscar and Twin Oscar are 
atomic: 
 
…the concepts expressed by the Earthly and Twearthly tokens of ‘water’ have to be 
thought of as atomic concepts, not compound concepts that are compositionally built up 
out of other concepts in well defined ways. For example, the experiment presupposes that 
water [i.e. the concept expressed by ‘water’] can’t be thought of as capable of being 
defined as: A tasteless, odourless liquid that flows in the rivers and faucets. For if it were 
a compositional concept of that sort, its extension would be determined by the extension 
of its ingredient parts. Hence, a conclusion to the effect that water and twater have 
different extensions would have to proceed differently than it does in Putnam’s original 
experiment, by showing that one of the ingredients of water – the concept expressed by 








Boghossian also claims that the intuition is only generated if it is supposed that, not only do 
Oscar and Twin Oscar succeed in expressing an atomic natural kind concept, Oscar and Twin Oscar 
also “aim” to express an atomic natural kind concept when they utter the word ‘water’: 
 
…the word ‘water’ – whether on Earth or on Twin Earth – must be thought of as aiming 
to express a natural kind concept; otherwise, the fact that water and twater are distinct 
natural kinds will not be semantically relevant. 
(ibid.) 
 
4.13: The Basic Argument  
 
Boghossian’s reductio involves an a priori philosophical argument that repurposes Burge’s famous 
Dry Earth case (Burge, 1982). Dry Earth is for all appearances identical to our own Earth – and, of 
course, to Twin Earth also. On Dry Earth, however, there is no water. Neither is there any twater. 
There is no liquid whatsoever that flows through Dry Earth’s equivalent of rivers and from Dry 
Earth’s equivalent of taps and fills Dry Earth’s equivalent of lakes and seas. The inhabitants of Dry 
Earth, nevertheless, are all under the mass illusion that there is.  
Whilst Oscar is thinking that water is wet on Earth, and Twin Oscar is thinking that twater is 
wet on Twin Earth, there also will be on Dry Earth Thirsty Oscar, who will be qualitatively identical 
to both Oscar and Twin Oscar. If this Thirsty Oscar is thinking a thought at all, then he’ll be doing so 
by deploying some sort of concept that would play the same cognitive role as Oscar’s water concept 
does in Oscar’s mental life, and the same cognitive role as Twin Oscar’s twater concept does in Twin 
Oscar’s mental life.  
Boghossian contends that such a concept can be neither atomic nor non-atomic. Thus, it 
cannot be any kind of concept at all. Thus, poor Thirsty Oscar cannot be thinking any kind of thought 
at all.   
 Boghossian contends that it is not possible that a subject could be deploying a non-atomic 
concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting an identical brain state is deploying an atomic 
concept. Thus, if Oscar and Twin Oscar’s respective concepts are atomic, then it cannot be the case 
that Thirsty Oscar’s is non-atomic. Thirsty Oscar’s concept cannot be non-atomic whilst Oscar and 
Twin Oscar’s respective concepts aren’t, as all three will be exhibiting identical brain states. Oscar 
and Twin Oscar’s respective concepts will both be atomic. Thus, Thirsty Oscar’s concept cannot be 
non-atomic.   
Boghossian contends that Thirsty Oscar’s concept cannot be atomic because if it were atomic 
then there’d be nothing that could act as its application conditions. It is water itself that acts as the 
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
72 
 
sole application condition for Oscar’s concept. Likewise, it is twater that acts as the sole application 
condition for Twin Oscar’s concept. There is no clear, odourless liquid on Dry Earth to provide 
similar membership conditions for the extension of Thirsty Oscar’s concept.    
What we have here is a conclusion and a philosophical argument that allows us to arrive at 
that conclusion through armchair a priori reasoning. We have the conclusion, ~F, that Thirsty Oscar 
cannot be thinking a thought. This conclusion, ~F, is derived via our reasoning that if it were the case 
that, F, Thirsty Oscar were thinking a thought, then a contradiction would be true. We would have the 
contradiction, ~~G&~G, that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept would be neither non-atomic nor 
atomic. Therefore, it must be the case that, ~F, Thirsty Oscar cannot be thinking a thought. Crucially, 
this is something that we know a priori. We know a priori that, ~F, Thirsty Oscar could not be 
thinking a thought.  
Supposing that content externalism is indeed true, content externalism being true will also be 
something that we know a priori. We know that content externalism is true through a priori 
consideration of philosophical argument. (According to Boghossian, we allegedly know through 
consideration of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ and the intuitions it allegedly generates – see above and 
below, §4.12; §4.212)  
By an ex hypothesi assumption a subject should be able to know a priori what she is thinking. 
If am thinking that water is wet, I should be able to know a priori that I am thinking that water is wet.   
Boghossian ventures that these three pieces of a priori knowledge put together could confer a 
fourth piece of a priori knowledge. That fourth piece of knowledge concerns something that we ought 
not to know a priori.  
Suppose I am thinking the thought that I’d express ‘water is wet’. I should, Boghossian 
ventures, be able to know a priori that if I am in a world in which there exist a water-like natural kind, 
then I will be deploying an atomic concept that has as its extension all and only instances of that kind.  
A priori knowledge of this conditional should be bequeathed to me via two things. The first of those 
two things is my a priori knowledge of the arguments for natural kind externalism. The second thing 
is my knowledge, which should also be a priori, of what my semantic intentions would be were I to 
utter aloud ‘water is wet’. I should be able to know, and know a priori, that I, like Oscar and Twin 
Oscar, ‘aim’ to express an atomic natural kind concept by my use of the term ‘water’. If I, like either 
Oscar or Twin Oscar, am on a planet where there is a natural kind that has the properties that we 
believe water to have – that is clear, odourless etc. – then I, like Oscar and Twin Oscar, will be 
deploying an atomic concept that has as its extension all and only instances of that kind. This 
conditional is something that I should be able to know a priori. 
If, conversely, I am not an inhabitant of such a world, if there is no such kind ‘water’, then I’ll 
be in a predicament that will essentially be the same as that of Thirsty Oscar. If Boghossian’s ‘Dry 




‘water’ then I won’t be thinking a thought. This second conditional is something that I should be able 
to know a priori through following Boghossian’s ‘Dry Earth’ argument. 
I, ex hypothesi, should be able to know a priori what I am thinking. By extension, I should 
know a priori that I am thinking a thought. I also know a priori that if I am thinking a thought I cannot 
be a victim of a predicament similar to that of Thirsty Oscar. I know a priori that I am thinking a 
thought, therefore I know a priori that I am not the victim of a predicament like that of Thirsty Oscar. 
I thus know a priori that my term ‘water’ denotes an existent natural kind. It is here we arrive at the 
absurdity. Hence, we have our reductio. It must be the case that content externalism is false, or I don’t 
have a priori knowledge of what I am thinking. Otherwise, I’d be able to know a priori that water 
exists, which would be absurd.   
 
4.2: Three Problems for Boghossian’s Reductio 
 
4.21: The Three Problems 
 
Boghossian’s reductio faces a number of potential problems that may be exploitable by a would-be 
refuter. 
Firstly, Boghossian’s reductio requires that it be the case that it is not possible that a subject 
could be deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting a (qualitatively) 
identical brain state is deploying an atomic concept. This, as we will see, is something that is 
potentially contestable. 
 Secondly, Boghossian’s reductio also requires that it be the case that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ 
concept cannot be atomic. This is also something that is potentially contestable.   
 Thirdly and finally, Boghossian’s reductio requires it to be the case that Oscar’s concept will 
be atomic. Boghossian’s case for this rests on what is in fact an idiosyncratic account of the 
provenance of content externalism.    
 
4.22: First Problem I: Korman’s Counterexamples 
 
Boghossian’s reductio requires that it be the case that it is not possible that a subject could be 
deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting a (qualitatively) identical 
brain state is deploying an atomic concept. Korman (2006, pp.514-517) presents two alleged 
counterexamples to this thesis.  
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 The first involves Burgean externalism (see my Chapter 1). It consists of “a variant of Tyler 
Burge’s arthritis example” (ibid., p.514 – see also my Chapter 1, §1.22).35 The concept that is 
expressed by ‘H2O’ is paradigmatically non-atomic. Suppose there is a subject who is unaware that 
this is the case. Let’s call him Ignorant Iain. This Ignorant Iain hears about a substance “aichtuwo” by 
listening to his socio-linguistic peers. He is extremely scientifically ignorant – but is otherwise 
intelligent – and is unaware that what he hears as “aichtuwo” is being used with the intention that it 
refer to the chemical compound ‘H2O’. Korman contends that according to the Burgean externalist, a 
subject such as Ignorant Iain would possess the very ‘H2O’ concept that his socio-linguistic peers 
possess. Korman draws comparisons with Alf the arthritis sufferer. Alf has an incomplete 
understanding of what ‘arthritis’ is. He doesn’t understand that the term ‘arthritis’ applies exclusively 
to ailments that affect the joints. He thinks that arthritis is something that can spread to the thigh. Alf 
nevertheless possesses the concept ‘arthritis’, that is, the concept that Alf’s socio-linguistic peers – i.e. 
other English speakers – express by their use of the term ‘arthritis’, or so the Burgean story goes. 
Korman contends that the situation that Alf is in is analogous to the situation of a subject such as 
Ignorant Iain. Ignorant Iain will have an incomplete understanding of what he hears as “aichtuwo”. He 
will nevertheless still possess the concept that his linguistic peers possess. Imagine now a 
counterfactual scenario in which what Ignorant Iain hears as “aichtuwo” is not being used by his 
socio-linguistic peers to refer to a chemical compound. Suppose that for whatever reason the phrase is 
being used to express an atomic concept. Like in Burge’s original arthritis case, this need not impinge 
on Ignorant Iain’s intrinsic properties, including his brain states. Ignorant Iain can in this imagined 
counterfactual scenario be exhibiting all the same brain states that he is actually exhibiting. And like 
Alf in Burge’s original thought experiment, Ignorant Iain will be in possession of the concept that his 
peers are in possession of. Thus, Ignorant Iain’s concept would be atomic. Thus, we have a case in 
which a subject – actual Ignorant Iain – is deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject – 
counterfactual Ignorant Iain – is exhibiting an identical brain state but deploying an atomic concept. 
 There are two responses available to a defender of Boghossian’s reductio with respect to this 
first alleged counterexample. Firstly, it could be maintained that the counterexample shouldn’t be 
considered a counterexample to Boghossian’s thesis. Rather it should be considered a reductio that is 
specific to Burge’s particular brand of content externalism. If Burgean externalism has the 
consequence that a subject could be deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is 
exhibiting an identical brain state is deploying an atomic concept, then ipso facto Burgean externalism 
must be false. 
 The second response does not require any such wholesale rejection of the ideas of one of 
content externalism’s most important pioneers. The second response is to maintain that the cases of 
 




Ignorant Iain and Arthritic Alf are disanalogous. The reason that Alf can be said to have the concept 
‘arthritis’ that his socio-linguistic peers possess, is that Alf has some understanding of the concept 
even though that understanding is incomplete. (He has some sort of grasp of the concept – see below 
§2.29.) There is a standard of understanding that Alf meets, and it is because of that that he is in 
possession of the concept. For Korman’s counterexample to work it must be supposed that Ignorant 
Iain has a very dim understanding of his peers’ concept ‘H2O’. Thus, it could be maintained that 
Ignorant Iain’s understanding is insufficient for him to be in possession of the concept in the first 
place.  
 Korman’s second counterexample invokes Kripkean baptism: 
  
Suppose that my duplicate and I each introduce a word ‘F’ with the following stipulation: 
Let ‘F’ express the atomic concept two iff there are aliens and the complex concept the 
even prime iff there are no aliens. In the actual world (let us suppose) there are aliens. My 
duplicate inhabits a world otherwise identical to the actual world except that there are no 
aliens. It would be a mistake to think that we now express one and the same concept 
when we say ‘F’ – to think, for instance, that we both express the concept two iff there 
are aliens and the even prime iff there are not. On the contrary, the nature of the 
stipulation guarantees that different concepts are expressed: ‘F’ expresses the atomic 




Korman admits that the idea that he is free to stipulate what concept his term ‘F’ expresses with the 
aid of conditionals in the way he describes may “raise some eyebrows” (ibid. p.516). But he protests 
that it should follow from Kripkean ideas about reference: 
 
…if Kripke is right that I can successfully fix the semantic properties of a name for some 
unfamiliar mineral simply by saying “Let ‘G’ refer to stuff like this,” I should likewise be 
able to fix its semantic properties with a more explicit baptism: “If this stuff is all SiO2 
then let ‘G’ express a concept that applies only to SiO2, and if this stuff is all Fe2O3 then 
let ‘G’ express a concept that applies only to Fe2O3, and if I see no reason for taking the 
baptism of F to be any less legitimate than this explicit baptism of G? if anything, the 
former is more secure, for more is known about the nature of F at the time of the baptism 
than about the nature of G.  
(ibid., p.516) 
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 There are three claims that Korman is making here, which Korman’s counterexample 
requires. The first of which is correct. The second is plausible. The third is just plain wrong. Thus, 
Korman has not succeeded in giving a counterexample to Boghossian’s thesis that it is not possible 
that a subject could be deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting a 
(qualitatively) identical brain state is deploying an atomic concept. 
 Korman’s first claim is that that according to Kripke’s views on reference it is possible to “fix 
the semantic properties of a name for some unfamiliar mineral simply by saying “Let ‘G’ refer to stuff 
like this,””. According to the Kripkean story about reference, it is indeed the case that a subject can 
fix the reference of a term ‘G’ by such a stipulation.  
 The second claim is that from this it should follow that a subject should be able to fix the 
“semantic properties” of the term ‘G’ with “a more explicit baptism: “If this stuff is all SiO2 then let 
‘G’ express a concept that applies only to SiO2, and if this stuff is all Fe2O3 then let ‘G’ express a 
concept that applies only to Fe2O3””. Nowhere in Kripke’s published material does he explicitly state 
that it is possible to fix the reference of a term via the aid of conditionals in the way Korman 
describes. Nevertheless, it is a plausible extension of Kripkean doctrine.  
 Thirdly, Korman is claiming that given the Kripkean story of reference, it will be possible for 
him to control which concept his term ‘F’ expresses, and in particular it is possible for him to control 
whether it’s atomic or non-atomic. This is simply incorrect. Given the Kripkean story of reference 
Korman will have control of the reference of his term ‘F’. What this means is that Korman has some 
control over the concept that the term expresses. He can control what it is that the concept is a concept 
of – by controlling what ‘F’ refers to – but nothing more than that. It doesn’t follow that he has control 
over whether the concept is atomic or non-atomic. It may be the case that because of Korman’s 
stipulation that, in both the supposed actual case in which aliens exist and in the counterfactual case in 
which they don’t, ‘F’ refers to the number two. Thus, it is because of Korman’s stipulation that the 
concept that is expressed by ‘F’, in both cases, is a concept of the number two. However, nothing in 
the Kripkean story of reference permits that Korman’s stipulations could have any effect on whether 
the concept is atomic or non-atomic. Furthermore, it is not at all clear why a concept that is acquired 
through the sort of deployment of other concepts that Korman describes could be labelled as ‘atomic’. 
The concept that ‘F’ expresses would arguably be non-atomic in both cases, as it would be a 
composite of sorts of the concepts ‘the number two’, ‘evenness’, ‘aliens’, etc..     
 
4.23: First Problem II: Boghossian on the Language of Thought Hypothesis 
 
For Boghossian’s reductio to work it needs to be true that it is not possible that a subject could be 
deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting an identical brain state is 




counterexamples to that thesis, which are the two that are alleged by Korman. But, if two alleged 
counterexamples to a thesis are debunked, then that does not automatically mean that that thesis is 
therefore true. A positive case needs to be made for Boghossian’s atomicity thesis.       
Boghossian argues that his thesis is true because it is “hard to see how the compositionality of a 
concept could be a function of its external circumstances” (Boghossian, 1998, p.173, Boghossian’s 
emphasis) in the way supposing that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be non-atomic requires. He cites 
the role of “internal syntax” (ibid, p.173) in determining whether a concept is atomic or non-atomic. 
He claims that the truth of his thesis “is especially clear on a ‘language of thought’ picture of mental 
representation”, but states very cryptically that such an adoption of the language of thought picture is 
inessential to his thesis.36  
  If Boghossian’s thesis is to be argued for on the basis of the Language of Thought Hypothesis 
(the LOTH), then it needs to be demonstrated how it is that the intuitive notion of conceptual 
atomicity could have a basis in the operations of Mentalese. It would need to be argued that there will 
be some feature of the relevant bits of Mentalese that could be said to correspond to any given 
concept’s atomicity or non-atomicity. That feature would need to be such that it would necessarily be 
the same in identical subjects – such as in the Oscar/Twin Oscar/Thirsty Oscar trio. There would need 
to be a match up with our intuitive notion of conceptual atomicity and what would be a more 
theoretical notion of conceptual atomicity that would pertain to the constituents of Mentalese strings.37  
 If, on the other hand, Boghossian’s thesis is not to be argued for on the basis of the LOTH, 
then Boghossian does not make it clear how else he intends it to be argued for.  
 
4.24: First Problem III: An Alternative Argument for Why Thirsty Oscar’s Concept Could not be Non-
Atomic 
 
36 Here is the relevant passage quoted in full: 
 
The compound option requires the externalist to say that one and the same word, with one and the same 
functional role, may express an atomic concept under one set of external circumstances and a compound 
decompositional concept under another set of external circumstances. But it is hard to see how the 
compositionality of a concept could be a function of its external circumstances in this way. Compositionality, 
as I understand it, can only be a function of the internal syntax of concept; it can’t supervene on external 
circumstances in the way that the compound proposal would require. (This is especially clear on a ‘language 
of thought’ picture of mental representation, but is independent of it.) 
Boghossian, 1997, p.172-3, 
 
This all Boghossian gives us with respect to why he thinks that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could not be non-atomic.  
37 There is also the issue of whether such knowledge regarding the language of thought could be a priori, which it needs to 
be if Boghossian’s reductio is to work. 




There is (I believe) a much simpler reason that can be given for why Thirsty Oscar’s concept may not 
be non-atomic, which doesn’t invoke anything as theoretically weighty as the LOTH. If Thirsty Oscar 
is to be in possession of his putative concept, then he must have the requisite grasp of his concept. In 
order to grasp a non-atomic concept, it is surely necessarily to have a grasp of its constituent concepts, 
and to have an understanding of how the non-atomic concept is, as it were, built up from those 
constituent concepts. I grasp the concept bachelor, because I grasp the concepts marriage, negation, 
and human male, and I understand how these concepts fit together to give us the concept bachelor. If 
Thirsty Oscar’s concept were non-atomic, then it is very hard to see how it could be said that he 
grasps his concept. As far as Thirsty Oscar will be concerned his concept will be atomic. He won’t 
even recognise it has a concept that is made up of simpler constituent concepts.         
 
4.25: Second Problem I: Two Ways in Which Thirsty Oscar’s Concept Might be Atomic 
 
For Boghossian’s reductio to work, I need to be able to rule out a priori my being in a similar 
predicament that Thirsty Oscar is unwittingly the victim of. The way I am meant to be able to do that 
is by establishing that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept can be neither atomic nor non-atomic. (If it 
can’t be either, then it can’t be any sort of concept at all. In which case, Thirsty Oscar can’t really be 
thinking any sort of thought at all.) Supposing that Thirsty Oscar’s concept cannot be non-atomic, and 
I am able to convince myself of the truth of that via a priori means, then what would remain for me to 
do is to establish that it can’t be atomic either via similarly a priori means.  
Boghossian’s contention is that Thirsty Oscar’s concept cannot be atomic because there 
would be nothing to determine what belongs to the concept’s extension. There would be no bouncer at 
the door of the concept’s extension calling the shots on what is and what isn’t getting in. In the case of 
our concept of water, what acts as the bouncer for that concept’s extension is water itself. Anything 
that’s a sample of a substance that is the same as the substance as what flows in rivers and from taps is 
happily let in. Anything that isn’t is barred.    
 Boghossian’s line of argument here requires the fourth of the five commitments regarding the 
notion ‘concept’ that were outlined at the start of this chapter (§4.11), which is that there must be a 
fact of the matter with respect to what belongs to a concept’s extension. A second thing that 
Boghossian’s line of argument requires is that Thirsty Oscar’s putative concept could not have 
application conditions. This presents two options for the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio. 
Firstly, she could challenge the commitment that there must be a fact of the matter what belongs to a 
concept’s extension. Secondly, she could try to point to something that could constitute Thirsty 





2.26: Second Problem II: Thirsty Oscar’s Concept Does Not Need Application Conditions: 
McLaughlin and Tye’s “Concrete Proposal” 
 
McLaughlin and Tye (1998a) challenge the commitment that it must be determinable what belongs to 
a concept’s extension and argue that Thirsty Oscar’s putative concept would indeed be a concept, 
despite the fact that it is bereft of application conditions. They present the following “concrete 
proposal”:  
 
Suppose […] that the concept of water has conceptual role CR. Since [Thirsty Oscar’s] 
concept has the same conceptual role as Oscar’s concept (which is, of course, the concept 
of water), [Thirsty Oscar’s] concept has role CR….What concept is [Thirsty Oscar] 
actually expressing when he uses ‘water’? He is expressing the concept one possesses if 
and only if one has an atomic concept with conceptual role CR, but nothing satisfies the 
reference-fixing description associated with it, and there is no kind, natural or motley, at 
the end of the relevant causal chains leading to one’s use of it. 
(ibid., p.307) 
 
What McLaughlin and Tye are describing here is a mental entity E that can feature in a subject S’s 
cognitive processes, that features in Thirsty Oscar’s cognitive processes, and that is identified by the 
following two properties. Firstly, E is such that it could only feature in a subject S who is a denizen of 
either Dry Earth, or a similar planet that is superficially identical to Earth but contains no water. 
Secondly, E is such that it would have constituted S being in possession of an atomic natural kind 
concept – i.e. an atomic concept of which only instances of a particular natural kind are permitted 
within its extension – had the subject been a denizen of either Earth, Twin Earth or a similar planet on 
which there exists a water-like natural kind. McLaughlin and Tye contend that because we can 
describe, in this way, the conditions under which E would feature in a subject S’s cognitive processes, 
it is therefore the case that if E features in a subject S’s cognitive processes then that constitutes her 
being in possession of a concept, which is the very concept that Thirsty Oscar is in possession of. That 
concept would be of a different character to the concept of water, and to the concept of twater. There 
wouldn’t be a natural kind such that something falls under it if and only if that something is an 
instance of that kind. But it would be a concept nonetheless.  
McLaughlin and Tye do not state what such a concept’s application conditions would be. 
They do not state what it would take for something to fall under it. They offer no argument as to why 
such a concept, or any concept, need not have application conditions. Boghossian’s question is – if 
Thirsty Oscar’s putative concept is indeed a concept, then what could constitute that concept’s 
application conditions? McLaughlin and Tye response to that question is – yes, Thirsty Oscar’s 
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putative concept is indeed a concept, its possession conditions are such and such. To which the 
defender of Boghossian will respond by angrily again asking – if Thirsty Oscar’s putative concept is 
indeed a concept, then what could constitute that concept’s application conditions?!  
   
4.27: Second Problem III: Three Ways in which Thirsty Oscar’s Concept Could have Application 
Conditions 
 
There may be other ways the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio may endeavour to challenge 
the commitment that there must always be a fact of the matter with respect to what belongs to a 
concept’s extension.38 If, however, it is to be maintained that the concept must have application 
conditions, then the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio could opt for a different route by 
arguing that it would be determinable what belongs to Thirsty Oscar’s concept’s extension.  
There are at least three potential ways in which she might be able to do this.  
Firstly, she could argue that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be a motley concept. She could 
argue that the concept could be such that it applies to all and any liquid that has the superficial 
properties that water has.   
Secondly, she could argue that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be necessarily vacuous. She 
could argue that the concept could be such that nothing could possibly fall under it.  
Thirdly and finally, the would-be refuter could argue that although what Twin Oscar calls 
‘water’ is illusory, it still in some sense exists, and it is still able to function as the thing that 
 
38 It could possibly be argued that the phenomenon of vagueness challenges Boghossian’s contention that it must be 
determinable what belongs to a concept’s extension. Take for instance the concept tall for an adult male. Anything that is an 
adult male that is taller than 6′2′′ will most definitely fall under that concept. Adult males that aren’t as tall as 5′7′′ most 
definitely will not fall under that concept. Arguably, there will be a range of heights somewhere in between 5′7′′ and 6′2′′ 
such that for any adult male whose height is within that range there will be no fact of the matter with respect to whether that 
adult male falls under that concept. If that is indeed the case, then the poor men whose height falls within that range will 
have in a sense been failed by the concept. The concept has failed to sort out which of those poor men fall under it, and 
which don’t. Nevertheless, tall for an adult male is most definitely a bona-fide concept.           
 There are a couple of things to note with such a proposal. Firstly, the problem with Thirsty Oscar’s putative 
concept is not that it would be vague. The problem with Thirsty Oscar’s concept would not be that it divides the world up 
into things that fall under it and things that don’t, apart from a problematic but restricted range of instances. The problem 
with Thirsty Oscar’s concept would be that it wouldn’t divide the world up into things that do and do not fall under it at all. 
The malaise afflicting vague concepts is of a different character than that that would afflict Thirsty Oscar’s concept. 
Secondly, vague concepts such as tall for an adult male are regarded as a serious philosophical problem. This is partly due to 
concepts being regarded as things that should divide the world up into things that do and do not fall under them, and vague 
concepts apparently fail to do so. Rather than contradict the thesis, the phenomenon of vagueness, and our reaction to the 




determines what belongs to Thirsty Oscar’s concept. Something falls under the concept if and only if 
it is the same as the illusory liquid that Thirsty Oscar finds all around him. 
 
4.28: Second Problem IV:  Thirsty Oscar’s Concept is ‘Motley’ 
 
The first way in which it may be possible that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept could in fact have 
application conditions is suggested by Korman. Korman suggests that it could be that Thirsty Oscar’s 
concept is such that a sample of any liquid that has the superficial properties that water has, whether it 
be water, twater, or something else, will fall under it. It could be that:  
  
…‘water’ expresses a concept that applies, with respect to all counterfactual situations, to 
all and only samples with the superficial features that water was believed to have. 
(Korman, 2006, p.508)39 
 
The problem with this suggestion is that it is hard to see how a concept could be such 
that it would apply to any liquid that has the superficial properties that water has, and yet be 
atomic. It is easy to conceive of a non-atomic concept that has such application conditions. Such 
a non-atomic concept would be one that can be broken down into the concepts of 
‘odourlessness’, ‘clearness’, etc.. 
 
4.29: Second Problem V: Thirsty Oscar’s Concept is Necessarily Vacuous 
 
To solve what I am referring to has the second problem it needs to be demonstrated emphatically that 
if Thirsty Oscar is indeed in possession of a ‘water’ concept then it cannot be atomic. Otherwise the 
would-be refuter is afforded a possible line of attack. Boghossian’s case for it not being atomic is that 
if it were atomic it could not have application conditions.   
We have so far considered and discounted one suggestion for how it could be that Thirsty 
Oscar’s concept could be both atomic and have application conditions, which is that the concept could 
be motley. There is, however, a second way in which it may be possible that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ 
concept could in fact have application conditions. It could be that Thirsty Oscar’s concept is 
necessarily vacuous.  
 
39 What I’m quoting here is from the third of what Korman describes as “a series of “default conditionals” which he proposes 
govern the semantics of the word ‘water’ given certain contingencies regarding the nature of ‘water’ (Korman, 2006, pp.507-
8). 
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This second suggestion is also mooted by Korman (Korman, 2006), and by others (e.g. 
Goldberg, 2005) as well. 
A necessarily vacuous concept is a concept that has an empty extension not because there 
isn’t anything in the actual world that meets its application conditions, but because there is nothing 
that could possibly belong to its extension. If Thirsty Oscar’s concept was necessarily vacuous then in 
no possible world will there be any substance that falls under his concept.  
This second suggestion is also problematic. Integral to our notion of what a concept is is the 
idea that concepts are grasped. To possess a concept is to grasp that concept. In a similar way that it is 
hard to see how Thirsty Oscar’s could be said to grasp his concept if it were non-atomic – see above 
(§4.24) – it is also hard to see how he could be said to grasp his concept if it were a necessarily 
vacuous concept. As far as Thirsty Oscar is concerned his concept applies to an everyday substance 
that he believes is all around him. Yet according to what is proposed here, Thirsty Oscar’s concept 
would in fact be such that nothing falls under it, and nothing could fall under it.     
Possibly, if we consider other putative instances of persons being, like Thirsty Oscar, 
unwittingly in possession of necessarily vacuous concepts, we could draw parallels between those 
instances and the situation of Thirsty Oscar. That is, if we are able to identify what constitutes the 
subjects of such instances’ grasp of their respective concepts, then that might give us clues as to what 
could constitute Thirsty Oscar’s grasp of his concept.  
Firstly, consider the concept largest prime. This concept although necessarily vacuous, will 
be non-atomic. What will constitute a subject’s grasp of the concepts will be an understanding or 
grasp of their constituent concepts. In order to grasp the concept ‘largest prime’ it is necessarily and 
sufficient to grasp what it is for something to be the largest of a given set of numbers and to grasp 
what a prime number is. A subject can grasp what it is for something to be the largest of a given set of 
numbers, and to grasp what a prime number is, but be unaware that there are an infinite number of 
primes. Thus, a subject can grasp the concept ‘largest prime’ without being cognizant of its necessary 
vacuity. This, however, offers us little help in our present endeavour of trying to find something that 
could constitute Thirsty Oscar’s grasp of his supposedly necessarily vacuous concept. The whole 
point of supposing that Thirsty Oscar’s concept is necessarily vacuous is to allow it to be atomic. It 
can’t be the case that Thirsty Oscar is able to grasp his concept by grasping its constituent concepts.    
Consider another (putative – at least) necessarily vacuous concept. Consider the concept that 
is expressed by the proper name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. According to Kripkean theory, since Sherlock 
Holmes is a fictional character, the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’ will be necessarily vacuous. The 
majority of the populace, however, won’t recognise it as such. The majority of the populous won’t 
have read Naming and Necessity (nor will they have read the belatedly published Reference and 
Existence: The John Locke Lectures (Kripke, 2013). Thus, they won’t have had the opportunity to 




they won’t be in a position to recognise the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as being necessarily vacuous. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the populace will still most definitely be in possession of the concept 
‘Sherlock Holmes’. Ipso facto, they must all have the requisite grasp of the concept.      
The reason why the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’ will be necessarily vacuous will be because 
something falls under it if and only if it is numerically identical to the fictional creation Sherlock 
Holmes. Since there could be nothing in the real world that meets that application condition – there is 
nothing in the real world that could be identical to a fictional creation – there could not possibly be 
anything in the real world that falls under the concept.  
Grasping the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’ should be a matter of having an understanding of 
who Sherlock Holmes is. There are at least three things that could be said to constitute the majority of 
the populaces’ understanding of who Sherlock Holmes is, and thus constitute their grasp of the 
concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Firstly, there is the significant body of knowledge about Sherlock Holmes 
that the majority of the populace will be in possession of. They’ll know he is a fictional detective. 
They’ll know, or most of them will know that he was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. They’ll 
know (probably) that he is played in an acclaimed TV adaption by Benedict Cumberbatch – and so 
on. Secondly, the majority of the populace will have an understanding of how their socio-linguistic 
peers use proper nouns. In particular, they will have an understanding of how the names of persons – 
such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ – that they hear being used all around them function. They’ll understand 
how names of persons are passed on from user to user. And, they’ll understand that at the beginnings 
of such chains of communication usually resides a new-born baby who has been baptised such and 
such, or, as is sometimes the case, a fictional character whose creator has named such and such. 
Thirdly, knowing all that about the functioning of proper names together with the significant body of 
knowledge about Sherlock Holmes that the majority of the populace will be privy to could be said to 
what jointly constitutes the majority of the populaces’ grasp of the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’. 
 It could be argued that the majority of the populaces’ grasp of the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
is predicated on them knowing that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character. It could be argued that 
someone who does not know that Sherlock Holmes is fictional, who (say) believes Sherlock Holmes 
was a real-life Victorian detective, couldn’t be said to grasp the concept, and thus couldn’t be in 
possession of the concept. If this is so, then any chance for us drawing parallels between this second 
example and the case of Thirsty Oscar’s concept is obviously scuppered. There will be a marked 
difference between the possessors of the ‘Sherlock Holmes’ concept and Thirsty Oscar. The former 
will know that their concept concerns something that doesn’t exist, whereas Thirsty Oscar does not.  
Consider a third example of a necessarily vacuous concept, which is similar, but which 
involves subjects not knowing that they are referring to a fictional character. Suppose that Napoleon 
never really existed. Suppose that Napoleon was invented as part of a very elaborate hoax executed 
with great competency by late nineteenth century propagandists (say). Contrary to wide-spread belief, 
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Napoleon is in fact a fictional character. If we believe we are using ‘Napoleon’ to refer to a real-life-
flesh-and-blood person when in fact we are not, then it is questionable whether we could be said to 
grasp the concept that ‘Napoleon’ on our lips purportedly expresses. As I’ve already intimated, taking 
either side with respect to this matter could prove controversial. Nevertheless, if it is conceded that we 
would grasp the concept ‘Napoleon’, then there’ll be the same three candidates, mutatis mutandis, for 
what could constitute that grasp, as there was in the case of the concept ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Firstly, 
there’ll be the body of knowledge concerning Napoleon that we’d be privy to. Yes, a lot of what we 
think we know about Napoleon would be wrong. We’d, for instance, believe falsely that Napoleon 
was a real person who declared himself Holy Roman Emperor. However, there would still be a great 
body of stuff that we’d still know about Napoleon. We’d know about the things that are alleged with 
respect to Napoleon. We’d know that it is alleged that he declared himself Holy Roman Emperor, etc.. 
Our being privy to this body of things that Napoleon is alleged to have done, might be what would 
constitute our grasp of the concept ‘Napoleon’. Secondly, what would constitute our grasp of the 
concept ‘Napoleon’ could be our understanding of how there’ll be a socio-linguistic chain 
determining the reference of the proper noun ‘Napoleon’. It’s just that we wouldn’t know that it so 
happens that that socio-linguistic chain began with nineteenth century propagandists inventing a 
fictional character called ‘Napoleon’. Thirdly, our grasp of the concept ‘Napoleon’ could be 
constituted jointly by our being privy to things that are alleged with respect to Napoleon, and by our 
understanding of how the term ‘Napoleon’ will have had its reference fixed.      
Is this third example any more helpful with respect to our present purposes? Well, suppose 
that Thirsty Oscar’s distant ancestors decided to make up a fictional natural kind that they called 
‘water’. Suppose that they characterised this non-existent ‘water’ has having certain properties. They 
said that it was a clear, odourless liquid. They said it was wet – and so on. Finally, suppose that it has 
now been forgotten that the original intention was that ‘water’ was to name a fictional kind. It is now 
believed that there is in fact a natural kind ‘water’ and it has all – or at least most – of the properties 
that the ancients described it has having. If this were the case, then Thirsty Oscar would have read 
about ‘water’ and its alleged properties in the relevant ancient texts. Thus, he could be said to possess 
a fictional, and therefore necessarily vacuous concept, even though he doesn’t recognise it as such. 
His grasp of the concept could be said to be grounded in knowing about water’s alleged properties, or 
in him knowing about how the term ‘water’ will have received its reference, or in both of those things. 
However, what is being described here is very far from what we are in fact supposing is the case when 
it comes to Thirsty Oscar’s use of the term ‘water’. Thirsty Oscar intends that his term ‘water’ refer to 
the clear, odourless liquid that he believes is all around him. It is not something he has read about in 
ancient texts.  
Finally, there is a fourth sort of case that might involve a subject being in possession of a 




‘phlogiston’ refer to the substance that is present in all combustible substances and that is released 
during combustion with the sort of reference-fixing intentions that are described throughout Naming 
and Necessity. That is, in doing so Becher won’t have been stipulating that ‘phlogiston’ be shorthand 
for ‘the substance that is present in all combustible substances and that is released during 
combustion’. He would have been doing something else. He would have been attempting to fix the 
reference of ‘phlogiston’ – à la Kripke. An arguable consequence of that would be is that because 
there is no substance that was picked out by Becher’s stipulation – because Becher failed in his 
attempt to fix the reference – the concept that Becher expressed with ‘phlogiston’ will have been 
necessarily vacuous. Becher could have nevertheless believed that there really was a substance 
present in combustible substances and was released during combustion, and that his concept was not 
empty, let alone necessarily so.  
If it is to be maintained that Becher is here indeed in possession of the necessarily vacuous 
concept that is here being supposed he expressed with the term ‘phlogiston’, then there must be 
something that can be said to have constituted his grasp of that concept. What could this be? Well, 
Becher will have been ignorant with respect to the true nature of the concept’s application conditions. 
However, he will have been cognizant of the mechanism that determines the application conditions of 
his concept. This consisted of him stipulating that ‘phlogiston’ refer to the substance that is present in 
all combustible substances and that is released during combustion. It is just that he won’t have known 
that that will have led to his concept being necessarily vacuous. He will have had a sort of proxy 
epistemic access to the concept’s application conditions. This seems to be the best that can be done 
with respect to presenting a candidate for what could have constituted Becher’s grasp of his concept. 
Does any of this help us in our quest to try and work out what could constitute Thirsty 
Oscar’s grasp of his concept? Well, if Thirsty Oscar had acquired his concept by virtue of him 
stipulating that ‘water’ refer to ‘the clear, odourless liquid that flows in rivers, and taps’, then by the 
same lights, Thirsty Oscar’s concept would be necessarily vacuous. And, by the same lights, Thirsty 
Oscar could be said to grasp his concept – by having the same sort of proxy epistemic access to the 
concept’s application conditions. However, this – again – is very far from what we are in fact 
supposing is the case when it comes to Thirsty Oscar’s use of the term ‘water’. We are not supposing 
that Thirsty Oscar would have acquired his concept in this way.  
Also, if Thirsty Oscar had acquired his concept in this way, then it is doubtful that it could be 
described as being ‘atomic’. As is the case in the Korman example (§4.22), Thirsty Oscar’s concept 
would similarly be a composite of sorts of other concepts.   
In summary, what we’ve been considering in this subsection is a suggestion for how it could 
be that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could have application conditions, which is that Thirsty Oscar’s 
concept could be necessarily vacuous. If Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be shown to have application 
conditions, then that would derail Boghossian’s reductio. Thus, if it could be shown that Thirsty 
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Oscar’s concept would be necessarily vacuous, then that would derail Boghossian’s reductio. The 
suggestion is problematic, because it is hard to see how Thirsty Oscar could be said to grasp his 
concept if it were necessarily vacuous. We considered putative instances of persons being unwittingly 
in possession of necessarily vacuous concepts and attempted to draw parallels between those instances 
and the situation of Thirsty Oscar. We adopted, on behalf of the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s 
reductio, the hope that if we could identify what constitutes such person’s grasp of their respective 
concepts, then that might give us clues as to what could constitute Thirsty Oscar’s grasp of his 
concept, if it were indeed necessarily vacuous. Unfortunately for the would-be refuter, this hope, at 
least in the four examples we’ve considered, is yet to come to fruition.  
 
4.210: Second Problem VI: Necessary Vacuity and the Three Burgean Paradigms 
 
Partial conceptual ignorance is essentially what Burgean externalism is built upon. The three Burgean 
routes to content externalism all involve subjects who lack a complete grasp of a certain concept that 
Burge maintains that they nevertheless possess. Alf the Arthritis Sufferer (see my Chapter 1, §1.22) 
possesses the same ‘arthritis’ concept that his socio-linguistic peers possess, even though he has an 
incomplete understanding of that concept. Alf is unaware that the term ‘arthritis’ is only applicable to 
ailments of the joints. Oscar, in Burge’s characterisation of ‘Twin Earth’, possesses the concept 
‘water’ even though he is ignorant of expert knowledge in that he does not know that water is H2O 
(see Chapter 1, §1.23). Person A possess the concept ‘sofa’ even though he subscribes to a non-
standard theory with regards to what sofas are (see Chapter 1, §1.24).   
  Although none of these three cases involve necessary vacuity, a question that could still be 
asked is would any of these three examples be sufficiently analogous to the case of Thirsty Oscar and 
his ex hypothesi necessarily vacuous ‘water’ concept to warrant meaningful comparison? Remember 
that the aim of the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio, if she is to go down the route of 
supposing that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be necessarily vacuous, is to demonstrate that Thirsty 
Oscar could be said to grasp his concept even though he is totally unaware that it is necessarily 
vacuous. In the previous subsection, we considered ways in which the would-be refuter might be able 
to do this. Comparisons with the Burgean cases might afford the would-be refuter further ways of 
pursuing this aim. Since we have already spent what is probably too much time on what is a tangential 
topic, I won’t here consider whether that line of enquiry could bear fruit.   
 The assumption that underpins the three examples can be viewed as a sufficient condition for 
conceptual grasp. If an ascribee can be ascribed thoughts with a term ˹φ˺ in oblique position by his or 
her socio-linguistic cohorts, then that should mean that the ascribee can be said to grasp the concept 
that the term ˹φ˺ expresses. If an ascribee can be ascribed thoughts with the term ‘water’ in oblique 




grasp the very concept ‘water’ that his or her socio-linguistic cohorts possess. This sufficient 
condition, however, is not applicable in the case of Thirsty Oscar. When we ask whether Thirsty 
Oscar could be in possession of a necessarily vacuous concept, we are really asking whether Dry 
Earthlings as a whole – i.e. Thirsty Oscar’s socio-linguistic cohort – can be in possession of such a 
concept.                   
In lieu of a substantial account of what it is to grasp a concept – i.e. one consisting of a list of 
jointly-sufficient necessary conditions – to measure the case of Thirsty Oscar and his putative 
necessarily vacuous concept against, we can only measure the case of Thirsty Oscar and his putative 
necessarily vacuous concept against other relevant cases of conceptual grasp, which may or may not 
involve necessary vacuity. Alas, such comparisons with the four examples of the previous subsection 
have not proven fruitful. I am leaving it as an open question whether comparing the case of Thirsty 
Oscar and his putative necessarily vacuous concept with the examples that Burge provides could 
prove fruitful.  
To reiterate the summation that ended the previous subsection, our enquiry has not of yet 
yielded a strong case for supposing that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be necessarily vacuous, which 
would lead directly to a refutation of Boghossian’s reductio. However, we are not necessarily 
therefore left with a strong case for the opposite conclusion – that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could not 
be necessarily vacuous. There could still be hope for the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio if 
she were to pursue this line.     
 
4.211: Second Problem VII: Illusory Bouncers 
 
Boghossian’s reductio requires that it must be the case that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept cannot be 
a bona-fide concept. Boghossian argues that if Thirsty Oscar were in possession of a concept then that 
concept could neither be non-atomic nor atomic. Thus, it can’t be the case that Thirsty Oscar is in 
possession of a concept. A would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio could argue that Thirsty Oscar 
could be in possession of a non-atomic concept. Failing that, she could instead try to argue that 
Thirsty Oscar could be in possession of an atomic concept. Boghossian argues that Thirsty Oscar 
cannot be in possession of an atomic concept because there could be nothing that could constitute the 
application conditions of his concept. The would-be refuter could argue that Thirsty Oscar’s concept 
would not need application conditions. Failing that, the would-be refuter could instead argue that 
Thirsty Oscar’s putative concept would in fact have application conditions. To do so successfully the 
would-be refuter must stipulate what those application conditions could be. The would-be refuter 
could argue that Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be a motley concept, in that it applies to all and any 
liquid that has the superficial properties that water has. A second option would be to try to argue that 
Thirsty Oscar’s concept could be necessarily vacuous, in that nothing could possibly fall under it. 
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There is also a third option that might be open to the would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio, 
which is what I turn to in this present subsection. 
             A would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio could argue that, although it may seem a 
contradiction in terms, illusions are things that do in fact have an existence of sorts. Illusions are 
things that have spatio-temporal coordinates. They have perceptual properties, albeit ones that only 
the sufferer of the illusion is privy to. Illusions are things that are caused by other things – by psycho-
illusion-agentic drugs and by psychosis – and, through the actions of those who suffer them, they in 
turn cause further things to happen.  
 A would-be refuter of Boghossian’s reductio could argue further that illusions could act as the 
things that determine what belongs to a concept’s extension – could act as the bouncer at the door of a 
concept’s extension – in the same way that something that is ‘real’ could.  
 Suppose that the denizens of Dry Earth suffer the illusion that there is this watery substance 
that is all around them because disseminated throughout the atmosphere of Dry Earth there is a 
psycho-illusion-agentic substance that has been very cleverly chemically engineered to produce in 
people the illusion that there is this watery substance that is all around them. (Such a substance would 
be along the lines of what the psycho-chemists of the chemocracy depicted in Stanislaw Lem’s 
dystopian novel The Futurological Congress might create.) We could say that something falls under 
Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept if and only if it is a sample of the illusory watery substance that that 
cleverly chemically engineered substance causes people to see (or otherwise sense).  
Imagine now a second Dry Earth. On this Dry Earth 2 there is similarly no water or water-
like substance, and it is similarly the case that its denizens all are under the mass illusion that there is 
some sort of water-like substance that is all around them. On Dry Earth 2, however, the illusion is not 
caused by the cleverly chemically engineered substance that causes the illusion on Dry Earth 1. The 
illusion of ‘water’ on Dry Earth 2 is caused by a different cleverly chemically engineered substance. It 
could be argued that the concept that ‘water’ expresses on the lips of the denizens of Dry Earth 2 
would therefore be different to the concept that ‘water’ expresses on the lips of the denizens of Dry 
Earth 1. We have two different illusory substances constituting the sole application conditions of the 
two respective concepts.             
We can also imagine a third and a fourth Dry Earth. On Dry Earth 3 and on Dry Earth 4 the 
mass illusion of a water-like substance is not caused by a cleverly chemically engineered substance. 
On Dry Earth 3 the illusion is instead caused by a weirdly coincidental mass psychosis. On Dry Earth 
4 the illusion is similarly caused by a weirdly coincidental mass psychosis, but there are important 
physiological differences between what is happening in the brains of the denizens of Dry Earth 3 to 
what is happening in the brains of the denizens of Dry Earth 4 that mark their respective psychoses 
out as being different illnesses. We could say that the concept expressed by ‘water’ on the lips of the 




denizen of Dry Earth 4. We could also say that the concepts will also be non-identical to the 
respective ‘water’ concepts of the denizens of Dry Earth 1 and of Dry Earth 2. We thus now have four 
different illusory substances constituting the sole application conditions of the four respective 
concepts.             
 
4.212: The Third Problem: Boghossian’s Account of the Provenance of Content Externalism  
 
Boghossian’s reductio requires that it be the case that it is not possible that a subject could be 
deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting a (qualitatively) identical 
brain state is deploying an atomic concept. This, as we’ve seen, is something that is contestable. 
Boghossian’s reductio also requires that it be the case that Thirsty Oscar’s ‘water’ concept cannot be 
atomic. This, as we’ve seen, is also something that is contestable. Boghossian’s reductio also faces a 
third problem. Boghossian’s reductio requires that it must be supposed that Oscar’s concept is atomic. 
Boghossian contends that this follows from what he takes to be the provenance of content 
externalism. The problem is that Boghossian mischaracterises the provenance of content externalism:   
 
…let us remind ourselves how Putnam’s thought experiment is supposed to work. 
Whereas Oscar, an ordinary English Speaker, lives on Earth, his molecular and functional 
duplicate, Toscar, lives on Twin Earth, a planet just like Earth except that the liquid that 
fills its lakes and oceans, while indistinguishable from Earthly water in all ordinary 
circumstances, is not H2O but some other substance with a different chemical 
composition – call it XYZ. Going by whatever criteria are relevant to such matters, water 
and twin water are distinct kinds of substance, even though a chemically ignorant person 
wouldn’t be able to tell them apart. Now widespread intuition appears to have it that, 
whereas Oscar’s tokens of ‘water’ apply exclusively to H2O, Toscar’s tokens of ‘water’ 
apply exclusively to XYZ. Widespread intuition appears to have it, in other words, that 
Oscar’s and Toscar’s ‘water’ tokens have distinct extensions.  
(Boghossian, 1997, p.164) 
 
Boghossian claims that for this “widespread intuition” to be generated:  
 
…the concepts expressed by the Earthly and Twearthly tokens of ‘water’ have to be 
thought of as atomic concepts, not compound concepts that are compositionally built up 
out of other concepts in well defined ways. For example, the experiment presupposes that 
water [i.e. the concept expressed by ‘water’] can't be thought of as capable of being 
defined as: A tasteless, odourless liquid that flows in the rivers and faucets. For if it were 
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a compositional concept of that sort, its extension would be determined by the extension 
of its ingredient parts. Hence, a conclusion to the effect that water and twater have 
different extensions would have to proceed differently than it does in Putnam's original 
experiment, by showing that one of the ingredients of water—the concept expressed by 




Boghossian misattributes an argument to Putnam, which involves allegedly alleged intuitions, that is, 
intuitions that Boghossian alleges that Putnam and his defenders allege are generated via 
consideration of Twin Earth. This argument is in fact a very weak one. Essentially, the argument is 
that intuitively it seems that it must be the case that certain thoughts of Oscar that he’d express using 
the word ‘water’, will –  if it assumed that that concept is atomic, otherwise mutatis mutandis for a re-
orientated thought experiment – have different contents to the corresponding thoughts of Twin Oscar. 
Thus, there can be instances in which two atom-for-atom duplicates can be thinking thoughts with 
different contents. Thus, content externalism must be true. Boghossian is alleging that it is alleged that 
consideration of Twin Earth is meant to deliver the strong – or at least fairly strong – intuition that 
Oscar and Twin Oscar’s thought contents cannot be identical, and thus the conclusion that content 
doesn’t supervene on intrinsic properties. The problem is that this just simply isn’t the case. 
Consideration of Twin Earth – in itself – does not generate any such intuition. 
For Boghossian’s reductio to work – for it to get off the ground – it does need to be supposed 
that Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s respective concepts will be atomic. Boghossian’s has presented us with 
an illegitimate reason for why we should suppose this would be the case. That does not necessarily 
mean that it won’t be the case. Nevertheless, Boghossian has presented us with an illegitimate reason 
for supposing it would be the case. 
This ends our discussion of Boghossian’s reductio. We have, in this present chapter, 
examined Boghossian’s reductio argument, in order to try to assess whether it leads us to 
incompatibilism. In doing so we have possibly given the compatibilist hope by identifying three 
potential – potentially solvable perhaps – problems for the defender of Boghossian’s argument. The 
first is that it is not clear that it must be the case that it is not possible that a subject could be 
deploying a non-atomic concept, whilst another subject who is exhibiting an identical brain state is 
deploying an atomic concept (§4.22-4.24). The second problem is that it is not clear that Thirsty 
Oscar’s ‘water’ concept cannot have application conditions if it is supposed that it must be atomic 
(§4.25-4.211). The third problem is that Boghossian’s reason for why we should suppose that Oscar’s 




In the next chapter we consider whether the compatibilist cause fares any worse in the face of 
another reductio argument that is meant to establish incompatibilism. We examine Brown’s reductio 
argument.40  
 
40 Boghossian’s reductio may also face a fourth and even a fifth problem.  
There is a certain sort of valid argument where it is possible to have a degree of epistemic entitlement to the 
premises without also having that same epistemic entitlement to the conclusion – even though the conclusion may follow 
directly from the premises. These arguments, which we can call warrant transmission failure arguments, have as their first 
premise what is usually some everyday fact that it can be taken for granted that we know, or that we have at least good very 
grounds for believing, i.e. we have warrant for believing. They have as their second premise a true conditional that has as its 
antecedent that everyday fact, and has as its consequent the negation of some outlandish scenario that could not be case if the 
everyday fact were true, and that crucially we don’t have the same warrant for believing to be false as we have for believing 
the everyday fact to be true. They have as their conclusion that consequent. 
If there are indeed such warrant transmission failure argument, then Moore’s ‘proof’ (Moore, 1959) of the external 
world would be the most infamous example of one. I have hands. I surely have warrant for believing that I have hands. 
Here’s one, here’s another! If I have hands, then I am not a BIV. It should therefore follow that I am not a BIV. It seems 
somehow, however, that, contra Moore, I am not warranted to conclude therefore that I am not a BIV. The warrant I have for 
believing I have hands somehow fails to transmit to what would be an obvious consequent of my having hands.  
 Boghossian reductio involves a subject engaging in what is effectively a modus ponens argument. A subject is 
meant to start with the ex hypothesi a priori knowledge that she is thinking that water is wet. Via consideration of the 
relevant philosophical arguments she is meant to come to know a priori that if she is thinking that water is wet, then that 
entails that water exists. That in turn is meant to deliver to the subject the a priori knowledge that water exists.  
It has been suggested (Davies, 2003; Wright, 2000; 2003; et al – also see Ch. 7 of Brown, 2004; Beebee, 2001; 
Brueckner, 2008; Schiffer, 2005; Wright, 2011; et al) that this modus ponens argument could be a warrant transmission 
failure argument, and this could allow us to say that although the premises can both be conferred the epistemic status of 
knowledge, that same epistemic status cannot be conferred on the conclusion. This potentially constitutes a further problem 
for Boghossian’s reductio.  
As I noted in the Introduction, this very cumbersome topic is something that I omit from this present thesis. This is 
largely due to considerations of space, and I may properly consider the topic in potential sequels.    
Brown’s own (earlier) reductio, which is the subject of the next chapter, and my own reductio argument, which I 
present in Chapter 6, involve modus ponens arguments that are similar to the modus ponens argument that forms the centre 
piece of Boghossian’s reductio. They both involve a subject deducing – and thus coming to know a priori – something that 
she could not possibly know a priori based on her ex hypothesi a priori knowledge that she is thinking some thought with 
some content. Thus, they are both potentially vulnerable to similar warrant transmission failure considerations. 
Boghossian’s reductio also involves another modus ponens argument. Boghossian’s reductio requires that based on 
a subject’s ex hypothesi a priori knowledge that they are thinking that water is wet, she is entitled to move to the conclusion 
that therefore she is thinking a thought. (That in turns enables her to conclude that she is not in the same predicament that 
Thirsty Oscar is in, as Thirsty Oscar couldn’t be thinking a thought, as the concept he would be deploying if he were 
thinking a thought could neither be atomic nor non-atomic.) Thus, we have a modus ponens argument that has as its first 
premise that the subject is thinking that water is wet. Its second premise is that if the subject is thinking that water is wet, 




Brown (2004, pp.287-9) has argued that it can be the case that you know you’re thinking that water is wet without 
also knowing that you’re thinking a thought. Brown’s cites a “widely accepted” (ibid., p.288) necessary condition for 
knowledge:    
 
…S knows that p only if, were p false, she wouldn’t believe that p. 
(ibid.)   
 
Brown notes that in the possible worlds in which a subject wouldn’t be thinking that water is wet would be worlds in which 
she doesn’t believe she is thinking that water is wet. In a world in which she is thinking that twater is wet she wouldn’t 
believe that she is thinking that water is wet. She would believe instead that she is thinking that twater is wet. This would not 
be so in possible worlds in which the subject is not thinking a thought at all. In such worlds the subject will still believe 
falsely that she is thinking a thought. She won’t, however, believe falsely that she is thinking that water is wet. Thus, the 
subject can be said to know that she is thinking that water is wet, and not know that she is thinking a thought.  
It does seem extraordinary to suppose, as Brown does, that it could be possible to know that you’re thinking that 
water is wet without also automatically knowing that you’re thinking a thought. It is like supposing that I could know that I 
am wearing a red T-shirt without knowing that I am wearing a T-shirt.  
It could be argued that what Brown as in fact done is present an inconsistent quadruple – the only way out of 
which is to reject either ex hypothesi claim the we can know a priori what we are think or content externalism. The 
conclusion that is it possible for a subject to know that she is thinking that water is wet, and not know that she is thinking a 
thought would essentially rests on three assumptions, which are the a priori claim, content externalism, and the necessary 
condition that Brown cites – that a subject knows that p only if, were p false, the subject would not believe that p. So, we 
must reject the conclusion’s converse – i.e. except the conclusion – or we must reject one of the three assumptions – we have 
an inconsistent quadruple that consists of the conclusion’s converse and the three assumptions. What should we reject? We 
should, contra Brown, maintain that if someone knows that they are thinking that water is wet, then they should also know 
that they are thinking a thought – supposing otherwise is like supposing that I could know I am wearing a red T-shirt, 
without knowing that I am wearing a T-shirt. In other words, we should not accept the conclusion. In other words, we should 
not reject the conclusion’s converse. That leaves the a priori claim, content externalism, or the necessary condition. If the 
necessary condition is as “widely accepted” has Brown intimates, then it is perhaps not the necessary condition that we 

















5.0: Introduction to Chapter 5 
 
In the previous chapter we considered Boghossian’s attempt to demonstrate that if content externalism 
is indeed true – or more specifically if it is true that Oscar and Twin Oscar, the co-stars of Putnam’s 
‘Twin Earth’, do indeed think thoughts with differing contents – and if it is also true that we have an a 
priori epistemic access to our thoughts, then it will absurdly be the case that we would be able to 
know a priori that water exists. In this present chapter I consider a similar attempt by Brown at 
demonstrating that if content externalism is true, specifically if Burgean externalism (see Chapter 1, 
§1.2) – or rather Brown’s interpretation of what Burgean externalism is (see below) – is true, and it is 
also true we have an a priori access to our thought contents, then it would follow that we could know 
a priori something that we similarly ought not to be able to know a priori.41   
  
 
41 The two attempts are both implementations of what McLaughlin and Tye call “McKinsey’s recipe” (after McKinsey, 
1991): 
 
Michael McKinsey (1991) has described a recipe for making a case that externalist theses are incompatible 
with privileged access [actually a priori access – see my Chapter 7, §7.2]. Suppose a version of externalism 
implies that certain thought contents are individuated, at least in part, by environmental factors. Let that p be 
a thought content of the type in question. McKinsey’s recipe for trying to show that the version of externalism 
is incompatible with privileged access is essentially the following: find some E such that (1) E cannot be 
known a priori…yet (2) the version of externalism implies that it is a conceptual truth that if one is thinking 
that p, then E.  
(McLaughlin and Tye, 1998a, p.290) 
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5.1: Brown’s Reductio: The Basic Argument 
 
Brown (1995) explicates two conditionals that she takes Burge to be committed to: 
 
Q: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of a natural kind k and x is agnostic 
about the application conditions of the concept k, then either x is in an environment which 
contains k, or x is part of a community with the concept k. 




R: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a non-natural kind concept c, and x is agnostic 
about the application conditions of c, then x is part of a community which has the concept c. 
(ibid, pp.154) 
 
The first conditional, Q, results from a generalisation of:  
 
P: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of water, and x is agnostic about the 
application conditions of the concept of water, then either x is in an environment that contains 
H2O, or x is part of a community which has a term ‘water’ which applies to something if and 
only if it is H2O. 
(ibid, p.152) 
 
Brown infers Burge’s commitment to this conditional P from a passage from ‘Other Bodies’ (Burge, 
1982) in which Burge considers a subject, Adam, who has no notion of ‘H2O’ and who has neither 
interacted with water or with other people:  
 
What seems incredible to suppose is that Adam, in his relative ignorance and indifference 
about the nature of water, holds beliefs whose contents involve the notion, even though 
neither water nor communal cohorts exist. 
 
42 If we’re to be pedantic, then we’d chastise Brown for her use of the definite article. If there is natural kind k, then (surely) 
there will potentially be more than one concept of that kind. The conditional should really be as follows: 
 
Q: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept of a natural kind k and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of that concept, then either x is in an environment which contains k, or x is part of a community that has 




(Burge, 1982, p.11643, quoted in Brown, 1995, pp.150-1)  
 
 In explicating the conditionals P and Q, Brown introduces terminology that Burge does 
not use (see my Chapter 1, §1.2). Brown introduces the term ‘agnostic about the application 
conditions’. For the antecedent of P to be applicable to a subject, that subject must be ‘agnostic 
about the application conditions’ of the concept ‘water’. For the antecedent of Q to be 
applicable to a subject, the subject must be in possession of a natural kind concept of which she 
is ‘agnostic about the application conditions’. This term ‘agnostic about the application 
conditions’ proves to be of considerable significance, as we’ll be seeing as we progress through 
this chapter.   
Brown infers Burge’s commitment to the second conditional, R, as following from the 
reasoning he employs in ‘Individualism and the Mental’:  
 
Imagine that Oscar is agnostic about the application of the word, ‘sofa’. For example, he 
may apply it firmly and correctly to what we call ‘sofas’, but be unsure about whether it 
also applies to broad single seat armchairs. According to Burge, if Oscar is part of an 
English speaking community then, despite his agnosticism, he has thoughts involving the 
concept sofa. But if, counterfactually, Oscar had been part of a community in which 
‘sofa’ applied both to what we call ‘sofas’ and to broad single seat armchairs, then Oscar 
would have chofa thoughts, where the concept of chofa applies both to what we call 
‘sofas’ and to broad single seat armchairs, ([Burge, 1979], pp.77-83). Now imagine that 
there are no other speakers in Oscar’s environment. How could Oscar have propositional 
attitudes involving the concept sofa? Since sofa is not a natural kind concept, Oscar’s 
environment cannot help him to acquire the concept. There are no other speakers. 
Nothing seems to show that his attitudes involve the concept sofa as opposed to chofa 
(Brown, 1995, p.153-4)      
 
Brown then combines these two conditionals Q and R to get the following conditional, which 
is a logical consequent of the conditionals Q and R: 
 
S: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of c, then either x is in an environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural 
kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural 
kind concept. 
 
43 Pg.98 in Burge 2007. 
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(Brown, 1995, p.154-5) 
 
If I know a priori that, when I am thinking water is wet, I am thinking that water is wet, then I 
should also know a priori I am deploying a concept ‘water’. If I am like Burge’s Adam and ignorant 
with respect to the chemical composition of water, then by Brown’s lights I will be ‘agnostic’ with 
respect to the application conditions of my concept ‘water’. Furthermore, I should be able to know 
that a priori. Thus, I will be able to know a priori that I meet the antecedent of the conditional S. I 
should be able to come to know a priori that the conditional S is true through reading Burge, and 
through reading Brown’s paper, and through consideration of the a priori arguments found therein. So, 
since I know a priori that the antecedent is true with respect to me, I should know a priori that the 
consequent of S will be true with respect to me. Thus, I’d know a priori that either water exists or I am 
part of a socio-linguistic community that possesses the concept ‘water’. That would be absurd. 
Therefore, either the ex hypothesi claim that I should know a priori what I am thinking must be false, 
or Burgean externalism must be false.      
 
5.2: Responding to Brown’s Reductio  
 
5.21: Doubting Q 
 
Brown’s conditional Q is a generalisation of the conditional P. The conditional P is meant to follow 
directly from the Burge quotation. However, it is not entirely clear that it does. Burge’s Adam is 
ignorant with respect to the nature of water. He doesn’t know that it is H2O. What might follow from 
the Burge quotation is the conditional:  
 
P*: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of water, and x does not know that 
water is H2O, then either x is in an environment that contains H2O, or x is part of a community 
which has a term ‘water’ which applies to something if and only if it is H2O. 
 
Brown’s conditional P and the conditional P* would amount to the same thing if not knowing that 
water is H2O was the same as being ‘agnostic’ with respect to the application conditions of the 
concept water. It is not clear that that should be the case, however. Consider the case of Confident 
Oscar. Confident Oscar is ignorant with respect to chemistry. He doesn’t know that water is H2O. 
Confident Oscar nevertheless feels that he knows exactly what water is. He knows that water is 
anything that is the same stuff as the clear, odourless liquid that he finds all around him, anything that 




Confident Oscar does not know that water is H2O, it would (surely) be wrong to say that he is 
‘agnostic’ with respect to the concept of water’s application conditions.  
The case of Confident Oscar and his ‘water’ concept and the case of the “Oscar”, who we can 
call Lonely Oscar, and his ‘sofa’ concept that Brown discusses in the quotation are markedly 
different. Confident Oscar has a very firm view of what does and does not fall under his concept. 
Something falls under the concept if and only if it is the same stuff as what Confident Oscar finds all 
around him, which, coincidently, is equivalent to something falling under the concept if and only if it 
is H2O. Lonely Oscar does not likewise have a firm view of what does and does not fall under his 
concept. He is unsure whether “broad single seat armchairs” fall under his concept.  
When presented with a clear, odourless liquid, Confident Oscar may in fact be unsure whether 
to call it ‘water’. This would be due to Confident Oscar’s lack of knowledge regarding the 
constitution of what he calls ‘water’ and the constitution of the clear, odourless liquid that is presently 
before him. If Confident Oscar was given a quick crash course on chemistry and told that what he 
calls ‘water’ is made of H2O molecules, and then told that the clear, odourless liquid is also made of 
H2O molecules, he’d without hesitation say that the clear, odourless liquid is ‘water’. If, on the other 
hand, Confident Oscar was given a quick crash course on chemistry and told that what he calls ‘water’ 
is made of H2O molecules, and then told that the clear, odourless liquid before him is not also made of 
H2O molecules, he’d without hesitation say that the clear, odourless liquid is not ‘water’. Lonely 
Oscar is unsure whether to call “broad single seat armchairs” ‘sofas’ for reasons that are entirely 
different. No amount of non-conceptual information, regarding sofas and broad singles seat armchair 
could help Lonely Oscar settle on whether broad single seat armchairs are sofas.   
(It might be worth recalling here Burge’s characterisation of Twin Earth (see my Chapter 1, 
§1.23). It is not entirely clear that within that characterisation that Oscar is unsure about the 
application conditions of ‘water’ in the same way that Lonely Oscar is unsure about the application 
conditions of ‘sofa’. It is rather his “ignorance of expert knowledge” – that he does not know that 
water is H2O – that, according to Burge, is pertinent. It is not immediately clear that there is anything, 
in Burge’s characterisation, that would rule out the original Oscar from having the same relationship 
with ‘water’ that Confident Oscar has.)       
 To come to the rescue of Brown’s reductio, the Burgean can in fact be shown to be committed 
to Brown’s conditional P (and hence Q), though it is in a roundabout way, and though it is not for the 
reasons that Brown gives.   
Consider Hesitant Oscar. Hesitant Oscar inhabits a world in which as well as water (H2O), 
there also exists another natural kind that we can call pinkish water. Pinkish water has a chemical 
composition that is distinct from water (H2O) – hence it being a distinct natural kind. Superficially 
speaking however, pinkish water and water are almost identical. Pinkish water looks, tastes, feels etc. 
almost exactly like water, and, on Hesitant Oscar’s world, is found in all the same places that water 
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(H2O) is found. The only superficial difference between water (H2O) and pinkish water is that under 
the right lighting conditions pinkish water exhibits a pinkish tinge. Suppose that like Confident Oscar, 
Hesitant Oscar is ignorant with respect to chemistry. He doesn’t know anything about the chemical 
composition of water (H2O), or pinkish water. Suppose that Hesitant Oscar believes that, by the 
standards of his socio-linguistic community, it is definitely correct to refer to water as ‘water’. 
Suppose, however, that Hesitant Oscar is unsure with respect to whether it is correct to refer to 
pinkish water as ‘water’. He is hesitant to refer to pinkish water as ‘water’. Finally, suppose that, by 
the standards of Hesitant Oscar’s socio-linguistic community, it is incorrect to refer to pinkish water 
as ‘water’. It is correct to refer to something as ‘water’ if and only if it is water (H2O). By Burgean 
lights, this should mean Hesitant Oscar is in possession of a concept of water (H2O), i.e. a concept 
such that something falls under it if and only if it is water (H2O). The case of Hesitant Oscar is far 
closer to the case that features in the Brown quotation. Hesitant Oscar’s reluctance to refer to pinkish 
water as ‘water’ mirrors exactly Lonely Oscar’s reluctance to refer to “broad single seat armchairs” as 
‘sofas’. 
Suppose now that counterfactually Hesitant Oscar was all alone. He was not part of any 
socio-linguistic community. By the reasoning invoked by Brown in the quotation (see above), this 
should mean that Hesitant Oscar would not be in possession of the concept water. This gives strong 
support for the conditional: 
 
P**: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of water, and x is agnostic about the 
application conditions of the concept water, then x is part of a community which has a term 
‘water’ which applies to something if and only if it is H2O. 
 
Brown’s conditional P follows trivially from the conditional P**. (If F→G, then F→G∨H.) From P 
should follow the generalisation of P that is Brown’s conditional Q. 
 As well as the truth of Q, along with the truth of R (see next two sections), Brown’s reductio 
also requires that there should be a case in which a subject meets the conditions stipulated in the 
antecedent of Brown’s combined conditional S, and in which they can know a priori that they meet 
the conditions stipulated in the antecedent of S. That is, there needs to be a case in which a subject is 
thinking a thought involving a concept of which they are ‘agnostic’ about the application conditions, 
and in which they can know a priori that they are thinking a thought involving a concept of which 
they are ‘agnostic’ about the application conditions. The considerations of this present section have 
shown that my being chemically indifferent would not ensure that my thinking that water is wet 
constitutes such a case. The question then is what would. This is a matter we’ll be returning to very 





5.22: Doubting R I: The Concept ‘gilver’ 
 
As well as the conditional: 
 
Q: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of a natural kind k and x is agnostic 
about the application conditions of the concept k, then either x is in an environment which 
contains k, or x is part of a community with the concept k. 
 
Brown’s reductio also requires that the Burgean be committed to the conditional: 
 
R: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a non-natural kind concept c, and x is agnostic 
about the application conditions of c, then x is part of a community which has the concept c. 
 
It has been questioned whether the Burgean needs to be committed to R. 
Falvey (2000, p.138) presents the following alleged counterexample to R. Consider the case 
of Isolated Iris. Isolated Iris happens to be in a similar predicament to Lonely Oscar. Iris happens to 
be in a world in which there are no other speakers. Suppose that Iris has had interactions with the two 
elements gold and silver but is ignorant with respect to their chemical composition. According to 
Falvey, the Burgean would concede that by virtue of such interactions Iris will have the concepts 
silver and gold – i.e. she’ll have a concept that applies to something if and only if it is gold (Au), and 
a concept that applies to something if and only if it is silver (Ag). Suppose that Iris stipulates to 
herself that ‘gilver’ be anything that is either gold or silver. Iris would thus be in possession of the 
concept gilver, which will be a concept such that anything that is either gold (Au) or silver (Ag) 
would fall under it. The concept gilver would be a non-natural kind concept. And according to Falvey, 
because Iris is indifferent with respect to the chemical composition of gold and silver, that means that 
she is agnostic with respect to the application conditions of the concepts gold and silver. That, in turn, 
means that Iris will be agnostic with respect to the application conditions of the concept gilver. Thus, 
Iris being in possession of the concept gilver would be in flat contradiction to Brown’s conditional R.   
There are a number of things that can be said with respect to this alleged counterexample.  
Firstly, Falvey makes the same mistake that Brown makes. As we’ve seen in the previous 
section, being indifferent about the chemical composition of a natural kind does not necessarily make 
you ‘agnostic’ with respect to the relevant concept’s application conditions.  
Secondly, it could be argued that even if Iris were agnostic about the application conditions 
for the concepts gold and silver, it would not follow that she is agnostic about the application 
conditions of the concept gilver. Iris will have a very good idea of what it takes for something to fall 
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under the concept gilver. She will know that anything that falls under it will be something that either 
falls under the concept gold or falls under the concept silver.  
Thirdly, the Burgean need not be committed to the idea that a subject can come into 
possession of the concept of a natural kind through interactions with it in the way that the 
counterexample requires. The Burgean might have the commitment in addition to their Burgean 
commitments, but they need not. 
 Fourthly and finally, there is what Brown herself says with respect to this alleged 
counterexample:  
 
…we can treat the gilver case as an exception to (R) without undermining (R)’s original 
motivation. (R) should not be taken to apply where a subject has a concept and is agnostic 
about it, where this agnosticism stems wholly from his agnosticism about a component 
concept in terms of which the first concept is defined. This exclusion clause poses no 
threat to the reductio as a whole, for the gilver subject can know a priori that his 
agnosticism about gilver stems wholly from his agnosticism about gold and silver. 
(Brown, 2001, p.218-9) 
 
There is we can suppose a hidden exemption clause in the antecedent of the conditional R, of 
which a subject can know a priori whether it applies to her, and thereby whether her case is one 
which is or isn’t ruled out. This hidden clause will carry over into the combined conditional S. 
A more explicit rendering of S would thus be: 
 
S+: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the 
application conditions of c, then, unless c is a composite of two or more concepts and x is 
agnostic about the application conditions of at least one of those concepts, either x is in an 
environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural kind concept, or x is part of a 
community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural kind concept.      
 
5.23: Doubting R II: The Concept ‘zofa’ 
 
Consider again Brown’s case for the conditional R: 
 
Imagine that Oscar is agnostic about the application of the word, ‘sofa’. For example, he 
may apply it firmly and correctly to what we call ‘sofas’, but be unsure about whether it 
also applies to broad single seat armchairs. According to Burge, if Oscar is part of an 




concept sofa. But if, counterfactually, Oscar had been part of a community in which 
‘sofa’ applied both to what we call ‘sofas’ and to broad single seat armchairs, then Oscar 
would have chofa thoughts, where the concept of chofa applies both to what we call 
‘sofas’ and to broad single seat armchairs, ([Burge], 1979, pp.77-83). Now imagine that 
there are no other speakers in Oscar’s environment. How could Oscar have propositional 
attitudes involving the concept sofa? Since sofa is not a natural kind concept, Oscar’s 
environment cannot help him to acquire the concept. There are no other speakers. 
Nothing seems to show that his attitudes involve the concept sofa as opposed to chofa 
(Brown, 1995, p.153-4)      
 
Brown’s case for the conditional R rests on Burge’s externalism having the entailment that 
who we are calling Lonely Oscar – who Brown calls “Oscar” in the quotation – could not be in 
possession of the concept ‘sofa’ because he is not part of a socio-linguistic community.  
It has been suggested (McLaughlin and Tye, 1998a; Falvey, 2000) that the Burgean need not 
be committed to this. It has been suggested that on the lips of Lonely Oscar ‘sofa’ expresses the 
concept zofa. This concept zofa will be distinct from the concept sofa – which has an extension that 
encompasses only sofas – and it will be distinct from the concept chofa – which has an extension that 
encompasses sofas and broad single seat armchairs. The concept zofa will apply to sofas – i.e. what 
we call ‘sofas’. However, there will be no fact of the matter with respect to the question of whether 
broad single seat armchairs fall under the concept zofa. It is indeterminate.44   
 
44 Depending upon Lonely Oscar’s dispositions it may also be the case that there are other types of furniture, as well as 
armchairs, such that there is no fact of the matter with respect to whether the concept zofa applies. This may also be the case 
with respect to chaise-lounges. If when presented with a chaise-lounge, Lonely Oscar was not sure whether to call it a ‘sofa’, 
then there would similarly be no fact of the matter with respect whether chaise-lounges fall under Lonely Oscar’s concept. 
 Depending upon the dispositions of Lonely Oscar, the concept zofa may or may not apply to other types of 
furniture also. For instance, it may or may not apply to chaise-lounges. It doing so or it not doing is dependent upon Lonely 
Oscar’s dispositions. If Lonely Oscar, when presented with a chaise-lounge, was adamant that what was before him could 
not be a ‘sofa’, then chaise-lounges would not fall under the concept zofa. If, on the other hand, Lonely Oscar was adamant 
that what was before him was most definitely a ‘sofa’, then chaise-lounges would fall under the concept zofa.        
The concept zofa would be similar to a vague concept, such as the concept tall for an adult male. A vague concept 
such as tall for an adult male does do some of the work of carving up reality that a concept is obliged to do, but falls short 
when it comes to a certain subset. Any man who is shorter than 5′7′′ does not fall under the concept tall for an adult male. 
Any man who is taller than 6′2′′ does. There will however be a range of heights somewhere in between 5′7′′ and 6′2′′ such 
that for a man whose height is within that range, there will be no fact of the matter with respect to the question of whether or 
not that man falls under the concept tall for an adult. Similarly, the concept zofa would do some of the work of carving up 
reality that a concept is obliged to do, but would fall short when it comes to a certain subset. That subset would comprise 
armchairs as well as possibly other things, such as chaise-lounges, depending upon Lonely Oscar’s dispositions.  
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Brown has in later works (Brown, 2001; 2004) conceded that Lonely Oscar could be in 
possession of a concept, that he could be in possession of the concept zofa. However, she still 
maintains that this does not mean the Burgean is permitted to jettison R. For the antecedent of R to be 
applicable to a subject, the subject must be ‘agnostic’ with respect to her concept’s application 
conditions. To be ‘agnostic’ with respect to a concept’s application conditions – as Brown in her later 
work clarifies – requires two things. Firstly, it must be the case there is at least one type of thing such 
that the subject is unsure whether her concept applies to that type of thing. Secondly, the subject’s 
concept must be such that there is a fact of the matter with respect to whether the type, or types, of 
thing that the subject is unsure about fall under the concept. So, for a subject to be agnostic with 
respect to the application conditions of the concept she expresses by ‘sofa’, not only must she be 
unsure whether the concept expressed by ‘sofa’ applies to broad single seat armchairs, it must also be 
the case that there is a fact of the matter with respect to the question of whether it does or not. It must 
either be the case that ‘sofa’ does apply to broad single seat armchairs, or it must be the case that the 
word ‘sofa’ does not apply to broad single seat armchairs.45  
 
5.24: How can you Know A Priori that you’re ‘Agnostic’? 
 
It may be questionable whether we can have concepts such as the concept zofa, which have the sort of 
indefinite application conditions that we are supposing that the concept zofa has. Let us, nevertheless, 
suppose that such concepts do exist.      
 
45 There is another option open to the would-be defender of Brown’s reductio. Rather than contend that a subject being 
‘agnostic’ about a concept’s application requires that that concept have definite application conditions, a would-be defender 
could suggest that a clause could be added to Brown’s conditionals. R would thus be replaced with: 
 
 R+: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a non-natural kind concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of c, and c has definite application conditions, then x is part of a community which has the concept c. 
 
The combined conditional S would become: 
 
S+: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application conditions of c, and c 
has definite application conditions, then either x is in an environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural 
kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural kind concept. 
 
The difference between this alternative proposal and the proposal that we accept Brown’s amended/clarified definition of 
‘agnostic’ are superficial. All of what I go on to discuss in the next section will apply mutatis mutandis to the alternative 
proposal. (If Clive could know a priori that bureaus are a particular sort of furniture, then he would be able to know a priori 




 Let us also accept Brown’s amended/clarified definition of ‘agnostic’. A subject is ‘agnostic’ 
with respect to a concept if (i) they are unsure about the concept’s application conditions, and (ii) the 
concept does have definite application conditions. 
 Consider again the conditional that forms the heart of Brown’s reductio: 
 
S: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of c, then either x is in an environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural 
kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural 
kind concept. 
 
 For Brown’s reductio to work there must be a case in which the antecedent of S applies to a 
subject, and in which that subject knows a priori that the Brown’s conditional S applies to her. There 
needs to be a case in which a subject is thinking a thought involving a concept of which she is 
agnostic about the application conditions, and in which she can know a priori that she is agnostic 
about that concept’s application conditions. Suppose I am thinking a thought involving a concept c. 
Ex hypothesi, I can know a priori that I am thinking such a thought. However, the reductio also 
requires that I should also know a priori that I am agnostic with respect to the concept c’s application 
conditions. This is not merely a matter of knowing a priori that I am unsure about the application 
conditions of c. It is also a matter of knowing a priori that c does in fact have determinate application 
conditions.  
 Brown suggests the following case:  
 
Suppose that a subject has a partial understanding of bureau [the concept that is expressed 
by ‘bureau’] and, in virtue of this, knows that it applies to a type of piece of furniture, but 
not what type. This subject can know a priori that he is unsure what type of furniture 
bureau applies to. It might also be argued that he can know a priori that it applies to some 
particular type of furniture. According to a traditional view, subjects can gain a priori 
knowledge of how a concept applies in virtue of understanding it. For example, a subject 
who understands the concept of a toothbrush can know a priori that it is the concept of an 
artefact, and someone who understands the concept of a dress can know a priori that it is 
the concept of a piece of clothing. Now, our subject is stipulated to know that bureau 
applies to a particular type of furniture in virtue of his partial understanding of it. Thus, 
someone might argue that his knowledge that bureau applies to a particular type of 
furniture constitutes a priori knowledge. But given that he also knows a priori that he is 
unsure what type of furniture bureau applies to, he can have a priori knowledge that he is 
agnostic about [the application conditions of] bureau. 
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(Brown, 2001, pp.219-220)  
 
Such a subject, let’s call him Clive, will know a priori that he meets the conditions of the antecedent 
of the conditional S, as long as he is able to form the belief that bureaus are a type of furniture – i.e. 
the concept ‘bureau’ has definite application conditions – via a priori means, and as long as that belief 
constitutes knowledge. Ex hypothesi, when Clive thinks a thought involving the concept, he should be 
able to know a priori that he is doing so. If the conditional S is true, then Clive could – if he were to 
attend philosophy classes – come to know a priori that the conditional S is true via consideration of 
Burge and Brown’s arguments. Thus, Clive will be able to know a priori that either he belongs to a 
socio-linguistic community or his concept bureau corresponds to a natural kind that exists in his 
environment. That’d be absurd. Thus, we will have our reductio.        
 Whether we do in fact have our reductio will be dependent upon whether Clive would be able 
to come to believe that his concept applies to a particular type of furniture via a priori means, and 
upon whether that belief would be knowledge constituting. The success of Brown’s reductio hinges 
upon whether Clive could know a priori that bureaus are a particular type of furniture.  
The relevant passages of Brown’s paper (Brown, 2001) are uncharacteristically unclear. But 
what (I believe) she may have had in mind is that there is a mechanism by which Clive could come to 
believe that his concept applies to a particular type of furniture that is either the same as or is similar 
to the mechanism that is employed in acts of critical reasoning. Suppose that Clive comes to belief 
that his friend Frank believes that bureaus are hopelessly antiquated. Clive would be able to reason 
that therefore Frank believes that a particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated. Clive would 
come, via his act of reasoning, to the new belief that Frank believes that a particular type of furniture 
is hopelessly antiquated. The way in which Clive comes to his new belief would (presumptively) be 
entirely a priori. Brown could be envisaging that something similar is going on when Clive comes to 
believe that his concept applies to a particular type of furniture.           
 So much for the belief, let’s now consider whether the belief could count as knowledge.  
 Brown talks of “some sort of transcendental argument” (ibid., p.222) that would aim to 
demonstrate that we must admit the possibility of a priori knowledge of analytic truths, if we are to 
maintain that we can come to know things through the process of critical reasoning. The following is 
what I believe she may have had in mind. Suppose that Clive were to come to belief that the there is a 
particular type of furniture that Frank thinks is hopelessly antiquated, in the way that I described, i.e. 
through his reasoning that because Frank thinks that bureaus are hopelessly antiquated, there is 
therefore a particular type of furniture that Frank thinks is hopelessly antiquated. That true belief 
would surely qualify as knowledge. Through his act of reasoning, Clive has come to know that there is 




particular type of furniture is gotten by the same – or a similar – mechanism, then that would suggest 
that that true belief must also constitute knowledge.  
 This “transcendental argument” requires a number of things. 
Firstly, you should recall the distinction between local reliability and global reliability from 
Chapter 3 (§3.22). When a subject forms a true belief that <p> via a method of belief formation, that 
belief formation method will be locally reliable just in case there are no relevant alternatives in which 
<p> is not the case, but the method would still lead the subject to form a false belief. The belief 
formation method will be globally reliable just in case it is and would be locally reliable with respect 
to all propositions that are sufficiently similar to <p>. The argument requires that global reliability 
and not just local reliability is necessary for knowledge. If just local reliability were necessary for 
knowledge, then that could allow us to say that Clive’s belief that there is a particular type of furniture 
that Frank thinks is hopelessly antiquated counts as knowledge, without us also having to admit that 
his belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture also counts as knowledge. The manner in 
which both beliefs are formed is the same. It just so happens – we could say – that that belief forming 
process is locally reliable in the case of the first belief, but not in the case of the second – i.e. it is not 
globally reliable.46  
 Secondly, the argument requires that the process by which Clive acquires his belief that Frank 
thinks a particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated be, in an appropriate sense, the same as 
the process by which he acquires his belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture. If the 
process by which the first belief is formed is not the same as the process by which the second belief is 
formed, then this would allow us to say that the first belief qualifies as knowledge, without us having 
to admit that the second belief qualifies as knowledge. And, we could do so whilst conceding that 
global reliability is required for knowledge. If the second belief doesn’t qualify as knowledge, then 
ipso facto the process by which the belief is formed is neither locally nor globally reliable. However, 
that won’t mean the process by which the first belief is formed is therefore not globally reliable, as it 
would, ex hypothesi, be a different process.  
Thirdly and finally, you should also recall from Chapter 2 what Brown calls the generality 
problem. A method of belief formation will be globally reliable just in case it is locally reliable with 
respect to a range of propositions that are similar to <p>. The generality problem is the problem of 
what determines which propositions are similar to <p>. The argument requires a solution to the 
generality problem under which the proposition that Frank thinks a particular type of furniture is 
hopelessly antiquated and the proposition that bureaus are a particular type of furniture would be 
deemed sufficiently similar.  
 
46 Brown in a footnote (Brown, 2001, p.222, fn.7) does state that the soundness of her argument could depend on upon the 
issue of whether knowledge requires global or local reliability. 
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The argument can be written more formally: 
 
Manifest Premise: Through an act of critical reasoning, Clive can come to know that Frank 
thinks a particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated. 
Observation 1: Through a similar act of critical reasoning Clive can form the true belief that 
bureaus are a particular type of furniture.  
Assumption 1: The act of reasoning that would lead Clive to form the true belief that bureaus 
are a particular type of furniture would be a priori.   
Assumption 2: In order for a belief formation method to confer knowledge, it must be the case 
that that method is globally reliable. 
Assumption 3: The act of critical reasoning that would lead to Clive’s knowledge that Frank 
thinks a particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated, and the act of critical reasoning 
that would lead to Clive’s true belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture would be 
tokens of the same method of belief formation 
Assumption 4: The correct solution to the generality problem would rule that the proposition 
that Franks thinks a particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated and the proposition 
that bureaus are a particular type of furniture are ‘sufficiently’ similar.  
Transcendental Requisite: If Clive’s true belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture 
would not constitute knowledge, then Clive could not come to know that Franks thinks a 
particular type of furniture is hopelessly antiquated through an act of critical reasoning. (From 
Assumptions 2-4.) 
Transcendental Conclusion: Clive’s true belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture 
would constitute knowledge. (From Manifest Premise and Transcendental Requisite.) 
Further Conclusion: Clive would know a priori that bureaus are a particular type of furniture. 
(From Assumption 1 and Transcendental Conclusion.)    
 
If the argument – whether it be what Brown had in mind or not – is sound, then we could, as 
the reductio requires, suppose that subjects could know a priori that they are ‘agnostic’ – per Brown’s 
amended definition – with respect to a concept’s application conditions. The argument being sound 
would mean that Clive would be able to know that he is agnostic with respect to the application 
conditions of his ‘bureau’ concept. Thus, it will be possible for Clive to know a priori that he meets 
the conditions stipulated in the antecedent of Brown’s conditional: 
 
S: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 




kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural 
kind concept. 
 
Thus, Clive could come to know a priori the consequent of S that either he inhabits a world that 
contains a natural kind that instances of which are called ‘bureaus’, or he belongs to a socio-linguistic 
community that has the concept ‘bureau’.  
 The later Brown, i.e. the Brown of Knowledge and Anti-Individualism, claims that it is “hard 
to see” how a subject could know a priori that they are agnostic about a concept’s application 
conditions (Brown, 2004, pp.298-301). Brown argues that if a subject is unsure about the application 
conditions of her concept, then it could be the case that the concept does not have definite application 
conditions, and thus would not be agnostic about the concept’s application conditions. So, since the 
subject cannot rule out that possibility a priori, it is surely the case that she cannot know a priori that 
she is agnostic about the concept’s application conditions.  
If the argument I characterise here is sound, then the later Brown must be wrong. A subject 
could know a priori that she is agnostic with respect to her concept’s application conditions. Such a 
subject perhaps wouldn’t be able to rule out a priori the possibility that that concept could have 
indeterminate application conditions. But, if the argument is sound, then such possibilities won’t 
always constitute relevant alternatives. 
Clive would not be able to rule out a counterfactual scenario in which the word ‘bureau’ as 
used by Clive’s socio-linguistic peers doesn’t have definite application conditions. However, if the 
earlier Brown’s argument – i.e. the argument I have inferred from Brown – is sound then a fortriori 
such a counterfactual scenario cannot constitute a relevant alternative. Because if it did then Clive’s 
true belief that bureaus are a type of furniture could not constitute knowledge – the a priori method by 
which Clive acquired his belief could not have involved him ruling out such a counterfactual scenario. 
Clive’s true belief will constitute knowledge if the argument is sound. Ipso facto, such a 
counterfactual scenario will not constitute a relevant alternative.    
For the earlier Brown’s argument to be sound the four assumptions I’ve explicated must all be 
true. I won’t here try to make a case for or against assumptions 2-4, which all essentially pertain to 
wider epistemological matters. I will, however, comment on Assumption 1, which is that the act of 
critical reasoning that leads Clive to form the belief that bureaus are a particular type of furniture 
would be a priori. I am not entirely convinced that the way in which Clive would come to the belief 
that bureaus are a particular type of furniture and to his belief that his friend Frank thinks that there is 
a particular type of furniture would be entirely a priori. In both cases Clive would essentially be 
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making judgements about how his socio-linguistic community – about how they use the word 
‘bureau’ – which should surely be a posteriori.47 
Brown’s reductio requires a case in which someone is in possession of a concept of which 
they are ‘agnostic’ about the application conditions and know a priori that they are ‘agnostic’ about 
the application conditions. This, problematically, means that they must know a priori that their 
concept has definite application conditions. We’ve been considering the case that Brown suggests 
could meet these desiderata. I have tried to reverse engineer an argument that would demonstrate that 
the case that Brown suggests would indeed meet the desiderata. It is not entirely clear that the 
argument I have come up with – whether it is what Brown had in mind or not – is sound. Thus, it is 
questionable whether we have a case in which someone is in possession of a concept of which they 
are ‘agnostic’ about the application conditions and know a priori that they are ‘agnostic’ about the 
application conditions.      
 
47 Brown, incidentally, worries that her subject being in possession of a priori knowledge that bureaus are a particular type of 
furniture would be precluded by Quinean considerations with respect to the analytic/synthetic distinction (Quine, 1951). The 
subject knowing a priori that bureaus are a particular type of furniture would constitute an instance of a priori knowledge of 
an “analytic truth” (Brown, 2001, p.220). Quine’s famous deliberations, Brown worries, entail a denial that there can ever be 
an instance of a priori knowledge of an analytic truth. She also worries that the possibility would also be precluded by the 
arguments that Burge himself puts forward in his (1986) ‘Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind’, as those 
arguments similarly entail a denial that there can ever be an instance of a priori knowledge of an analytic truth. It is not clear 














In the preceding three chapters I have been assessing some of the most prominent strands in the 
debate that lasted from the late eighties to the mid noughties over whether content externalism is 
compatible with the claim that we should have an a priori access to the contents of our thoughts.  
In Chapter 3, I considered what is known as the discrimination argument.  Proponents of the 
discrimination argument hold that externalism allows for cases in which a subject forms a true – 
guaranteed-to-be-true (even) – belief about what she is thinking, but in which there will be relevant 
alternatives – i.e. pertinent counterfactual scenarios – in which things would seem to the subject 
exactly as they actually are, and in which the subject is not thinking what she is actually thinking. The 
most famous of those cases is the case of Slow-Switching Sally.  
There are two ways of countering the discrimination argument. The first is to insist that no 
such case would or could actually arise. The problem with this is that, even if the case of Slow-
Switching Sally is dismissed for being too contrived, there seem to be slow-switching cases that are 
more plausible such as the ones we encountered throughout the chapter – such as the cases of Biff and 
Griff.  
The second way of countering the discrimination argument is to adopt the reliabilist 
approach. If content externalism were true, then there would be cases in which a subject forms a true 
belief about what she is thinking, and in which there will be relevant alternatives in which things 
would seem to the subject exactly as they actually are, and in which the subject is not thinking what 
she is actually thinking. In such cases, however, the existence of such relevant alternatives does not 
disqualify the subject’s true belief from counting as knowledge, as within those relevant alternatives 
the subject would not form what would be the false belief that she is thinking what it is that she is 
actually thinking.  
Brown’s Wasp-Phobic Wendy case might pose a problem for this second approach – but 
could only do so if a number of conditions can be satisfied.        
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 In chapter 4, I considered Boghossian’s reductio argument. Boghossian argues that if content 
externalism is true, and it is true that we can know a priori what the contents of our thoughts are, then 
it follows absurdly that we could know a priori that water exists. If I know a priori that I am thinking 
that water is wet, I can deduce that I am not a denizen of Dry Earth, and thus I can come to know a 
priori that I am not a denizen of Dry Earth, and thus come to know a priori that water exists. 
 Boghossian’s reductio rests on three claims.  
 Firstly, it must be the case that if we have a pair of (qualitatively) identical subjects it cannot 
be the case that one is deploying an atomic concept whilst the other is deploying a non-atomic 
concept.  
Other than making cryptic allusions to the LOTH, Boghossian does not adequately explain 
why, if my ‘water’ concept is indeed atomic, it follows from that that my atom-for-atom Dry-
Earthling duplicate’s equivalent concept cannot therefore be non-atomic.  
This could potentially be remedied if a convincing case for Boghossian’s thesis could be 
provided. For instance, I have suggested that my Dry Earthling counterpart could not be said to grasp, 
and therefore possess, his putative ‘water’ concept if it were non-atomic, as, as far as my counterpart 
would be concerned, the concept would be atomic.  
The second claim is that a Dry Earthling ‘water’ concept could not be atomic. 
Boghossian does not exhaustively dispel the possible ways in which my Dry Earthling 
counterpart could still be said to be in possession of an atomic concept, even though on Dry Earth 
there would be no equivalent of water that could determine that concept’s application conditions. For 
instance, Boghossian doesn’t say anything about why the concept could not be necessarily vacuous.  
 The third claim is that Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment requires that Oscar’s 
‘water’ concept be atomic.  
Boghossian does not adequately explain why this needs to be the case.  
In Chapter 5 we saw how Brown derives the following conditional from the writings of 
Burge:  
 
Q: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of a natural kind k and x is agnostic 
about the application conditions of the concept k, then either x is in an environment which 




R: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a non-natural kind concept c, and x is agnostic 





 By combining these conditionals, Brown deduces that a Burgean must be committed to: 
 
S: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of c, then either x is in an environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural 
kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural 
kind concept. 
 
 Brown argues that if Burgean externalism were true, a subject could know a priori that the 
antecedent of S applies to her. Thus, the subject could come, via consideration of the relevant 
philosophical arguments, to know a priori that the consequent of S also applies to her, which would be 
absurd. 
It has been doubted whether the Burgean needs to be committed to the conditional R. It has 
been suggested that an isolated subject could be in possession of a concept even if she is unsure about 
that concept’s application conditions, as long as it is supposed that it is possible for a concept to have 
indefinite application conditions. If an isolated subject is in possession of a concept and she is unsure 
whether that concept applies to a particular set of things, then it will be the case that there is no fact of 
the matter whether that concept applies to that set of things.  
In response, Brown has conceded that there could be concepts with indefinite application 
conditions, but has contended that in order for a subject to be ‘agnostic’ with respect to a concept it 
must be the case that that subject is unsure about that concept’s application conditions, and it must 
also be the case that the concept does have definite application conditions, there cannot be a set of 
things for which there is no fact of the matter whether the concept applies.  
If there are concepts with indefinite application conditions, then in order for a subject to know 
a priori that she meets the conditions stipulated in the antecedent of Brown’s conditional S she must 
be able to know a priori that her concept c has definite application conditions. Brown has presented a 
case in which a subject could meet this requirement, but only if the ‘transcendental’ argument that I 
have inferred from an obscure passage in one of Brown’s papers is sound. It is not clear whether that 
argument is indeed sound. 
In sum, the previous three chapters have all respectively considered prominent arguments for 
incompatibilism. None of these three arguments are entirely convincing. They contain too many 
potentially-pluggable-but-as-of-yet-unplugged dialectical holes.  
Our enquiry could end here. Content externalism being incompatible with the claim we 
should know a priori what the contents of our thoughts are may pose a threat to content externalism. 
But we have no compelling reason to suppose that the two things are indeed incompatible. The 
arguments that we’ve considered are potentially salvageable. As-of-yet-unplugged dialectical holes 
could potentially be plugged. Nevertheless, we are possibly safe to conclude that we don’t as of yet 
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have conclusive arguments for supposing that content externalism and the a priori claim are 
incompatible.    
There is, however, the matter of why it should be supposed that content externalism and 
claims that we should be able to know a priori what we are thinking being incompatible would pose a 
threat to content externalism. If it is indeed the case that the two things can’t both be true, then why 
should it be problematic to suppose that it is the latter and not the former that must be false? In the 
final chapter of the thesis – Chapter 7 – I essentially consider the feasibility of denying that we should 
be able to know a priori what we are thinking.   
Also, Boghossian’s reductio can (I believe) be given a new lease of life. In the next and 
penultimate chapter – Chapter 6 – I advance my own reductio argument that concerns Kripkean 

















6.0: Introduction to Chapter 6 
 
In the previous three chapters I assessed the arguments of others for the incompatibility of content 
externalism and the claim that we should be able to know a priori what we are presently thinking. In 
this present chapter, I present my own original argument for the incompatibility of Kripkean 
externalism and the claim that we should be able to know a priori what we are presently thinking. This 
argument is a reductio similar to those advanced by Boghossian and Brown. It takes inspiration from 
Boghossian’s reductio in particular, but it trades the notions of conceptual atomicity and non-
atomicity that fuel Boghossian’s reductio for the Kripkean notions of direct and descriptional 
reference. Boghossian’s reductio banks on the contention that in the event ‘water’ does not refer, 
‘water’ could express neither an atomic nor a non-atomic concept, and therefore could not express a 
concept at all. Analogously, the reductio I propose banks on it being the case that in the event 
‘Aristotle’ does not refer, ‘Aristotle’ could neither refer directly nor be shorthand for a definite 
description. 
  
6.1: The Basic Argument 
 
According to Kripkean theory, when I utter the name ‘Aristotle’ it should be the case that I am not 
using it as shorthand for some definite description that Aristotle uniquely satisfies. My reference is 
not mediated through the conceptual lens that is a definite description. Instead, I refer directly to 
Aristotle (see Kripke, 1982; Salmon, 1982; and Kaplan, 1989). Due to Kripke’s commitment to 
Millianism (see my Chapter 1, §1.3), it should also be the case that if there were no ‘Aristotle’, then 
the thought I’d express ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ (say) could not have a content. The thought owes 
its very content to Aristotle. Thus, although even though I may believe that I am thinking a thought 
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that I’d express ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’, if there were no ‘Aristotle’, I could not be thinking any 
such thought. And thus, if it is to be supposed that I know a priori that I am thinking the thought 
‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’, then it should follow that I would be able to know a priori that there was 
an ‘Aristotle’, that Aristotle existed. This would be absurd.           
     
6.2: Could ‘Aristotle’ be Shorthand for a Definite Description in the Event that he did not 
Exist? 
 
My reductio requires it to be the case ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ could not express a thought if 
Aristotle had never existed. Thus, if it can be shown that ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ could express a 
thought, in the event that Aristotle never existed, my reductio will have failed.  
One way in which this might be done is to argue that ‘Aristotle’ on my lips would, in the 
event that Aristotle never existed, be shorthand for some appropriate definite description. When I utter 
‘Aristotle’ what I really mean, if it is indeed that case that Aristotle never existed, is ‘the teacher of 
Alexander’ (say), or ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’ (perhaps). The thought ‘Aristotle was an 
alcoholic’ thus becomes ‘The teacher of Alexander was an alcoholic’, or ‘The last great philosopher 
of antiquity was an alcoholic’, and thus acquires a new Aristotle-independent content.      
  This is precisely what has been suggested by Ludlow (Ludlow, 2003). Ludlow suggests that 
we can mix Russellian and Kripkean semantic theory for a sort of best of both worlds approach. 
Kripke has shown that Russellian semantic theory, which holds that names are shorthand for definite 
descriptions, is in irreconcilable conflict with intuitions, made bare by Kripke, regarding the workings 
of proper names (Russell, 1905; Kripke, 1982). Russellian theory, nevertheless, apparently succeeds 
where Kripkean theory does not, in that it gives us a solution to the problem of empty names – names 
that fail to refer. Ludlow’s suggestion is that we concede that Kripke is basically right in the case of 
names that do not fail to refer, but for names that do fail to refer we return to Russell. Even though 
Naming and Necessity rips up the old Russellian rule book in spectacular fashion, we still need to 
defer to its torn fragments in the problematic case of empty names, or as Häggqvist and Wikforss, in 
their critique of Ludlow (Häggqvist and Wikforss, 2007, pp.379-382), deliciously put it: 
 
Russell, as it were, gets to clean up after Kripke’s party. 
(ibid., p.379) 
 
In the counterfactual scenario in which Aristotle did not exist, the name ‘Aristotle’ on my lips would 
be an empty name – it would be a name that fails to refer. Ludlow’s suggestion is that because of this 
the name ‘Aristotle’, on my lips, should be ascribed the semantics that Russellian semantic theory 




definite description that Aristotle is believed to uniquely satisfy. Even though, in the actual case it is 
not. In the actual case, in which Aristotle exists, the name ‘Aristotle’, on my lips, will refer directly.       
The problem with this suggestion is that the role that speaker intentions play in 
communication would be compromised. If I’m going to use a name as shorthand for some definite 
description, then I should do so with the intention to use that name as shorthand for a definite 
description. Likewise, if I’m going to use a name to refer directly, then it should be the case that I 
would do so with the intention to do so.  
Under Ludlow’s proposal it seems that whether I use a name as shorthand for a definite 
description, or use it to refer directly to someone or something, would not depend upon my intentions, 
but would depend upon factors pertaining to my external environment – it will depend upon whether 
or not something in my external environment exists.     
 Ludlow contends that in both the actual and counterfactual scenario, I do exercise my 
semantic intentions to their full extent when I utter the sentence ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ in that in 
the both the actual case and in the counterfactual scenario, my semantic intentions are to express the 
thought that I am currently thinking. It just so happens that that thought is different in the 
counterfactual scenario to what it actually is. Not only is it different in terms of its content. It is also 
different in terms of its logical form. In the actual situation the thought is singular, whereas, in the 
counterfactual scenario the thought is descriptive.    
Häggqvist and Wikforss complain that this is no better than the position that Ludlow himself 
rejects that he calls “bald externalism” (Ludlow, 2003, p.405), and that is the view that: 
 
…the logical form of an utterance such as ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ depends entirely 
on whether Socrates exists. 
(Häggqvist and Wikforss, 2007, p.380)  
 
Häggqvist and Wikforss complain that what Ludlow proposes:   
 
…can hardly be characterised as a situation in which the logical form of the utterance is 
determined by the individual’s intentions. Rather, the logical form of the thought as well 
as of the utterance is determined by the speaker’s environment – this is why there is a 
connection between the two, and not because there is a prior intention determining the 
logical form of the utterance. Hence this position seems to be no better off than “bald 
externalism” when it comes to giving intentions a semantic role. 
(ibid., Häggqvist and Wikforss’ emphasis)   
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Häggqvist and Wikforss (ibid., p.381) consider another suggestion for what role my semantic 
intentions could play. My intention to use ‘Aristotle’ to refer directly constitutes a necessary condition 
for ‘Aristotle’ referring directly. It is just that my having that intention is not also a sufficient 
condition for ‘Aristotle’ referring directly. If it is my intention to use ‘Aristotle’ as shorthand for some 
definite description, then I would be doing so both in the actual situation, and in the counterfactual 
scenario in which ‘Aristotle’ does not refer. If it is not my intention to use ‘Aristotle’ as shorthand for 
some definite description, if instead it is my intention to refer directly to Aristotle, then it will be the 
case that I will be referring directly to Aristotle only in the actual situation in which Aristotle existed. 
I will not be referring directly to Aristotle in the counterfactual scenario in which he did not exist. In 
the counterfactual scenario, I would be using ‘Aristotle’ as shorthand for some definite description, 
even though that would be contrary to my intentions.  
Häggqvist and Wikforss complain that this again is no advancement on ‘bald externalism’, 
that it: 
 




 There is also a third suggestion for how it could be that my intentions could still feature in my 
utterance that is mooted by Häggqvist and Wikforss. The suggestion is that my intentions are 
“disjunctive”. I use ‘Aristotle’ with the intention that it refer directly to Aristotle as long as he did 
exist but be shorthand for some definite description if it so happens that he did not.  
Häggqvist and Wikforss’s complain that this third proposal: 
 
…clearly requires ordinary speakers to have intentions concerning semantics, involving 
semantic theories, and attributing such meta-semantic intentions (i.e. intentions 
concerning foundational semantics) to ordinary speakers is utterly implausible – even 
more so when we consider that we may be asked to attribute them to speakers of, say, 11th 
century Norse. 
(ibid., p.382)  
 
We could here take issue with Häggqvist and Wikforss’s dismissal of the linguistic abilities of 
“ordinary speakers” – and of speakers of “11th century Norse” in particular. Ordinary speakers – 
including speakers of 11th century Norse – should have at least a tacit grasp of the distinction between 
referring to something directly and using a term as shorthand for some definite description, which 




speakers should be able to effectively have the disjunctive intention that a name have the semantic 
properties that Kripkean semantic theory states that it would have in case that the named existed, and 
have the semantic properties that Russellian semantic theory states that it would have in case that the 
named did not exist. 
In any case, there are independent reasons for supposing that this third proposal won’t work.  
Firstly, if I, or indeed anybody, can possess the disjunctive intention that ‘Aristotle’ refer 
directly to Aristotle in the case that he existed but be shorthand for a definite description in the case 
that he did not, then I should be able to have the non-disjunctive and simpler intention that ‘Aristotle’ 
should refer directly to Aristotle.  
Secondly, there is no good reason why I or anyone should use ‘Aristotle’ with the more 
complex disjunctive intention.48 The raison d’etre of directly referring expressions and the raison 
d’etre of definite descriptions coincide. Directly referring expressions and definite descriptions are 
both used by the speaker to identify a unique individual – or object, or natural kind (even – see 
Chapter 1, §1.32) – that the speaker believes exists, and that the speaker wishes to say something 
about. If Aristotle did not exist, then that is just as much a problem for the speaker who wishes to 
refer to Aristotle via the means of a definite description as it is for the speaker who wishes to refer to 
Aristotle directly. If Aristotle did not exist, both speakers would have failed to do what they’ve set out 
to do in their respective speech acts. It is unlikely that a speaker, who uses ‘Aristotle’ to refer directly, 
would want – as some sort of consolation prize – to be interpreted as using ‘Aristotle’ as shorthand for 
a definite description that would pick out no existing individual, if it so happens ‘Aristotle’ fails to 
refer. 
Relatedly but more generally, an objection to my reductio might be that for most speakers, 
their intention in using a referring expression is simply to refer. They may not care whether that 
reference is achieved through their referring expression being shorthand for some definite description 
or through it being directly referential. Indeed, they may not even be aware that there is a difference. 
For our purposes, however, we need only demonstrate that there is at least one person, namely me, 
who would be able to acquire a priori knowledge that Aristotle exists to get us to the absurdity that my 
reductio requires. This means that, for our present purposes, we can in fact restrict ourselves to the 
case of someone who has read Naming and Necessity, and who is aware of the difference. We need 
only contend that I have a semantic intention that my use of ‘Aristotle’ refer directly to Aristotle, and 
that because of that ‘Aristotle’ on my lips cannot possibly be shorthand for some definite description.    
 
48 In words more couched in Russellian theory (Russell, 1905), it is unclear why someone would want to be understood as 
stating that Aristotle was an alcoholic, in the event that Aristotle existed, but stating that there exists someone who is the one 
and only teacher of Alexander and who was an alcoholic, in the event that Aristotle did not exist.   
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Alternatively, it may be argued that everyone is capable of having something that can be 
correctly described as an ‘intention to refer directly’ and is also capable of having something that can 
be correctly described as an ‘intention to refer descriptionally’. It is just that some of us have been 
made more aware of such tacit intentions through reading things like Naming and Necessity. 
Our reductio is maintained regardless, as it is I – someone who has read Naming and 
Necessity – who is its intended victim. 
In sum, we cannot suppose that ‘Aristotle’ could be shorthand for a definite description in the 
event that Aristotle had never existed because if I’m going to use a name to refer directly, then I do so 
with the intention to refer directly, and if I were going to use a name has a shorthand for some definite 
description then I would do so with the intention to use that name has a shorthand for a definite 
description. In the event Aristotle never existed, I could not be using ‘Aristotle’ as a shorthand for 
some definite description, as that would run contrary to my semantic intentions.  
 
6.3: Could ‘Aristotle’ Still Refer Directly even if Aristotle did not Exist (if You’re a Millian)?  
 
The previous section should have established that the name ‘Aristotle’ could not be shorthand for 
some definite description, in the event that Aristotle did not exist. A question that could still be asked 
is: is there any other way in which ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ could still express a thought if it were 
the case that Aristotle did not exist? I venture that from the perspective of a Kripkean externalist the 
answer to that question must be no. This would, mean that as the reductio requires, I would be able to 
deduce that Aristotle exists based on my ex hypothesi a priori knowledge that I am thinking the 
thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’. To be a Kripkean externalist is by definition – i.e. by my 
definition (see Chapter 1, §1.31) – to be a Millian. A direct consequence of that is that the name 
‘Aristotle’ must refer to something, otherwise there can be no thought expressed by ‘Aristotle was an 
alcoholic’.       
 What I am venturing here requires some qualification. It might be possible, even from the 
Millian perspective, that ‘Aristotle’ could still refer in the event that there was no flesh-and-blood 
individual who bore the name.  
Let’s consider four ways in which Aristotle might not have existed, but in which the name 
‘Aristotle’ could still be in use. 
Firstly, imagine a scenario in which ‘Aristotle’ was some sort of fictional character created by 
medieval Arab scholars, and the relevant Kripkean socio-linguistic chain that connects our present 
day use of the name ‘Aristotle’ connects us to these Arab scholars, and to their fictional creation.  
Secondly, imagine a scenario in which the residents of fourth century BC Athens all suffered 
from a weirdly coincidental mass psychosis that caused them all to see a man who talked a lot about 




relevant socio-linguistic chain connects our present-day use of the name ‘Aristotle’ to these psychotic 
fourth-century Athenians.  
Thirdly, imagine a scenario in which the universe is only a few seconds old – all our 
memories, the fossil record, etc. are fabrications. 
Fourthly and finally, consider the following scenario. When the Great Library was set alight 
two Alexandrian brothers named ‘Aris’ and ‘Stotle’ braved the flames, rescuing a fair number of 
scrolls. The brothers believed that the scrolls were all by the same author. They were unsure who that 
author was, or what he – they assumed that he was a ‘he’ – was called. So, they decided to name the 
mystery author after themselves. They decided to name him ‘Aristotle’. They thus essentially engaged 
in a Kripkean baptismal event in which the reference of ‘Aristotle’ was apparently established via a 
reference-fixing definite description. I say ‘apparently’ because, unbeknownst to the brothers, it so 
happens that the scrolls contained works by a number of different authors. Thus, the brothers failed to 
fix the reference of ‘Aristotle’. Suppose that our present-day use of ‘Aristotle’ is linked via the 
requisite socio-linguistic chain to this failed baptismal event. (And – if you like – suppose that the 
scrolls that the brothers rescued became what we now believe are the works of a single author called 
‘Aristotle’.)        
In the third and fourth scenarios the Millian would (surely) have to concede that because in 
those scenarios ‘Aristotle’ would fail to refer there cannot be a thought that is being expressed by the 
sentence ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’. Things, however, aren’t so clear cut with respect to the first two 
scenarios. It could be argued that in the first scenario ‘Aristotle’ refers to the fictional creation of the 
Arab scholars in the same way that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to the fictional creation of Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle. The same thing mutatis mutandis can be argued with respect to the second case. The 
bearer of the name ‘Aristotle’ could arguably be the perceptual illusion jointly suffered by the fourth 
century Athenians.  
If either, or both, of these two sorts of possibilities are allowed on behalf of the Millian, then 
my reductio may need modification. The charge may cease to be that if I could know a priori that I am 
thinking the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’, then I could know a priori that Aristotle existed. 
Instead the charge could be that I would be able to know a priori that either Aristotle existed (i.e. was 
flesh and blood) or there existed someone or some people who gave birth to a fictional character 
called ‘Aristotle’. Or, it could be that I would be able to know a priori that either Aristotle existed or 
there existed someone or some people who suffered an illusion of seeing a man they called ‘Aristotle’. 
Or, finally, the charge could be that I would be able to know a priori that either Aristotle existed or 
there existed someone or some people who gave birth to a fictional character called ‘Aristotle’ or 
there existed someone or some people who suffered an illusion of seeing a man they called ‘Aristotle’. 
Such a priori knowledge would maybe be less substantive than the a priori knowledge that Aristotle 
existed (was flesh and blood). However, it will still be the case that I should not have such a priori 
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knowledge. They are still things that we should not be able to know a priori. Thus, the reductio is 
maintained.49 
Alternatively, we could go the other way and contend that the ex hypothesi a priori 
knowledge that I am thinking ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ would allow me, absurdly, to rule out via a 
priori means scenarios like the third and fourth scenarios. The charge would thus become that, if I 
could know a priori that I am thinking the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’, I could know a priori 
that the universe is older than a few seconds. Or the charge would thus become that I could know a 
priori that if there was a Kripkean baptismal event in which the name ‘Aristotle’ was first introduced, 
then that baptism must have succeeded in establishing a reference. Again, such a priori knowledge 
may be less substantive than the a priori knowledge that Aristotle existed (was flesh and blood), but 
they are still things that I should not be able to know a priori. Thus, the reductio would still be 






49 Brown’s reductio presumes that it would be absurd for a subject to know a priori that either there is a certain natural kind 
or she belongs to a socio-linguistic community – see previous chapter. The Brown supposition seems very similar to a 
supposition that a subject can know a priori that either Aristotle existed or a community of people with whom the name 
originated existed. Thus, if the former is absurd, then (surely) the latter should also be considered absurd.  
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7.0: Introduction to Chapter 7 
 
The last five chapters of this thesis have all concerned the question of whether content externalism is 
incompatible with the claim that we should have an a priori access to our thoughts. In this final 
chapter I consider whether it would be a problem if it was. I argue that we may be able to deny a 
priori access by challenging a notion that is seemingly widespread throughout the debate, which is 
that privileged access and a priori access are equivalent.  
Privileged access and a priori access would, I argue, only need to be held to be equivalent 
under a certain conception of what privileged access should amount to. Under this conception our 
having privileged access should involve each of us being the only one who is privy to the goings on in 
a personal private mental realm. Just as we via our senses are privy to the goings on in an external 
world that is observable by all, there should also be another realm of goings on that is our own private 
mental realm that we are privy to via some faculty that is analogous to the senses. It is only we 
ourselves that can discern the goings on in this private realm. No one else can. Furthermore, our 
judgements with regards to the goings on within this private realm will be a priori, as although they’ll 
involve us using something that is akin to our senses, they won’t require the use of our actual senses. 
Such a picture of privileged access would be incompatible with a denial of a priori access. I suggest, 
however, that, in the case of thought content at least, we can dispense with such a notion of privileged 
access whilst still maintaining that we have a privileged access of another sort to our thoughts.   
  
7.1: Outline of Chapter 7 
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I start the chapter (§7.2) briefly considering two prominent instances in which it is apparent that 
privileged access and a priori access are conflated.  
I then (§7.3) characterise three broad positions that are possible to have regarding the method 
by which we self-ascribe a given class of mental states. The first position grants privileged access to 
the given class of mental states, but also requires a priori access. The second position holds that the 
way in which we self-ascribe mental states of a given class doesn’t necessarily require a priori access. 
This second position, however, denies privileged access. The third position grants privileged access to 
mental states of a given class, without necessarily requiring a priori access. I argue that in the case of 
thought there are grounds for rejecting the first and second positions and opting for the third that are 
independent of the compatibility debate.  
I then (§7.4) sketch an account of the method by which we self-ascribe thought content, 
which adheres to the third position. This account should grant us privileged access to our thought 
contents, without necessarily requiring us to have a priori access. Thus, it should demonstrate how it 
could be that we can have both externalism and privileged access, without needing a priori access as 
well.  
In the final section (§7.5) I consider how my account intersects with what has been discussed 
in previous chapters.   
     
7.2: McKinsey and Brown and the Supposed Equivalence of A Priori and Privileged Access 
 
The implicit assumption that privileged access and a priori access are equivalent is widespread 
throughout the compatibility debate. For one prominent instance consider the opening paragraph of 
McKinsey’s ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’: 
 
It has been a philosophical commonplace, at least since Descartes, to hold that each of us 
can know the existence and content of his own mental states in a privileged way that is 
available to no one else. This has at least seemed true with respect to those ‘neutral’ 
cognitive attitudes such as thought, belief, intention, and desire, whose propositional 
contents may be false. The crucial idea is not that one’s knowledge of these states in 
oneself is incorrigible, for surely we can make mistakes about what one believes, intends, 
or desires. Rather the idea is that we can in principle find out about these states ‘just by 
thinking’, without launching an empirical investigation or making any assumptions about 
the external world. I will call knowledge obtained independently of empirical 
investigation a priori knowledge. And I will call the principle that it is possible to have a 
priori knowledge of one’s own neutral cognitive attitude states, the Principle of 




(McKinsey, 1991, p.9, McKinsey’s Emphasis)        
 
McKinsey here starts talking about the notion that “each of us can know the existence and content of 
his own mental states in a privileged way that is available to no one else”. He then switches to talk of 
how each of us can know the existence and content of their own mental states “without launching an 
empirical investigation or making any assumptions about the external world”. It is clear that 
McKinsey regards the two things to be equivalent.  
For a second equally prominent instance, consider the following passage from Brown’s Anti-
individualism and Knowledge: 
 
A subject’s first-person access to her own propositional attitudes is strikingly different 
from her third-person access to the propositional attitudes of other subjects. To know 
what someone else thinks, a subject must use empirical evidence about behavior, whether 
linguistic or non-linguistic. For instance, I might attribute to you the belief that today is 
Tuesday, on the grounds that you say it is, or that your actions fit the activities in your 
diary for Tuesday. In other cases, the link might be less direct. In your absence I might 
attribute to you the belief that the government’s new education policy is wrong. Here, I 
haven’t used any information about your current behaviour. Instead, I use my general 
knowledge of your political views gained in the past using behavioral evidence. By 
contrast, a subject can know what she herself thinks without basing this on evidence 
about her own behavior, whether past or present. For example, I can know that I believe 
that today is Tuesday without first observing my behavior, say, hearing myself say 
‘Today is Tuesday’, or noticing myself go about the activities in my diary for Tuesday. 
Indeed, I can know that I have this belief without evidencing it in my behaviour at all 
(perhaps, I have only just woken up). Similarly, I can know that I believe that the 
government’s new policy is wrong without inferring this form a general knowledge of my 
own political views, gained through observation of my own past behavior. This 
distinctive way of gaining knowledge seems available for a wide range of propositional 
attitudes. Any subject has a host of beliefs about mundane matters of fact that she can 
know herself to have without using behavioural evidence, such as beliefs about 
geographical facts (e.g., that Paris is the capital of France), beliefs about the properties of 
object and kind (e.g., that water is wet), beliefs about numbers (e.g., that 1+1=2), and so 
on. There are numerous examples of other attitudes a subject can know herself to have 
without reliance on behaviour, including certain desires (e.g., that this meeting not go on 
much longer), hopes (e.g., that I don’t buy my grandmother the same present for 
Christmas as my brother) and intentions (e.g., that I will go shopping later on).   
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(Brown, 2004, pp.33-34)    
 
Brown here argues for what McKinsey claims has been “a philosophical commonplace, since 
Descartes” to hold, which is that “each of us can know the existence and content of his own mental 
states in a privileged way that is available to no one else”. Brown then draws a conclusion about what 
McKinsey labels “the Principle of Privileged Access”, which is the principle that each of us can know 
the existence and content of their own mental states “without launching an empirical investigation or 
making any assumptions about the external world”: 
 
It seems, then, that whereas knowledge of others’ propositional attitudes is based on 
empirical evidence concerning behavior, knowledge of one’s own propositional attitudes 
is typically independent of empirical evidence, whether about behavior or the external 
world in general. In short, a subject can typically have a priori knowledge of her 
propositional attitudes, that is, she can have such knowledge without basing it in a 
justificatory way on perceptual experience. 
(Brown, 2004, p.35)    
 
It is clear that Brown also views privileged access and a priori access as amounting to the same 
thing.50    
 
7.3: Three Broad Positions Concerning the Method by Which We Self-Ascribe Mental States 
 
7.31: The First Position 
 
Viewing privileged access and a priori access as being equivalent would be valid if a certain broad 
and generalised position on the way in which we self-ascribe mental states were true. This position is, 
however, only the first of what are three broad and generalised positions that I believe it is possible to 
have regarding the ways in which we self-ascribe mental states. This first position holds that a subject 
self-ascribes her mental states, or a given class of her mental states – e.g. her thoughts – via her 
discerning the goings on in a personal and private realm that only she is privy to.  
An adherent to this first position will hold that the way or ways in which a subject discerns 
her mental states are akin to the ways in which she discerns the goings on in her external environment, 
 
50 Although in the quotations both McKinsey and Brown talk more broadly of the epistemic access we have to our 
propositional attitudes, when they get into the main meat of their respective lines of argument, they switch exclusively to talk 




but are entirely separate, and therefore, for that reason, are necessarily both privileged and a priori. 
The way or ways in which a subject discerns her mental states will be privileged because they will 
only afford the subject herself epistemic access to her own private mental realm. They will be a priori 
because it is only the goings on of the external realm, not the internal realm, that should require a 
posteriori discernment, and the private and the external realms are separate.  
Suppose that, as part of some sort of party game, you have both of your hands plunged into 
two boxes. You are to guess what is in each of those boxes through touch alone. The judgements that 
you make via the use of your left hand with regards to what is in the left-hand box are separate from 
the judgements that you will make via the use of your right hand with regards to what is in the right-
hand box. An advocate of the first thesis holds that a subject metaphorically has two different hands 
plunged into two different boxes. One of those metaphorical boxes is the external realm, and the 
metaphorical hand that she has feeling around in that metaphorical box is her senses. The other of 
those two metaphorical boxes is the subject’s own private mental realm, and the metaphorical hand 
that the subject has feeling around in that metaphorical box is something akin to but other from her 
senses. There are potentially other hands in the former box, but it is only the subject’s own hand that 
is able to feel around in the latter. It is only through our senses that we make a posteriori judgements. 
Everything else is a priori. The judgements that the subject makes with regards to the second 
metaphorical box will be a priori. They will also be privileged, because it is only the subject herself 
that has a hand in the second box.     
The sixth chapter of Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is essentially an attack on the first position, 
which Ryle saw there being widespread assent for. Consider the opening paragraph: 
 
A natural counterpart to the theory that minds constitute a world other than ‘the physical 
world’ is the theory that there exist ways of discovering the contents of this other world 
which are counterparts to our ways of discovering the contents of the physical world. In 
sense perception we ascertain what exists and happens in space; so what exists or happens 
in the mind must also be ascertained in perception, but perception of a different and 
refined sort, one not requiring the functioning of gross bodily organs. 
(Ryle, 1949, p.148) 
 
The first position is essentially what Ryle here sees as the “the theory” that is a “natural counterpart to 
the theory that minds constitute a world other than ‘the physical world’”. 
 Now, the great aim of The Concept of Mind was a comprehensive attack on dualism. Ryle 
was a physicalist. He – as is evident in the quotation – saw the first position as a “natural counterpart” 
to dualism, and therefore, for that reason, something in need of refutation. It is important to note, 
however, that that connection need not necessarily be made. It is possible to be anti-dualist and still 
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adhere to the first position. Indeed, as we are about to see, Armstrong et al are adherents to the first 
positions and yet they, like Ryle, are physicalists. The first position holds that there are private mental 
realms, and it is only the owners of those private realms that are privy to the goings on therein. Such 
private mental realms need not ultimately be non-physical as Ryle’s choice of language suggests.  
 There might also be further options. A holder of the first position need not necessarily be a 
dualist or a physicalist. There are no obvious reasons why a holder of the first position could not be 
(say) an idealist – and hold that everything is mental – or (say) a neutral monist – and hold that 
everything is ultimately made of something that is neither physical nor mental.     
Ryle goes on to characterise two ways in which he claims that it is supposed that the 
“contents” of the “other world” may be discerned. Firstly, Ryle characterises a supposed “constant 
awareness” (ibid.) of the things that are meant to occur in the other world. There are processes that 
occur in the other world that a subject cannot help but be aware of: 
 
The states and operations of the mind are states and operations of which it is necessarily 
aware, in some sense, and this sense of ‘aware’, and this awareness is incapable of being 
delusive. The things that a mind does or experiences are self-intimating, and this is 
supposed to be a feature which characterises these feelings not just sometimes but always. 
(ibid., p.152)       
  
For explanatory aid Ryle gives a couple of similes: 
 
…it is supposed that mental processes are phosphorescent, like tropical sea-water, which 
makes itself visible by the light which itself admits. Or, to use another simile, mental 
processes, are ‘overheard’ by the mind whose processes they are, somewhat as a speaker 
overhears the words he is himself uttering. 
(ibid.)  
 
Secondly, Ryle characterises a process which, in contrast, a subject deliberately engages in known as 
‘introspection’. In addition to being made aware of the goings on within our private mental realms by 
their very “phosphorescence”, we can also consciously attend to such goings on:  
 
It is supposed that much as a person may at a particular moment be listening to a flute, 
savouring wine, or regarding a waterfall, so he may be ‘regarding’ in a non-optical sense, 
some current mental state or process of his own. The state or process is being deliberately 






An adherent to the first position need not necessarily hold that the ways in which a subject discerns 
are exactly as the two that Ryle characterises here. But, it is hard to see how the adherent to the first 
position could characterise the epistemic relationship that a subject has with respect to the goings on 
within her private mental realm, without that characterisation implicitly involving either the subject 
being made aware of those goings on, or the subject consciously making an effort to discern those 
goings on, or both.    
 The first position can be characterised has having a stronger and a weaker version. The 
stronger version concerns both the provenance of our self-ascriptions of our mental states, and the 
epistemic worth of our self-ascriptions of mental states. The weaker version concerns the provenance 
of our self-ascriptions of our mental states only. The weaker version holds that we can form true 
beliefs regarding our mental states through being privy to a private mental realm. The stronger version 
of the first position holds that we can know our mental states through being privy to a private mental 
realm. We can form true beliefs regarding our mental states through being privy to a private mental 
realm, and those true beliefs constitute knowledge.      
Gertler, in her surveys of the various positions on self-knowledge (Gertler, 2011; 2020), 
characterises two major theories that essentially purport to demonstrate how it is that the first position 
is true, and furthermore that it is not just the weaker version that is true, the stronger version is also 
true. These two theories both purport to give an account of a way in which a subject could form true 
beliefs regarding her mental states that involves the subject discerning the goings on in a private 
mental realm, and explain why such true beliefs would constitute knowledge. The two theories 
purport to explain how a subject could form true beliefs regarding her mental states, and furthermore 
purport to explain why such beliefs would constitute knowledge. In both cases, those explanations 
picture the subject as being privy to the goings on in a private mental realm.    
The first of the two theories Gertler labels The Acquaintance Theory. The acquaintance theory 
states simply that a subject will be acquainted, in the Russellian sense, with at least some of her 
mental states, and it is through that acquaintance that the subject is able to acquire knowledge of those 
mental states. Who Gertler fashions as contemporary acquaintance theorists (Bonjour, 2003, 
Chalmers, 2003, Conee, 1994; Fales, 1996; Feldman, 2004; Fumerton, 1995; Gertler, 2001; Levine, 
2006; Pitt, 2004) maintain that the epistemic relation – that of ‘acquaintance’ – that Russell (Russell, 
2010-11; 2012) famously claimed held between us and sense impressions, and between us and 
universals, holds between us and certain of our mental states. Furthermore, they maintain that it is 
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through such acquaintance that we come to self-ascribe those mental states. Furthermore, they 
maintain that that is the reason why such self-ascriptions constitute knowledge.51  
Gertler (Gertler, 2011, p.95) suggests that the class of mental states that we could most 
plausibly know through being acquainted with are what she terms ‘sensations’, by which she means 
phenomenal mental states of experiencing a certain sensation, e.g. the phenomenal state of feeling a 
certain pain. Gertler (ibid., p.123) also suggests that there could be other mental states that we could, 
for similar reasons, plausibly know through being acquainted with, if those states are similarly 
phenomenal states. 
The second major theory that adheres to the first position that Gertler characterises is The 
Inner Sense Theory. The inner sense theory states that just as a subject is able to discern the goings on 
via the use of her senses and thus come to know things about the world, she is also able to discern the 
goings on in her own private mental realm and thus come to know her mental states via the use of a 
special ‘inner sense’.  
Gertler outlines a historical version of the inner sense theory that she attributes to Locke: 
 
This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself…And though it be not Sense, as 
having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly 
enough be call’d internal Sense. 
(Locke, 1687, II.i.iv; as quoted by Gertler, 2011, p.39, p.129) 
 
According to Locke’s famous tabula rasa doctrine there is no such thing as an ‘innate idea’. All ideas 
have an experiential source. They can come from the external world via our senses. Alternatively, 
ideas can come from the source that is being referred to in the quotation, which necessitates an 
internal mental realm that “every Man has wholly in himself”, and a means of discerning the goings 
on therein that “might properly enough be call’d internal Sense”.       
Gertler also outlines a more contemporary version of the inner sense theory that she attributes 
to Armstrong (and to Lycan52 and to others53). Armstrong characterises “a self-scanning process in the 
brain” (Armstrong, 1968; Gertler, 2011, p.132) that allows a subject to know her mental states. This 
self-scanning process is like a sense in that it allows a subject to know her mental states without 
knowing their true nature. A table is an arrangement of atoms. By seeing and touching a table I may 
 
51 Through the course of her chapter on the acquaintance theory (Gertler, 2011, Ch. 4, pp.87-128), Gertler elaborates a more 
detailed account of how it is that we come to form knowledge constituting beliefs about our mental states through being 
acquainted with them. The details of which we need not here concern ourselves with.   
52 Lycan, 1996. 




not necessarily be aware that it is an arrangement of atoms, but I can still know that it is there, and 
that it has certain properties. For Armstrong mental states are, as are tables and everything else, 
essentially arrangements of atoms. Armstrong is a physicalist. It is through the use of “a self-scanning 
process in the brain” that we can come to know our mental states, that we are in possession of them, 
and that they have certain properties, without necessarily knowing their true nature.  
In terms of their broad outlines, the acquaintance theory and the inner sense theory are 
similar. Acquaintance is akin to a sense, but it is not quite like a sense. An ‘inner sense’ would 
similarly be akin to a sense, but not quite like a sense. Both the acquaintance theory and the inner 
sense theory propose that there is a means that we have of discerning the goings on in our own 
cognition that is akin to, but not quite like a sense.  
There are ways in which the two theories differ that we need not overly concern ourselves 
with here. For instance, one way in which the acquaintance theory and the inner sense theory differ is 
that Russellian acquaintance comes pre-packaged with a guarantee that something described as being 
like a ‘sense’ may not have. If we are acquainted with some thing – in the Russellian sense – then 
there is absolutely no way that that thing cannot exist. If we are acquainted – in the Russellian sense – 
with our mental states, then it will necessarily be the case that we are subject to those mental states.54 
If, on the other hand, we in some sense sense our mental states then we won’t necessarily have that 
same guarantee. The phenomenon of perceptual illusion allows that we can sense in the ordinary 
sense of ‘sense’ – see, hear, etc. – things that are not in fact there. If the way in which we discern our 
mental states is characterised as being an ‘inner sense’ that isn’t Russellian acquaintance exactly, but 
will nevertheless be akin to a sense, then that allows for the possibility that such an ‘inner sense’ 
could be something that, although reliable most of the time, could, in exceptional circumstances, lead 
us astray in a way that acquaintance could not.      
Another way in which, according to Gertler, contemporary versions of the inner sense theory, 
such as those of Armstrong (et al), and the acquaintance theory are different is that contemporary 
versions of the inner sense theory are epistemologically externalist, whereas the acquaintance theory 
is epistemologically internalist.55 
 
54 This would not necessarily mean that the self-ascriptions that we’d make through such acquaintance would be infallible – 
see Gertler 2011, Ch.4. 
55 I hear footsteps. I thus form the true belief that there is someone walking nearby. Supposing that that true belief constitutes 
knowledge, there are broadly two reasons that could be given as to why it does.  
The first is that when I heard the footsteps, I experienced the phenomenology of hearing footsteps. That is, I 
experienced a phenomenological episode that has a certain character that constitutes my hearing footsteps. My experiencing 
that phenomenological episode with that character is what justifies my belief that there is someone walking nearby, and that 
is why my true belief constitutes knowledge.  




7.32: The Second Position 
 
The position characterised in the previous subsection one of three positions that I believe that it is 
possible to have regarding the ways in which we self-ascribe mental states. I characterise the third 
position in the next subsection. I characterise the second in this present subsection.  
The second position consists of two commitments. The first commitment is that, for a given 
class of mental states, the self-ascription of those mental states does not and cannot involve the 
consultation of a private mental realm that only the self-ascriber is privy to. The second commitment 
is that, for that given class of mental states, a third party could, in principle, be at least as equally able, 
and as epistemically qualified, to discern those mental states as the self-ascriber is.    
In chapter six of The Concept of Mind, after Ryle has dispensed with – what I am calling – the 
first position, he goes on to argue that the second position will be true with respect to a potentially 
 
A second reason is that the belief forming process – i.e. my sense of hearing – that leads to my belief that there is 
someone walking nearby is reliable. I may have experienced a phenomenological episode with a specific character when I 
heard the footsteps. But that is irrelevant. What matters, for the question of knowledge, is that my belief “will be the 
outcome of a reliable process, causally linked to its truthmaker” (Gertler, 2011, p.131), which in this case is the person who 
is walking nearby.  
If we are to suppose that a subject can discern her mental states because of a special epistemic relationship that she 
has with respect to the goings on within her own cognition, and if we also suppose that the beliefs about her mental states 
that the subject would thereby form would constitute knowledge, then there will similarly be two broad reasons as to why 
they would.  
Firstly, it could be maintained that the phenomenology that a subject experiences when she self-ascribes a mental 
state justifies her self-ascription, and thereby confers it as knowledge. Just as I experience a phenomenological episode that 
has a specific character when I judge that there is someone walking nearby, I experience a similar phenomenological episode 
that also has its own specific character when I judge that I believe that Paris is the capital of France. It is my experiencing 
that phenomenological episode with that specific character that is, firstly, responsible for my self-ascribing the belief that 
Paris is the capital of France, and that, secondly, is the reason why that self-ascription constitutes knowledge.   
Secondly, it could be maintained that what matters is the reliability of the process that leads to a subject’s belief 
that she has a certain mental state. The subject may well experience a phenomenological episode when she self-ascribes her 
mental state that is particular to the self-ascribing of that mental state. Such phenomenology, however, is irrelevant, when it 
comes to the question of whether the subject knows that she is subject to the mental state. In forming my belief that I believe 
that Paris is the capital of France I may experience a phenomenological episode that has a certain character, which will be 
specific to the mental process that is my forming the belief that I believe that Paris is the capital of France. But that as no 
bearing on whether my belief that I believe that Paris is the capital of France constitutes knowledge. The reason why my 
belief that I believe that Paris is the capital of France constitutes knowledge is that it “will be the outcome of a reliable 
process, causally linked to its truthmaker”, which in this case will be my belief that Paris is the capital of France.  
Who Gertler characterises as acquaintance theorists emphasise the first reason, whereas contemporary versions of 




very large range of mental states. Ryle (1949, pp.166-177) argues that, for a large range of mental 
states, a subject knowing or being aware of those mental states – what we might describe as ‘her 
knowing or being aware of those mental states’ – is essentially a matter of her being aware, or her 
“being alive to” what it is she will/would do or say when/if certain contingencies arise. That being 
aware of or “being alive to” what it is she will or would do essentially consists of the subject making 
accurate predictions regarding what she will or would do. Such predictions can only be based on 
things that are publicly observable, such as the subject’s past behaviour. There is nothing that is 
privately observable to base them on. There is no private mental realm. Thus, the predictions that the 
subject makes are predictions that can potentially be made by a third party – who knows the subject 
exceptionally well, who (say) has been watching her since birth. Furthermore, the predictions made by 
such a third party can potentially be of the same epistemic worth, as they can potentially be based on 
the same data set, namely the subject’s past behaviour and other things that are publicly observable.  
A subject who is walking alone along a seafront promenade is unlikely to avow aloud ‘I want 
ice cream’ to no-one in particular. She may, however, in a counterfactual scenario, in which (say) she 
was walking with a companion, avow ‘I want ice cream’ to that counterfactual companion. Such a 
counterfactual avowal would – or at least could56 – be indicative of what might properly be described 
as ‘a desire for ice cream on the part of the subject’. Essentially, Ryle’s contention is that it is the 
subject’s consideration of such counterfactual scenarios, and her judging on how she’d act in such 
counterfactual scenarios, her judging that she’d avow ‘I want ice cream’, that leads to, and even 
warrants, the subject self-ascribing to herself a desire for ice cream. Furthermore, the subject’s 
judgement that she’d behave in a certain way can only be based on things, such as her past behaviour, 
that are publicly observable. It could not possibly be based on anything else. The subject’s self-
ascription of a desire for ice cream is essentially a prediction. It is a prediction that the subject makes 
regarding how she would behave. It is a prediction that can only be based on things that a third party 
could in principle be privy to. There is nothing that could contribute to the subject’s calculation that 
only she can be privy to. Thus, it is a prediction that could, in theory, be made with the same 
epistemic confidence by a third party.57  
 
56 Whether it is indicative of ‘a desire for ice cream on the part of the subject’ may be dependent upon the precise details of 
what is actually the case, and upon the precise details of the counterfactual scenario in which the subject would make the 
avowal, and also upon the precise details of other past, present, future, actual, and counterfactual behaviours of the subject. 
57 A more contemporary adherent to the second position is Carruthers (Carruthers, 2011; Gertler, 2020). Carruthers proposes 
that the way in which we discern many of our own mental states is via a special faculty that originally evolved in order to 
allow us to discern the mental states of others, but was later in our evolutionary history co-opted for the purpose of the 
discernment of our own mental states. We self-ascribe our own mental states based on the same cues, such as externally 
observable behaviour, that lead us to ascribe mental states to others. The provenance of our self-ascriptions of mental states, 
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 The first position, considered in the previous section, grants that we have privileged access to 
our mental states, but requires that we have a priori access. In contrast, the second position, which we 
are considering in this present section, does not require that we have a priori access, but flat out denies 
that we have privileged access. The third position, which I consider in the next section, allows that we 
can have privileged access in such a way that may not require a priori access.       
  
7.33: The Third Position 
 
The two positions I characterised in the previous two subsections are not (I believe) exhaustive of the 
positions that it is possible to have regarding the ways in which we self-ascribe mental states. There is 
also a third position. This third position consists of the second position’s first commitment and the 
denial of the second position’s second commitment. An adherent to the third position agrees with the 
adherent to the second position that the self-ascription of the given class of mental states does not and 
cannot involve the consultation of a private mental realm. An adherent to the third thesis, however, 
denies that a third party could in principle be at least as equally able and just as epistemically 
qualified to ascribe mental states, of the given class, to a subject as the subject herself is. 
 A famous and often quoted Evans passage can be interpreted – see below (§7.4) – as 
demonstrating how it could be that the third thesis is true in the case of belief: 
 
[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak or occasionally literally, 
directed outward, upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be 
a third world war?” I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward 
phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be a third 
world war?”  
(Evans, 1982, p.225) 
 
I take stock of current world events and come to belief that there is going to be a third world war. By 
taking stock of those same current world events I can also come to believe that I believe that there is 
going to be a third world war. I don’t self-ascribe the belief based on the goings on in some private 
mental realm that only I am privy to. I self-ascribe my belief based on facts about current world 
events which in principle are available to everyone. But it is only I that can ascribe to myself a belief 
based on those facts with any great certainty. A third party may surmise, given that I am privy to the 
facts about current world events, and given that I am a rational and reasonably intelligent person, that 
 
therefore, is such that it is the case that a third party could, in theory, ascribe mental states to us with the same degree of 




I therefore should surely believe that there is going to be a third world war. But they can only surmise 
that I believe that there is going to be a third world war. A third party could not be as certain that I 
believe that there is going to be a third world war as I myself am, even though both I and the third 
party may be basing our respective judgements on a convergent data set. The epistemic access I have 
to my belief is privileged. A third party could not be as equally able or as epistemically qualified to 
ascribe to me the belief as I myself am. The privileged epistemic access I have to my belief, however, 
is not privileged because of my being privy to the goings on within some private mental realm.  
 
7.34: Why be a Third Positionist? 
 
I have now characterised three broad positions on how it is that we come to self-ascribe mental states 
of a given sort. The first position maintains that we self-ascribe mental states, of the given sort, via 
being privy to a private mental realm. We have privileged access because we have a priori access to 
that private mental realm. The second position denies that there are such things as private mental 
realms. It maintains that an external observer is in principle able to ascribe mental states to a subject 
with the same authority as the subject herself is, and thus we do not have privileged access. The third 
position also denies that there are such things as private mental realms, but maintains, nevertheless, 
that an external observer could not in principle be able to ascribe mental states to a subject with the 
same authority as the subject herself is, and thus we do have privileged access. Moreover, the third 
position may allow that we could have privileged access that is not predicated on a priori access.   
In the next section I present a new account of what could be the provenance of our self-
ascriptions of thought content. This new account should demonstrate how it could be that the third 
position could be true with respect to thought content. It should demonstrate how it could be that we 
self-ascribe our thoughts based on publicly discernible facts, but, nevertheless, do so in such a way 
that a third party could not.      
 My reason for doing so in this present thesis is to demonstrate how we can have privileged 
access to our thoughts without it needing to be a priori, and thus how we can have privileged access 
even if content externalism is true. There is however an independent and possibly stronger reason for 
such an approach, which is that, in the case of thought, there are grounds for the rejection of the other 
two positions. 
 If we are to suppose that we have privileged access to our thoughts then we must reject the 
second position. 
 The first position would be undesirable because of something that was observed in the 
opening paragraph of this thesis. If we do self-ascribe thought via our being privy to some private 
mental realm, as a first-positionist approach would suppose that we do, then (surely) it should be the 
case that thoughts produce their own phenomenology. Otherwise, there would be no basis on which 
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we self-ascribe thought. Our thoughts should announce themselves to us, and they could only do that 
via the phenomenology that they would need to give off – they should be “phosphorescent, like 
tropical sea-water, which makes itself visible by the light which itself admits”. As was observed in the 
opening paragraph of this thesis, thoughts produce no phenomenology. It, therefore, (surely) cannot 
be the case that we self-ascribe thought via being privy to some private mental realm.58   
  There is a serious drawback to taking a third-positionist approach. If we self-ascribe thought, 
or any given class of mental states, via the obtuse means that a third-positionist approach would 
suppose, then the epistemic relationship we have with those mental states will be suspect. Consider 
again the Evans example. If I base my belief that there is going to be a third world war on it being the 
case that there is going to be a third world war, then I will have ‘inferred’ – if what I will have done 
can be called that – a fact about my internal mentality from something that has nothing to do with my 
internal mentality. The same will be true of thought – as we’ll be seeing in the next section.  
 This may seem to be quite a bullet that must be bitten. However, it does seem reasonable to 
suppose that the three positions I’ve characterised may be exhaustive of the relevant dialectical space. 
It is hard to see how a theory regarding the provenance of our self-ascriptions of mental states could 
be neither first-positionist, second-positionist, nor third-positionist. (It is hard to imagine what fourth 
positionism, or even fifth positionism, could look like.) If we do assume exhaustion, then we can 
contend that our bullet biting is necessitated not so much because of the possible incompatibility of 
content externalism and claims that we should have an a priori access to our thoughts, but rather 
because of the undesirability of first positionism and second positionism in the case of occurrent 
thought.59 
 
7.4: A Third-Positionist Account of the Method by Which We Self-Ascribe Thought 
 
Consider again the famous Evans quote: 
 
[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak or occasionally literally, 
directed outward, upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be 
 
58 This is not intended as a water-tight refutation of first positionism. For starters, it requires that one agrees with me that 
thoughts produce no phenomenology. Also, it is – strictly speaking – still possible to be a first positionist whilst agreeing 
with me that thoughts produce no phenomenology. One can be an inner sense theorist à la Armstrong et al but contend that 
not only is it the case that any phenomenology produced through mental state self-ascription is not relevant to assessing 
whether such ascriptions count as knowledge (see fn. 55), it is actually the case that no such phenomenology is produced. In 
other words, one can be an inner sense theorist (à la Armstrong et al) who denies epiphenomenalism.  
59 One could bite an alternative bullet by being a hard-nosed-materialist epiphenomenalism-denying inner sense theorist – 




a third world war?” I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward 
phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be a third 
world war?”  
(Evans, 1982, p.225) 
 
Evans can be interpreted as proposing that we self-ascribe belief via a sort of mental act that is almost 
like an act of reasoning but isn’t exactly. A subject judges something to be the case, and that leads her 
to judge that she believes that that something is the case. I judge that there is going to be a third world 
war and based on that I judge further that I believe that there is going to be a third world war. I make a 
judgement concerning geo-politics and based on that I make a judgement concerning what it is that I 
believe. In an act of reasoning we start by judging that something is the case and based on that we 
judge that something else is the case. We may (say) judge that both <p> and <p→q> are the case and 
based on that judge (correctly – if <p> and <p→q> are both indeed the case) that <q> is the case. This 
would constitute an act of deductive reasoning. We may (say) judge that all swans so far encountered 
have been white and based on that judge (plausibly – but falsely) that all swans are white. This would 
be an example of induction. Finally, there is abduction. I may judge (say) that I am experiencing 
phenomenology that is consistent with the external world being real and from that judge that the 
external world being real is the more plausible explanation – as opposed to the usual sceptical 
alternatives – for why that is the case and thus that the external world is indeed real. Evans’s act of 
quasi-reasoning is almost like such acts of reasoning in that it involves a subject judging that 
something is the case and then based on that judging that something else is the case. But it isn’t 
exactly an act of reasoning.  
This interpretation of Evans diverges from Moran’s (Moran, 2001). Moran presents the Evans 
quote alongside the following quote from Edgley, in which the notion of ‘transparency’ is introduced: 
 
[M]y own present thinking, in contrast to the thinking of others, is transparent in the sense 
that I cannot distinguish the question “Do I think that P?” from a question in which there 
is no essential reference to myself or my belief, namely “Is it the case that P?” This does 
not of course mean that the correct answers to these two questions must be the same; only 
I cannot distinguish them, for in giving my answer to the question “Do I think that P?” I 
also give my answer, more or less tentative, to the question “Is it the case that P?” 
(Edgley, 1969, p.90; quoted in Moran, 2001, p.61) 
 
Moran views Evans and Edgley as getting at the same point, that they are both trying to bring to light 
the notion of ‘transparency’, even though it is only Edgley that actually uses the term “transparent”:     
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To claim that one question is “transparent” to another is not to claim that one question 
reduces to the other. The fact that answers the question about the war is different from the 
fact about a particular person’s belief. As Edgley points out, the correct answers to the 
two questions need not be the same. But nor is it right to say, as he does, that the two 
questions are indistinguishable from within the first-person point of view. After all, it 
isn’t as if, although the answers to the two questions are in fact distinct, I must remain 
somehow in the dark about this, or that I cannot see them pointing in different directions. 
It will be common knowledge, among anyone with the concept of belief, that although 
one believes something as true, the fact believed and the fact of one’s belief are two 
different matters. From within the first-person perspective I acknowledge the two 
questions as distinct in virtue of acknowledging that what my beliefs are directed upon is 
an independent world, and they may therefore fail to conform to it. So, rather than 
reducibility or indistinguishability, the relation of transparency these writers are pointing 
toward concerns a claim about how a set of questions is to be answered, what sorts of 
reasons are to be taken as relevant. The claim, then, is that a first-person present-tense 
question about one’s belief is answered by reference to (or consideration of) the same 
reasons that would justify an answer to the corresponding question about the world. 
(Moran, 2001, pp.61-62) 
 
Moran arrives at the following conclusion: 
 
…the vehicle of transparency in each case [i.e. in the cases of both Edgley and Evans] 
lies in the requirement that I address myself to the question of my state of mind in a 
deliberative spirit, deciding and declaring myself on the matter, and not confront the 
question as a purely psychological one about the beliefs of someone who happens also to 
be me. 
(ibid., p.63; Moran’s emphasis) 
 
In our interpretation of Evans we are agreeing with Moran that, even from a first-person perspective, 
the question of whether one believes that there is going to be a third world war is distinct from the 
question of whether there is going to be a third world war. But we are rejecting Moran’s contention 
that the former question is being answered through the entering into of a “deliberative spirit”. 
According to our interpretation of Evans, the question of whether I believe that there is going to be a 
third world war is a “purely psychological one”. I ask myself a question about geo-political matters, 
which I answer through (presumably) a posteriori means. I then – through a rather epistemologically 




internal psychology. The question of whether I believe that there is going to be a third world war does 
not become – is not ‘transparent to’ (if you like) – the question of whether I ought to believe that there 
is going to be a third world war. I am not necessarily assessing my reasons for believing that there is 
going to be a third world war. Rather, I am drawing a conclusion about my internal psychology based 
on – what is for me – the fact that there is going to be a third world war.60   
 Adapting this Moran-divergent take on Evans, in which the normative aspect is absent, leads 
to a new account of occurrent thought self-ascription.  
Tautologically, if I judge that there is going to be a third world war, then it will be the case I 
am at that moment judging that there is going to be a third world war. Something will be presently 
happening in my cognition, which is that I am judging that there is going to be a third world war. 
Suppose now that my judgement that there is going to be a third world war sparked me to make a 
further judgement. Suppose I make a further judgement that I am at present61 judging that there is 
going to be a third world war. That latter judgement will be correct, as it will be the case that I am 
presently judging that there is going to be a third world war. I will have thus engaged in a similar act 
of quasi-reasoning that we, inferring from Evans, are supposing leads to my judgment that I believe 
that there is going to be a third world war. A judgement about geo-politics has led me to make a 
further judgement about my internal cognition. The difference is that it has resulted in a judgement 
that is about my occurrent mentality as opposed to being about something that perdures with respect 
to my mentality. Beliefs are things that persist over time, whereas judgements are things that happen 
at a given moment in time. At the moment in time in which I judge that there is going to be a third 
world war, it should (presumptively – see next paragraph) be the case that at that moment I believe 
there is going to be a third world war. It should also remain true for some time after I make the 
judgement – that there is going to be a third world war – that I will continue to believe that there is 
going to be a third world war. (It may also have been true before I made the judgement – that there is 
going to be a third world war – that I believed that there is going to be a third world war.) Whereas, it 
 
60 It is thus wrong to refer to my account as ‘a transparency account of self-knowledge’ if that leads to one seeing it as 
invoking the ideas of Moran, as that can only lead to misunderstandings. There may be meaningful comparisons to be made, 
but that is something must wait until potential sequels. In the meantime, it is far better if we all put such considerations to 
one side. My account is in fact far closer to Burge, and his account of thought self-ascription (see Chapter 2, §2.2; and §7.54 
of this chapter), than it is to Moran. (We are talking here exclusively of the Burge of Burge 1988 and not the slightly later 
Burge of Burge 1996 – in the later paper Burge begins to tread a similar path to the path that Moran treads.)  
61 This temporal sensitivity means that the account of thought self-ascription I am outlining here, like the account of Burge 
(see Chapter 2, §2.2, and §7.54 of this chapter), cannot – on its own – explain how a subject can discern what she was 
thinking a few seconds ago (say), or what she was thinking when she was stood taking in the Mona Lisa during the weekend 
break in Paris that she enjoyed last summer (say).  
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is only true at the moment that I make the judgement – that there is going to be a third world war – 
that it is the case that I am presently judging that there is going to be a third world war.   
This method of judgement self-ascription has a guarantee of accuracy that the method of 
belief self-ascription that we are inferring from Evans arguably does not. I may, in a more despairing 
moment, judge that there is going to be a third world war and based on that judge further that I believe 
that there is going to be a third world war. I then may, at a slightly later point when my mood has 
been lifted, start earnestly making plans about an eventual retirement, which I am not envisaging will 
take place during a nuclear winter. If I am entertaining the possibility of such a retirement, then 
arguably it cannot be said that I truly ‘believe’ that there is going to be a third world war, and that I 
didn’t really ‘believe’ that there is going to be a third world war when I made the judgement that there 
is going to be a third world war.62 Thus, we have an instance in which the Evans method of belief self-
ascription – i.e. the method we are inferring from Evans – will have led to falsehood. It will still, 
however, have been the case that when I judged that there is going to be a third world war that I was 
indeed at that moment judging that there was going to be a third world war. Thus if I judged at that 
moment that I was judging that there is going to be a third world war, it will have indeed been the 
case that I was judging that there was going to be a third world war. 63              
Suppose now that my judgement that there is going to be a third world war sparks me to judge 
(instead of or alongside my judgement I am presently judging that there is going to be a third world 
war) that I am thinking – i.e. entertaining – a thought with the content <there is going to be a third 
world war>. That judgement will also concern my occurrent mentality; it will be about a slightly 
different aspect of my occurrent mentality. That judgement will also be true; it will have the same 
guarantee of being true. It is made true by my judgement that there is going to be a third world war. If 
I am judging that there is going to be a third world war, then ipso facto I am thinking – i.e. 
entertaining – a thought with the content <there is going to be a third world war>. What we have here 
is a method for occurrent thought self-ascription. A subject can judge that <p>, and that can lead her 
to judge further that she is thinking a thought with content <p>. Call this the conviction method.  
Suppose that instead of judging that there is going to be a third world war I judge that it is 
true or false that there is going to be a third world war.64 At the moment that I make this judgement – 
 
62 C.f. the Gallois case considered in fn. 23, and the numerous other similar examples that are to be found throughout 
published philosophy. 
63 There will of course be other ways of interpreting the example – i.e. possibly ones that would be more favourable with 
respect to the Evans method – hence my insertions of the qualifier ‘arguably’.  
64 This sort of judgement – in many circumstances – might better be understood as a ‘might’ judgement. I consider whether 
the common clear and odourless substance in my environment, which I and my socio-linguistic brethren call ‘water’, could 
be present, in its liquid form, on Venus. I judge that water (in its liquid form) might be on Venus, i.e. it might or might not 




that it is true or false that there is going to be a third world war – it will be the case that at that very 
moment in time I am entertaining a thought with the content <there is going to be a third world war>. 
Thus, if this judgement sparks me to judge further that I am thinking – i.e. entertaining – a thought 
with the content <there is going to be a third world war>, then that second judgement will be correct. 
What we have here is a second method for thought self-ascription. A subject can judge that it is true 
or false that <p>, and that can lead her to judge further that she is thinking a thought with content <p>.  
Call this the contemplation method.  
 If we do self-ascribe thought via either of these two methods, then we will have a privileged 
access to our thoughts. The methods only work from the first-person perspective. You may judge that 
there is going to be a third world war, or judge that it is true or false that there is going to be a third 
world war, and, for some bizarre reason, based on that, judge further that I am presently thinking the 
thought <there is going to be a third world war>. I may, by sheer coincidence, indeed be presently 
thinking that very thought. But it is extremely unlikely. If I, on the other hand, judge that there is 
going to be a third world war, or judge that it is true or false that there is going to be a third world 
war, and based on that judge that I am presently thinking that <there is going to be a third world war>, 
then it will most definitely be the case that that is what I am presently thinking.  
Depending upon the nature of the thought that is being self-ascribed, self-ascription via the 
conviction and contemplation methods may or may not necessarily involve a posteriori judgement. 
My judgement that there is going to be a third world war will be a posteriori. If that a posteriori 
judgement leads me to self-ascribe the thought ‘there is going to be a third world war’, then that self-
ascription will require a posteriori judgment. Suppose I judge instead that it is true or false that there 
is going to be a third world war. That judgement is possibly a priori. If it is, and it leads to my self-
ascribing the thought ‘there is going to be a third world war’ then I will have self-ascribed a thought 
without that self-ascription requiring a posteriori judgement.  
 Interestingly, the self-ascription of a singular thought will involve an a posteriori judgement 
regardless of whether it is via the conviction method or the contemplation method.  
A judgement that Aristotle was an alcoholic will obviously be a posteriori. Thus, if I were to 
self-ascribe the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ based on it being the case that Aristotle was an 
alcoholic – i.e. via the conviction method – then that self-ascription would be based on an a posteriori 
judgment.  
Interestingly, the judgment that it is true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic will also be a 
posteriori. Thus, if I were to self-ascribe the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ based on it being the 
case that it is true or false Aristotle was an alcoholic – i.e. via the contemplation method – then that 
self-ascription would be based on a posteriori judgment. The unsubstantiveness of the judgement that 
it is either true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic may, prima facie, make it seem purely a priori. 
It is, however, that very unsubstantiveness that makes the judgement a posteriori. Because of its 
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unsubstantiveness, the judgement boils down to – essentially is – the judgement that Aristotle exists, 
which is a posteriori.   
 We might, due to a commitment to Millianism – and hence Kripkean externalism (see 
Chapter 1, §1.3) – or otherwise, suppose that the content of the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ is 
dependent upon Aristotle. That is, we might suppose that changing the object of the thought changes 
its content. If we are to suppose this, then we must also suppose that changing the object also changes 
the content of the second-order judgements about the thought that would be formed via either the 
conviction or contemplation method. Imagine a counterfactual in which the Kripkean reference-
determining socio-linguistic chain, which in actuality connects us to the actual Aristotle, connects us 
to the numerically non-identical Arisnotle (see Chapter 1, §1.3). If we are to suppose that in such a 
counterfactual scenario, the content of ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ would be different, then we must 
also suppose that the corresponding judgement ‘I am thinking that Aristotle was an alcoholic’ would 
have a different content. In such a counterfactual scenario, instead of judging that it is true or false 
that Aristotle was an alcoholic and correspondingly judging that I am thinking that Aristotle was an 
alcoholic, I would be judging that it is true or false that Arisnotle was an alcoholic and 
correspondingly judging that I am thinking that Arisnotle was an alcoholic. The judgement would still 
be true. Its content would be reflective of the content of the thought of which it concerns.  
 In such a counterfactual scenario I would use the same words to express my internal 
ratiocinations. I would say that ‘I am judging that it is true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic’, 
and I would based on that say that ‘I judge that I am thinking that Aristotle was an alcoholic’. I would, 
however, be using ‘Aristotle’ to refer to Arisnotle as opposed to (the actual) Aristotle. 
 Depending upon how its details are cashed out, I might not be able to distinguish my being in 
such a counterfactual scenario from what is actual. The judgements that I make about what I am 
thinking via the conviction or contemplation methods would still be true nonetheless. 
 Alternatively, we might suppose – as Burge does (see Chapter 1, §1.4) – that the contents of 
singular thoughts are independent of their object. That is, we might suppose that changing the object 
does not change the content. If we are to suppose this, then we must also suppose that changing the 
object does not change the content of the second-order judgements about the thought that would be 
formed via either the conviction or contemplation methods. Let us suppose that Alfred is able to think 
a number of singular thoughts with respect to apple 1, including (for instance) the one he’d express 
‘that apple [pointing to apple 1] looks delicious’. Let us also suppose that in a counterfactual scenario 
in which apple 1 is replaced by the numerically non-identical apple 2, such singular thoughts would 
have the same content as they actually have. If we are to suppose this, then the second-order 
judgements that Alfred would make with respect to what he is thinking would have the same content 




 Alfred would still self-ascribe his thoughts through a posteriori judgement regardless of 
whether he does so via the conviction or contemplation method. If Alfred were to self-ascribe the 
thought ‘that apple look delicious’ via the conviction method, then he would do so via making the 
clearly a posteriori judgement that that apple looks delicious. If he were to ascribe via the 
contemplation method, he would self-ascribe the thought through judging that it is true or false that 
that apple looks delicious. This judgement will also be a posteriori for reasons already stated. The 
judgement will essentially be that the apple exists.   
 Along with singular thought there is also another sort, or rather another three sorts, of thought 
that the self-ascription of which would necessarily involve a posteriori judgement regardless of 
whether the conviction or contemplation method is used. The self-ascriptions of the thoughts that 
Burge claims that we are able to think – and that he derives his content externalism from (see Chapter 
1, §1.2) – would necessarily involve a posteriori judgement regardless of whether they are arrived at 
via the conviction or contemplation method.  
 Recall the case of Arthritic Alf. Alf is able to think thoughts that are expressible using a term, 
‘arthritis’, that Alf incompletely understands. He is unaware that the term ‘arthritis’ is only applicable 
to ailments of the joints. If Alf were to self-ascribe the thought ‘arthritis is not as bad as cancer’ via 
the conviction method, then he would do so through judging that arthritis is not as bad as cancer. Such 
a judgement should be a posteriori. If he were to self-ascribe the thought via the contemplation 
method, then he’d do so through judging that it is true or false that arthritis is not as bad as cancer. 
This would also constitute an a posteriori judgement. It would be a judgement that Alf makes about 
his socio-linguistic community. It is a judgement that there is this ailment, of which he suffers from, 
that is called ‘arthritis’ that certain things can be true or false with respect to.           
In Burge’s reading of Twin Earth, if Oscar were to self-ascribe the thought ‘water is wet’ via 
the conviction method, then he would do so by judging that water is wet, which is obviously a 
posteriori. If Oscar were to self-ascribe his thought via the contemplation method, then he’d do so 
through judging that it is true or false that water is wet. In making such a judgement Oscar will be 
making a judgement about his socio-linguistic community, and about the interactions that more 
scientifically literate members of his socio-linguistic community have had with a naturally occurring 
substance. Oscar will be judging that there is this naturally occurring substance called, by the 
members of the socio-linguistic community to which Oscar belongs, ‘water’, of which things can be 
true or false of, and of which there are members of his socio-linguistic who know a lot more than 
Oscar himself knows about its internal nature, and have a much better sense what should and what 
shouldn’t be considered ‘water’. The judgement will be simultaneously about what substances exist in 
Oscar’s external environment and about how there are more knowledgeable members of his socio-
linguistic community who are better able to classify, and have classified, such substances.        
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Finally, recall Burge’s ‘sofa’ thought experiment, in which there is a “Person A” who 
believes that sofas are a sort of religious artefact that would normally collapse if sat upon – i.e. has a 
“nonstandard theory” with respect to what ‘sofas’ are. If this person A were to self-ascribe the thought 
‘sofas normally collapse if sat upon’ via the conviction method, then he’d do so through judging that 
sofas normally collapse if sat upon. That judgement would obviously be a posteriori. If Person A were 
to self-ascribe the thought via the contemplation method, then he’d do so through judging that it is 
true or false that sofas normally collapse if sat upon. This judgement would also be a posteriori. 
Person A will be judging that there are things he encounters daily that his wider socio-linguistic 
community call ‘sofas’, and it will be true or false of these ‘sofas’ that they will normally collapse if 
sat upon. (Person A believes that his socio-linguistic peers are wrong about the nature of these 
artefacts and are thus wrong about what should be considered their defining characteristics. But, in the 
case of thought self-ascription, that is irrelevant.)   
As is the case mutatis mutandis with respect to the Millian/Kripkean view of singular thought, 
if Arthritic Alf were to use the conviction or contemplation methods to self-ascribe a relevant thought 
in the counterfactual scenario in which the term ‘arthritis’ encompasses a larger range of ailments – 
i.e. not just those that effect the joints – then that would still yield true self-ascriptions. The relevant 
second-order beliefs will have contents that are different but are reflective of the contents of the 
relevant first-order thoughts in such a way that that ensures their truth. The same will be true mutatis 
mutandis with respect to the other two Burgean cases.  
Now, there are an infinite number of primes. This is something that would be true even if the 
universe was such that it was incapable of producing complex life. More particularly, it would still be 
true if there were no beings in the universe capable of comprehending that there are an infinite 
number of primes. It would be preposterous to suppose that because there are an infinite number of 
primes, then that means that there is a very specific sentient being – presumptively the endpoint of a 
complex evolutionary history – who at a very specific moment in time thought the thought <there are 
an infinite number of primes>. It would be even more preposterous to suppose that because it is true 
or false that there are an infinite number of primes, then that means that there is such a being who at a 
very specific moment in time thought the thought <there are an infinite number of primes>.  Yet 
making such preposterous intellectual jumps is precisely what my proposed account of thought self-
ascription supposes that we do when we self-ascribe thought. To self-ascribe the thought <there are an 
infinite number of primes> a subject either judges that there are an infinite number of primes or that it 
is true or false that there are an infinite number of primes, and it is that what leads her to judge that 
she is presently thinking the thought <there are an infinite number of primes>.   
If a subject judges that she is thinking that there are an infinite number of primes, based on it 
being the case that there an infinite number of primes (or on it being true of false that there are an 




number of primes. It is guaranteed to be the case that she is thinking that there are an infinite number 
of primes. The proposed process is preposterous yet infallible. 
Despite that infallibility, it might be argued that, because subjects’ beliefs about what they are 
presently thinking are formed via such an epistemically dubious process such beliefs, therefore, 
cannot possibly count as knowledge. It might be argued further that regardless of what else it may 
hope to achieve – i.e. regardless of whether it demonstrates how we can have privileged access 
without a priori access – an account of thought self-ascription must allow that we can know our 
thoughts and thus if under my account we would not know our thoughts, then my account is ipso facto 
a failure. The response to this objection is to query whether the notion that we do have knowledge of 
our thoughts is so irrefutable. It may be the case that it is irrefutable that we are able to discern our 
own thoughts in a way that others cannot. But, must it also be the case that such discernment should 
jump through all the necessary epistemological hoops required for it to qualify as knowledge? There 
is an overarching point here. Even if we are to maintain that my account would confer knowledge, 
then we must still concede that there is something odd about that knowledge. Such knowledge would 
be acquired via our making a preposterous inference. The overarching point is that if we are to accept 
my account then we must choose between either conceding that there is something odd about the 
knowledge that we have of our thoughts, or conceding that it is odd that the provenance of our thought 
self-ascriptions is such that it can’t be said that we have knowledge of our thoughts. Either way, if we 
are to accept my account of thought self-ascription, then we must concede that thoughts, and the 
epistemic relationship we have with them, are – as already alluded to in the opening sentence of this 
thesis – indeed strange.  
My account of thought self-ascription if accepted may affect how we countenance ourselves 
as thinking beings in other ways that I won’t here try to articulate or explore further. It should suffice 
to say there is something very uncomfortable about my account of thought self-ascription. This does 
not mean that my account must therefore be untrue. An uncomfortable truth is still a truth. Or rather, 
just because an idea may be uncomfortable does not necessarily mean that it is therefore untrue.  
In any case, regardless of this discomfort, we do have our desired account of thought self-
ascription that allows that we can have a privileged access to our thoughts without that privileged 
access necessarily requiring us to have an a priori access to our thoughts. This in turn should allow for 
an acceptance of content externalism that is free of the worry that such an acceptance of content 
externalism might be incompatible with the claim that we should be able to discern what it is on our 
minds better than a third party ever could.         
 
7.5: Loose Ends  
 
7.51: The Three Reductios 




In chapters four, five, and six we considered reductio arguments that purport to show that if it is true 
that we have an a priori access to our thoughts, and if content externalism were true, then our having 
an a priori access to our thought would entail our having an a priori access to the external world. It is 
(hopefully) clear that this worry vanishes if my account of thought self-ascription is accepted, as my 
account denies that we need to have an a priori access to our thoughts. (We have a privileged access 
to our thoughts without needing an a priori access to our thoughts.) 
 Furthermore, the consequents of the conditionals that power the three reductios are essentially 
the sorts of things that according to my account we judge to be the case in order to ascertain what we 
are thinking. In each reductio the protagonist is ex hypothesi granted the a priori knowledge that they 
are thinking a certain thought. The protagonist is then shown to have a priori knowledge of a certain 
conditional that has as its consequent some fact about the external world of which it would be absurd 
suppose that they could have a priori knowledge of. Thus, it is shown that if the protagonist does 
indeed have the ex hypothesi a priori access to their thought, then absurdly they will know a priori the 
consequent of that conditional. According to my account the protagonists of each of the three 
reductios would not have an a priori access to the respective thoughts. Furthermore, the way in which 
the protagonists would ascertain that they are thinking what they are thinking is through their judging 
to be the case what it so happens are the consequents of the conditionals that power each of the three 
reductios. My account transforms what are apparently troublesome reductios into harmless and trivial 
cycles of ratiocination!  
Let’s run through the reductios in reverse order. The reductio in Chapter 6 involves a person 
deducing that Aristotle exists through ex hypothesi knowing a priori that they are thinking the thought 
‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’. According to my account the person would not be able to ascertain that 
they are thinking ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’ through a priori means. Instead, they would do so, if 
they were to do so via the contemplation method, through judging that Aristotle existed, and thus it is 
true or false of him that he was an alcoholic. Brown’s reductio centres around the conditional:    
 
S: Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of c, then either x is in an environment which contains instances of c and c is a natural 
kind concept, or x is part of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c is a natural 
kind concept. 
 
The consequent of S is roughly the sort of thing that from x’s point of view would need to be the case 
in order for a proposition involving c to be true or false, and thus what x would need to judge to be the 
case in order to self-ascribe a thought involving the concept c. For a proposition to be true or false the 




determinate application conditions. Because of x’s ‘agnosticism’ with respect to the application 
conditions of c, such a judgement will necessarily be about how the concept’s application conditions 
are determined by her external physical and socio-linguistic environment. Finally, Boghossian’s 
charge is that water would need to exist in order for there to be a concept ‘water’, in the way that a 
content externalist would understand it. Thus, if a subject is granted the a priori knowledge that she is 
thinking ‘water is wet’, she would be able to deduce via a priori means that water exists, which would 
be absurd. According to my account, such a subject would not ascertain that she is thinking ‘water is 
wet’ through a priori means. She would do so, if she went via the contemplation route, through 
judging that it is true or false that water is wet, which is to judge that there is a concept ‘water’. If 
such a concept is inextricably tied to the natural kind water in the way that Boghossian contends that 
content externalists must suppose that it is, then the judgement will effectively be that water exists.65   
 
7.52: The Problem of the ‘Empty’ Case  
 
Although my account seems to circumvent the three reductios, there is nevertheless a related problem 
that an adoption of my account may need to navigate, which is the problem of the ‘empty’ case. 
Suppose that I judge that it is true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic and based on that self-
ascribe the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’. Imagine now a counterfactual in which there is no 
‘Aristotle’, there isn’t even a fictional creation or perceptual illusion going by the name of ‘Aristotle’ 
(see Chapter 6, §6.3), but in which everything seems to me as it actually is.66 It would seem that the 
Kripkean externalist would need to accept an Evansian/McDowellian (Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1986) 
conclusion that within such a counterfactual scenario my self-ascription process would be illusory 
from start to finish. I could not be judging that it is true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic, and I 
could not be thinking that Aristotle was an alcoholic. I would nevertheless believe that I am self-
ascribing a bona fide thought. In the actual situation, in which Aristotle exists, I would also belief that 
I am self-ascribing a bona fide thought. In the actual situation that belief will be true, and crucially its 
 
65 It is conceivable that there may be – though I at present am unable to see it – a non-first-positionist account/conception of 
privileged access that like the non-first-positionist account outlined in the previous section allows for privileged access 
without a priori access – i.e. would envisage some sort of privileged access that does not necessarily have to be a priori. This 
rival account may be susceptible to the reductios in a way my account is not. Call the imagined method of thought self-
ascription Method M. Suppose that it is through Method M that I self-ascribe the thought water is wet. The a priori reasoning 
that the protagonist in Boghossian’s reductio (say) is meant to follow may then lead me to the conclusion that because I am 
thinking that water is wet water must therefore exist. Depending on the precise nature of Method M this may be deemed a 
problematic route to the conclusion that water exists, even though it won’t necessarily be entirely a priori. If that is so, then 
that is all the more reason to accept my account of thought self-ascription over this imagined rival account, as, for the 
reasons stated, this won’t be the case in the case of my account.         
66 One way of doing this would be to imagine that the universe is only a few seconds old – see Chapter 6, §6.3. 
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provenance is accounted for. It is a result of a chain of reasoning – or rather quasi-reasoning – that 
begins with my judgement that it is true or false that Aristotle was an alcoholic, that in turn leads me 
to judge that I am thinking the thought ‘Aristotle was an alcoholic’, and that in turn leads me to judge 
that I am thinking a bona fide thought. In the counterfactual situation the corresponding belief will be 
false, but that is not the problem. The problem is how do we account for the belief’s provenance. It 
cannot be due to the same chain of reasoning because in the counterfactual scenario in which there is 
no ‘Aristotle’ no such chain of reasoning can take place. Imagine three persons hanging from a cliff 
edge. The third person holds on to the second person’s ankles, who in turn holds on to the ankles of 
the first person, who holds on to the edge. If the first person is unable to keep their grip, all three 
persons fall to their deaths.  
 
7.53: Slow Switching 
 
Recall the case of Slow-Switching Sally. Slow-Switching Sally is routinely switched between Earth 
and Twin Earth, and consequently switches between thinking that water is wet to thinking that twater 
is wet. If Slow-Switching Sally were to self-ascribe the thought that water/twater is wet via either the 
conviction or contemplation methods, she would arrive at a guaranteed-to-be-true belief about what 
she is thinking, regardless of which planet she is on. Slow-Switching Sally, however, would not be 
able to discriminate between a situation in which she is on Earth and self-ascribes the thought: water 
is wet, and a situation in which she is on Twin Earth and self-ascribes the thought: twater is wet. In 
Chapter 3 of this thesis we considered whether cases such as those of Slow-Switching Sally challenge 
the claim that we should be able to know a priori what we are currently thinking. We assumed that we 
are able to form guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs about what we are thinking through a priori means, and 
we considered whether those guaranteed-to-be-true beliefs could count as knowledge in the light of 
slow-switch cases. Those same considerations should apply mutatis mutandis to the question of 
whether the guaranteed-to-be-true-but-in-the-case-of-the-sort-externally-individuated-thoughts-in-
question-not-a-priori beliefs that the conviction and contemplation methods would yield could fully 
qualify for the esteemed designation ‘knowledge’ (if content externalism is/were true). That is, if the 
considerations alluded to towards the end of the last section don’t already disqualify such beliefs from 
qualifying for that esteemed designation.  
 
7.54: Comparison with Burge’s ‘Cogito-Like Judgements’ Account of Thought Self-Ascription: A Cliff 
Hanger Resolved 
 
My account of thought self-ascription is similar to Burge’s account of thought self-ascription (Burge, 




relations between a thought and a judgement. I judge that I am thinking that writing requires 
concentration therefore I am thinking that writing requires concentration, and therefore my judgement 
is correct, or so Burge’s account goes. If I judge that writing requires concentration or that it is true or 
false that writing requires concentration, it will be the case that I am thinking that writing requires 
concentration. Thus, if my judgement that writing requires concentration, or that it is true or false that 
writing requires concentration, leads to me judging further that I am thinking that writing requires 
concentration, then that further judgement will be true, or so my account goes. 
 The key difference between my account and Burge’s account is that my account explains the 
provenance of our thought self-ascriptions. It may well be true that if I judge that I am thinking that 
writing requires concentration then I will be thinking that writing requires concentration, but Burge’s 
account does not explain why I’d judge that I am thinking that writing requires concentration in the 
first place. My account does. According to my account it is my judgement that writing requires 
concentration, or that it is true or false that writing requires concentration, that leads me to judge that I 
am thinking that writing requires concentration.  
      
7.55: The Redeployment Thesis 
 
What is known as the Redeployment Thesis (Peacocke, 1983; Sawyer, 2001; – see my Chapter 2)  
states that we should be able to form second-order beliefs about our first-order thoughts such that the 
content of such second-order beliefs should be reflective of the content of the first-order thoughts of 
which they are about in such a way that guarantees truth. The redeployment thesis requires there to be 
an appropriate belief-forming process or appropriate belief-forming processes by which a subject 
comes to form a belief about what she is presently thinking linking that belief to the thought that she 
is presently thinking. The conviction and contemplation methods are candidates for what those 
















If our having a privileged epistemic access to our occurrent thoughts required that we have an a priori 
access to our thoughts, then content externalism being incompatible with the claim that we do have an 
a priori access to our thoughts would pose a very serious problem for content externalism. It is 
possible though questionable that content externalism is incompatible with the claim that we should 
have an a priori access to our thoughts. However, it is not clear that our having a privileged access to 

















Armstrong, A (1968) A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge. 
Bach, K (1987) Thought and Reference, OUP. 
Beaney, M (ed.) (1997) The Frege Reader, Blackwell. 
Beebee, H (2001) ‘Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism’, 
Philosophical Quarterly, 51 (204) pp.356-374. 
Bernecker, S. (1996): ‘Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge’, Nous, 30, 
pp.262–275. 
Boghossian, P (1989) ‘Content and Self-Knowledge’, Philosophical Topics, 17, pp.5-26 (also in 
Ludlow and Martin, 1998) 
_____ (1997) ‘What the Externalist Can Know a Priori’, Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, 97, 
pp.161-175 (also in MacDonald et al, 1998).  
Bonjour, L (2003) ‘Back to Foundationalism’ in Bonjour, L and Sosa, E (eds.) (2003) Epistemic 
Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Blackwell. 
Bridges, J (2006) ‘Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 73 (2), pp.290-315.  
Brown, J (1995) ‘The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 55, 
pp.149-156 (also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998). 
_____ (1998) ‘Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities’, Mind, 107, pp.275-303. 
_____ (2001) ‘Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism’, Analysis, 61, pp.213-224. 
_____ (2004) Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MIT Press. 
Brueckner, A (1992) ‘What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori’, Analysis, 52, pp.111-118 (also in 
also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998).  
_____ (2002) ‘Anti-Individualism and Analyticity’, Analysis, 62, pp.87-91. 
_____ (2004) ‘Brewer on the McKinsey Problem’, Analysis, 64, pp.41-3. 
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
152 
 
_____ (2008) ‘Wright on the McKinsey Problem’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76 
(2), pp.385-391. 
_____ (2011) ‘A Defense of Burge’s “Self-Verifying Judgements”’, International Journal for the 
Study of Skepticism, 1:1, pp.27-32.  
Burge, T (1973) ‘Reference and Proper Names’, The Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp.425-439. 
_____ (1977) ‘Belief De Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp.338-362 (also in Burge, 2007). 
_____ (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4, pp. 73-121 (also in 
Burge, 2007). 
_____ (1982) ‘Other Bodies’, in Woodfield, A (ed.) Thought and Object, OUP (also in Burge, 2007).  
_____ (1986) ‘Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind’, Journal of Philosophy, 83, pp.697-720 
(also in Burge, 2007). 
_____ (1988) ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 85, pp.649-663, (also in 
Ludlow and Martin, 1998). 
_____ (1996) ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 
pp.91-116, (also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998). 
_____ (2007) Foundations of Mind, OUP.  
Carruthers, P (2011) The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, OUP. 
Chalmers, D (2003) ‘The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief’ in Smith, Q and Jokvic, A 
(eds.) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, OUP. 
Conee, E (1994) ‘Phenomenal Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp.136-150. 
Davidson, D (1987) ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings of the American philosophical 
Association, (also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998).  
_____ (2001a) Essays on Action and Events (2nd Edition), Clarendon Press. 
_____ (2001b) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2nd Edition), Clarendon Press. 
Davies, M (2003) ‘The Problem of Armchair Knowledge’ in Nuccetelli, 2003.    
Edgley, R (1969) Reason in Theory and Practice, Hutchinson. 
Evans, G (1982) The Varieties of Reference, OUP 
Fales, E (1996) A Defense of the Given, Rowman and Littlefield. 
Falvey, K (2000) ‘The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 60, 
pp.137-142.  
Falvey, K and Owens, J (1994) ‘Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism’, Philosophical 
Review, 103 pp.107-137. 
Feldman, R (2004) ‘Foundational Justification’ in Greco, J (ed.) (2004) Ernest Sosa and His Critics, 
Blackwell. 
Frege, G (1892) ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’ in Beaney, M (1997) The Frege Reader, Blackwell. 




Fitch, G and Nelson, M (2018) ‘Singular Propositions’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions-singular/>. 
Fumerton, R (1995) Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Rowman and Littlefield. 
Gallois, A (1996) The World Without, The Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority, 
Cambridge University Press.  
Gerken, M (2008) ‘Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?’, 
Philosophia, 36, pp.87-96. 
Gertler, B (2001) ‘Introspecting Phenomenal States’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
41, pp.91-112. 
_____ (2011) Self-Knowledge, Routledge. 
_____ (2020) ‘Self-Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/self-
knowledge/>. 
Gibbons, J (1996) ‘Externalism and Knowledge of Content’, The Philosophical Review, 105, pp.287-
310. 
Goldberg, SC (2000) ‘Is “I Am Presently Thinking That p” Self-Verifying?’ Presented at the Central 
States Philosophical Association Meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska. 
_____ (2003) ‘On Our Alleged A Priori Knowledge that Water Exists’ Analysis, 63, pp.38-41. 
_____ (2005) ‘An Anti-Individualistic Semantics For ‘Empty’ Natural Kind Terms’, Grazer 
Philosophische Studien, 70, pp.147-168.  
_____ (ed.) (2015) Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, Cambridge University Press. 
Goldman, A (1977) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 73, pp.771-
791. 
_____ (2006) Simulating Minds, OUP. 
Häggqvist, S and Wikforss, Å (2007) ‘Externalism and A Posteriori Semantics’, Erkenntnis, 67, 
pp.373-386. 
Horgan, H and Tienson, J (2002) ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of 
Intentionality’ in Chalmers, D (ed.) (2002) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, OUP USA. 
Jeshion, R (ed.) (2010) New Essays on Singular Thought, OUP.  
Kallerstrup, J (2011) ‘Recent Work on McKinsey’s Paradox’, Analysis, 71, pp.157-171. 
Kaplan, D (1989) ‘Demonstratives’ in Almog, J, Perry, J, and Wettstein, H (eds.) (1989) Themes 
From Kaplan, OUP. 
Korman, DZ (2006) ‘What Externalists Should Say about Dry Earth’, Journal of Philosophy, 103, 
pp.503-520. 
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
154 
 
Kripke, S (1982) Naming and Necessity, Blackwell. 
_____ (2011) ‘A Puzzle about Belief’ in Kripke, S (2011) Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, 
Volume I, Oxford Scholarship Online.  
_____ (2013) Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, OUP. 
Lasonen-AArnio, M (2006) ‘Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged 
Access is Not the Issue’, Dialectica, pp.433-445. 
Levine, J (2006) ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint’ in Alter, T and Walter, S 
(eds.) (2006) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness 
and Physicalism, OUP. 
Loar, B (1976) ‘Semantics of Singular Terms’, Philosophical Studies, 30, pp.353-377.  
Locke, J (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Historical text, multiple editions are 
available, no page numbers referenced). 
Lormand, E (1996) ‘Nonphenomenal Consciousness’, Noûs, 30 (2), pp. 242-261. 
Ludlow, P (1997) ‘On the Relevance of Slow-Switching’, Analysis, 57, pp.285-6 (also in Ludlow and 
Martin, 1998). 
_____ (2003) ‘Externalism, Logical Form and Linguistic Intentions’ in Barber, A (ed.) Epistemology 
of Language, OUP. 
Ludlow, P and Martin, N (eds.) (1998) Externalism and Self-Knowledge, CSLI Publications. 
Lycan, WG (1996) Consciousness and Experience, MIT Press. 
MacDonald, C (1998) ‘Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge’ in MacDonald et al, 1998. 
MacDonald, C, Smith, BC, and Wright, C (eds.) (1998) Knowing Our Own Minds, OUP. 
McDowell, J (1986) ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’ in McDowell, J and Pettit, P 
(eds.) (1986) Subject, Thought, and Context, OUP.  
McKinsey (1991) ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 51, pp.9-16.  
_____ (2007) ‘Externalism and Privileged Access are Inconsistent’ in McLaughlin, P and Cohen, J 
(eds.) Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 
McLaughlin, BP and Tye, M (1998a) ‘fExternalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge’ in MacDonald 
et al. 
_____ (1998b) ‘Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?’ Philosophical Review, 
107, pp.349-380. 
Moore, GE (1959) ‘Proof of the External World’ in Moore, GE (1959) Philosophical Papers, Allen 
and Unwin 
Moran, R (2001) Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton University 
Press. 
Noordhof, P (2005) ‘The Transmogrification of A Posteriori Knowledge: Reply to Brueckner’, 




Nuccetelli, S (ed.) (2003) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, MIT Press. 
Peacocke, C (1983) Sense and Content, OUP. 
_____ (1996) ‘Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 96, pp.117-158. 
Perry, J (1979) ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs, 13, pp.3-21 (Also in Perry (1993) The 
Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays, OUP). 
Pitt, D (2004) ‘The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 69, pp.1-36. 
Putnam, H (1975) ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’ in Putnam, H, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2: Mind, 
Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press. 
Quine, WVO (1951) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, The Philosophical Review, 60, pp.20-43 (also in 
Quine (1953) From a Logical Point of View, Harvard.) 
Recanati, F (1993) Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, Blackwell. 
Russell, B (1905) ‘On Denoting’, Mind, 14, pp.479-493. 
_____ (1910–11) ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 11, pp.108–128 (Also in Russell, B (1917) Logic and Mysticism and Other 
Essays, Allen and Unwin.) 
_____ (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, OUP. 
_____ (1921) The Analysis of Mind, Spokesman. 
Ryle, G (1949) The Concept of Mind, Penguin. 
Sawyer, S (1998) ‘Privileged Access to the World’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, pp.523-
533. 
_____ (2001) ‘In Defence of Burge’s Thesis’, Philosophical Studies, 107, pp.108-128. 
Salmon, N (1982) Reference and Essence, Blackwell. 
_____ (1986) Frege’s Puzzle, MIT Press. 
Schiffer, S (2005) ‘Paradox and the A Priori’ in Gendler, TS and Hawthorne, J (eds.) (2005) Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology Vol. I, OUP.  
Segal, G (2000) A Slim Book about Narrow Content, MIT Press. 
Segal, G (2001) ‘Two Theories of Names’, Mind and Language, 16, pp.547–563. 
Soames, S (1987) ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content’, Philosophical 
Topics, 15, pp.47-87. 
Spicer, F (2009) ‘On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking)’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 39, pp.137-160. 
_____ (2011) ‘Two Ways to be Right about What One is Thinking’, International Journal for the 
Study of Skepticism, 1:1, pp.33-44. 
Tye, M (1998) ‘Externalism and Memory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72, pp.77-94.   
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
156 
 
Tye, M and Wright, B (2011) ‘Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?’ in Bayne, T and Montague, M 
(eds.) (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology, OUP. 
Warfield, TA (1992) ‘Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism are Compatible’, Analysis, 52, 
pp.232-7 (also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998). 
_____ (1997) ‘Externalism, Self-Knowledge and the Irrelevance of Slow-Switching’, Analysis, 57, 
pp.282-4 (also in Ludlow and Martin, 1998). 
Wright, C (2000) ‘Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and 
Putnam’s Proof’, Philosophical Issues, 10, pp.140-163. 
_____ (2003) ‘Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference’ in Nuccetelli, 2003. 
_____ (2011) ‘McKinsey One More Time’ in Hatzimoysis, A (ed.) (2011) Self-Knowledge, Oxford 
Scholarship Online. 
 
Novel Referred To 
 
Stanislaw Lem, The Futurological Congress, trans. Michael Kandel, Harcourt. 
 
End of Thesis 
Word Count (including footnotes, excluding bibliography): 68,056 
 
I, the author (Simon Stubbs), confirm that the Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University’s 
Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means).  This work has not 
been previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.   
